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Preface: Transport is Interesting,
Again
Less than two decades into the new millennium, transport is
becoming interesting (again?). Such resurgence is why we initiated
this book in 2015. Revolutionary technical advances are taking root;
evolutionary social forces are responding; together, these
phenomena are changing how people access and exchange goods.
Transport and planning discussions are now being reshaped,
prompting even seasoned transport professionals to appear as
neophytes. Our aim with this work is straightforward: to reframe
the evolving nature of debates about transport and to shape
perspectives about the future of transport in cities.
Each person’s perspective is shaped by their own experiences.
Both of us have sat in Minnesota car dealerships on gray and snowy
April days while our so-called ’tickets to freedom’ received their
15,000 mile3 checkup. In these times, we have each contemplated 3 25,000 km
the volume of salt that the car was exposed to over the past year
and incremental quantities of rust our car accrued. We are not alone
in these experiences. They are familiar for those who have lived
north of the US’s Mason-Dixon line. In such gloomy environs, one
feels little joy associated with auto-mobility. One surprising
reflection on all of this is that little has changed in these respects (or
significantly improved) for as long as most people can remember.
The 1950s created the institutions and the financing tools needed
to greatly expand transport infrastructure. After the onset of the US
Interstate Highway System, the 1970s version of the Clean Air Act
aimed to address the environmental costs of cars, and subsequent
policies have had noticeable success in improving air quality. Public
transport, mired in ‘crisis’ since the 1950s, received a large infusion
of federal capital. Not surprisingly, transport planners in the 1980s
were vexed with suburban ‘gridlock.’ They spent time chasing
inexpensive strategies based on transport system and travel demand
management as the roll-out of the highway network slowed.
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Planning buzzwords in the 1990s focused on growth management
and concurrency (between development of land and the provision
of infrastructure), so that public facilities were ‘adequate.’
Proclaimed as the largest public works project in the world since
the Pyramids, there are good reasons the Interstate Highway Act left
many legacies. An oft unrealized impact, however, is that for the next
half-century, transport centered on the themes of deployment (rolling
out the highway network), and management (better operating the
system). Transport planning in the Interstate Era focused on more
roads here, removing bottlenecks there, better managing capacity
over yonder. Innovation, technological or policy, took a back seat.
So did doing anything exciting in transport.
The 1992 Highway Bill, more formally the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act,4 mildly deflected the highway centric4 The Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act is refreshingly abbreviated
ISTEA (and pronounced Iced Tea).
trajectory of US transport investments. Reducing the negative
externalities attributed to auto use received increased attention;
other modes received a boost of funding and acknowledgement.
The reaction against auto-mobility gained steam with the warning
whistle of rising greenhouse gas emissions and the observations of
climate change. In some cities, initiatives might center less around
reducing car use and more around enhancing other transport
options. Either way, less changed than one would have expected
given the revolution in information technologies over the same
period.
But now, starting in the 2010s, growing on seeds laid earlier,
rapidly transforming transport systems in communities of all sizes
are experiencing creative innovation. Globally, cities are witnessing
new forms of information and communication technologies coupled
with new real-time data enabling new approaches to share
resources. These changes are invoking fresh flows of goods and
information and allow people to achieve activities in ways
unavailable just a few years ago. Borrowing from Thomas Kuhn’s
popular 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, discussions
ring of a paradigm shift.5 Transport practitioners are encountering5 (Kuhn 1962).
anomolous new behaviors that the historically accepted paradigms
have difficulty explaining.
What is certain in the future is that humans will maintain desires.
Whether for stuff, skills, smarts, esteem, solace, security, salvation,
spirituality, space, scenery, love, or socializing, these desires and the
way they are accessed change with the times. Most desires have
historically been satisfied by moving stuff while traversing distances
across physical geographies. People transport themselves to collect
some things; they expect other things to come to them. Moving
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forward, there is heightened uncertainty about how they will seek
to access (or possess) things they care about it. What is paramount
for the transport business is to uncover ways to ease how these
desires are achieved in ways that comport with goals for which
cities claim to be aspiring (e.g., livability, environmental
preservation, social cohesion).
In this book we first explore the welcome notion that traffic – as
most people have come to know it – is ending and why. We depict a
transport context in most communities where new opportunities are
prompted by the collision of slow, medium, and fast moving
technologies. Fast moving technologies include computers and
communication technologies, especially adopted by younger
travelers. With an average life span of 11 years, cars would
represent medium-moving technologies. The topology of the road
network itself is the slowest moving of all, having been in place for
years and unlikely to change much in the future. We juxtapose
other changes likely to have a near-term impact, including a range
of emerging technologies, such as autonomous vehicles, electric
vehicles, transit improvements, and better networking of car and
cab sharing, referred to as mobility-as-a-service (MaaS).
We develop a framework to conceptualize transport and
accessibility more broadly. In this framework, transport systems are
being augmented with a range of information technologies.
More specifically, the first part paints a picture about the End of
Traffic: data, history, and trends. We focus on what has actually
happened (Chapter 1), why what is happening is a good thing (C.
2), the underlying causes (C. 3), how the inevitable conflicts between
the timeframes of change keep transportation practice lagging far
behind imagined transportation potential (C. 4).
The second part examines upcoming processes that are shaping
the future of transport, and their consequences: Electrification (C.
5), Autonomy (C. 6), Connectivity (C. 7), Mobility-as-a-Service (C.
8), Demassification (C. 9), Dematerialization (C. 10), Delivery (C. 11).
While these changes are still mostly too small have been measured
in the system statistics. We have begun to see the tip of the iceberg
in their transformative potential. We look at how even the laggard
transit modes will be affected (C. 12). Then, we consider changes to
land use (C. 13).
In the third part, the book builds to prescribe planning, finance,
and design strategies for communities themselves and more
specifically, those responsible for shaping the provision and use of
infrastructure in such communities to embrace that better reflect
changes. We prescribe new design aspects and priorities for
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rights-of-way consistent with the end of traffic (C. 14). We
recommend pricing strategies to accelerate the end of traffic (C. 15).
These might happen, but they cannot happen without active public
direction (unlike the technology changes of dematerialization,
electrification, automation, sharing, and cloud commuting, which
are on trajectories if not entirely independent of public policy
interventions, mostly so). Our last chapter (C. 16) charts paths
forward for how transport will redeem itself.
There are things that might happen on their own (with a minimal
amount of public policy interference). There are things the public
can make happen through directed policies. There are things the
public can prevent from happening with policy. We think the
culmination of results presents an optimistic perspective, though
some have referred to the ideas stated herein as “refreshingly
unromantic.” This scenario has causes and effects, and can be
compared with a status quo scenario (where traffic neither rises nor
falls much) and one where traffic resumes its once seemingly
remorseless march upward. We then offer priorities to accelerate
these trends. Why delay positive outcomes like the end of traffic
congestion, the end of tailpipe emissions, the end of car crashes,
and the end of having to pay attention while driving?
This work is far from the first book on the future of transport
issues, and we hope not the last. A similar work appeared almost
two decades ago by the person to whom this work is dedicated (Bill
Garrison); he offered observations back then which remain on-point
today, if slow to take root. The content herein derives from our
personal observations of and reflections on transport practice and
scholarship. The text grew largely out of David’s Transportist blog66 http://transportist.org.
which he has been writing since 2006; far fewer ideas may have
sprouted in Kevin’s blog, Vehicle for a Small Planet.77 http://vehicleforasmallplanet.com.
Our purview admittedly has three limitations. First, most
references and supporting data are United States focused.
International readers may appreciate the changing dynamics, but
will need to apply the concepts appropriately (easier done in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and in many parts of Europe).
Many of the trends are unfolding globally, albeit at different rates.
Second, the phenomena that we describe mostly apply to urban
transport systems from the developed world (sometimes referred to
as the West or the Global North, though it encompasses very east
and south places like Australia and New Zealand). Third, our
assessment and projections for several phenomena risk being a bit
cavalier in the interests of brevity and readability. This is not a
journal article. We would like it to be read. Some conjectures might
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be unsettling for a few people. We mitigate such ’brushing off’ by
documenting assumptions and relevant citations in the margins.
This third edition has some enhancements while still following
the format of the first two. We grew tired of coming up with
excuses for why we could not deliver copies to our parents or to
offer you a physical, signed copy. So we are pleased to partner with
the Network Design Lab and now offer a physical print edition; the
first two editions were released in e-versions only. We inserted
revisions throughout reflecting updates to data charts and further
graphics that support many of our arguments. And, we changed
the order of some text and combed other parts to ensure greater
readability and streamlining of ideas. Reviews of past editions of
this work appreciated the lively and personal nature of the writing.
We retained this feature.
Even if transport is not your bailiwick, there is something
interesting for you here. We aim for a quick read – and to
encourage you to think outside your immediate realm. By the end
of this book (this evening, if you so choose) you will appreciate the
changing times in which you live. You will, we hope, appreciate
what is new about transport discussions and how definitions of
accessibility are being reframed. You will be provided with new
ways to think about transport that syncs with a radically changing
landscape. Even if transport is not your bailiwick, we think there is
something interesting for you here because we conjecture about the
places where at least two-thirds of the global population will live by
2050 and how they will satisfy their daily needs. We hope you enjoy
reading our prospects.

What Happened to Traffic
Figure 4: What happened to
traffic? Photo by Kevin J. Krizek.
Dateline: June 29, 2056
Today marks the 100th Anniversary of the Interstate Highway Act
in the United States. Let’s reflect on how travel has changed over the
past century.
Remember traffic? It was only 40 years ago that residents across
the globe complained about getting stuck in traffic. Normal ‘around
town’ errands were ensnared in snarled interchanges. Remember
when it sometimes took three times longer to cross town than it
’should have?’
But even back then – and largely unnoticed by the naked eye –
new transport patterns were taking root. The significance of these
patterns, however, failed to be realized. Car traffic leveled off in the
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beginning of the century and has fallen fairly steadily ever since.
A few keen observers picked this up, but many transport agencies
were in denial at the time. Back then, analysts offered two possible
futures:
• The first forecast that per capita vehicle travel would pick up on
its upward path based on the previous century – a forecast
reminiscent of the proverbial ostrich with its sand-encased head.
• A second forecast acknowledged that per capita vehicle travel
remained flat, but one where overall traffic grew with population
increases. Major transport providers asserted the need for new
and wider roads, despite falling traffic overall. More capacity
demanded new resources, requiring additional revenues. Many
claimed that though private vehicle use was falling across the
developed world, on average, it wasn’t falling in their jurisdiction.
And, there were still unsolved problems that don’t go away just
because travel isn’t increasing.
Most public officials failed to anticipate what actually happened.
This third future was one where per capita vehicle travel fell
significantly. Even acknowledging the initial dip in travel (at least in
the US), most observers attributed it to gas prices and the Little
Depression of the second Bush Presidency. What went largely
unrealized was that travel began dropping before the economy
tanked.
Remember work? Our great-grandparents (of the World War II
era) went to their job six days a week, only taking off for the
Sabbath, from the time when they were teenagers. And, their
parents worked from childhood, which had yet to be invented. The
workforce generally got a full two-day weekend in the middle of the
twentieth century. Around the turn of the century, many companies
started granting every-other Friday off (the 5/4 schedule). The
3-day weekend was celebrated every other week as the norm.
About a decade ago, workers moved to a 9 hour day, 4 days per
week at the office, and the other 4 hours were ‘at home’ work. The
rise of the Internet dissolved the once strict separation of home and
work. The half of the population that worked in offices could no
longer leave work at the office. So they brought their personal lives
into the workplace, living what sociologists call the ‘blended life.’
By 2025 taking every-other Monday off (the 4/3 schedule) was
established for office-workers at most large firms. Today, half-days
on Wednesdays are common for many office workers, with only
Tuesdays, Wednesday, and Thursdays as interactive collaboration
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days. In today’s ‘flipped’ office, people file ‘paperwork’ at home on
their own computers, and only show up for collaborative work and
meetings.
Remember office buildings? Once the heart of cities, we soon
discovered high-rise office towers were overbuilt after real-time
telecommunication became ubiquitous. Office buildings were
reconfigured to be mostly meeting space, with some interim work
spaces that became more like cafes or pubs than the cubicles
satirized in the 20th century comic strip Dilbert and the turn-of-the
century movie Office Space. After the commercial real estate bubble
popped in the famous Skyscraper Crash, many office buildings
were torn down or adapted into living space, others remain vacant.
With the daily office grind being a phenomenon of the past, work
trips cratered.
Remember the ‘American Dream’ of a house in the
suburbs? Some downtowns were virtually abandoned by business
after the Skyscraper Crash. This helped undercut new residential
construction in the suburbs, and suburban land prices fell,
attracting lower income immigrants, who subdivided large tract
mansions into housing for large extended families, and leading to a
measurable ‘white-flight’ back to the center city, as former
suburbanites colonized vacant and reconfigured office buildings.
While the suburbs were now less expensive, some actually gained
population. Lower income residents still own cars, but not as many.
The traditional 2- and 3-car garage is being transformed into a
workshop, living space, or small store. More urban living, much of
it in abandoned and remodeled office buildings, reduced the
distances people needed to travel. Many 20-somethings live in these
windowless, but well-connected, skyscraper dorms, while artists
have begun to occupy and see inspiration in the detritus of the late
20th century skyway network. Cities began to encourage accessory
housing, and conversion of garages to apartments.
Remember the long-term career? On average, our parents and
grand-parents stayed in the same industry (if not the same firm)
from high school or college until age 65 or so. Now in 2056, half the
population doesn’t enter the regular workforce until age 30. The
other half leaves well before age 60. They work three different
‘full-time’ jobs over the course of a career. Individual firms used to
cultivate employees, paying for training. Now a 10-year series of
unpaid (or low-wage) internships while simultaneously attending
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school online or part-time and engaging other pursuits is the norm.
Many just receive the Universal Basic Income and have dropped out
of the conventional workforce altogether. Over time, the workforce
has continued its drop as technology-enabled productivity reduced
the value of older workers. With fewer people working, there were
fewer work trips.
Remember shopping? Physically traveling to a store used to be
the norm for everything. Then came catalogs. Catalogs morphed on
the Internet (remember the Amazon.com boom?). Acquiring things
now is now clearly a combination of the occasional physical trip to
the store (likely for nostalgia-sake or simply entertainment), letting
’bots and virtual agents do the work for you especially for regular
stocks like paper towels, napkins, and Spam. And so now most
goods get delivered. Going shopping continues its long 50 year drop,
and consumption of material goods has declined with it.
Remember advertising? Internet Adblockers, video-on-demand,
and other time-shifting technologies diminished advertising in
people’s lives. Ads did not disappear, and many companies now
want to coat road surfaces with new digital ad-delivery technology.
Cash-strapped road agencies are looking favorably on sponsored
roads. With less window shopping and a decline in advertising, the
culture became less materialistic.
Remember long-distance trucking? Decentralized
manufacturing, including 3-D on-demand printing, has begun to
replace long-distance shipping of many goods, which can now be
made locally. Teamsters used to steer the truck, which are now
controlled remotely. Trucking as a profession has seen a long
decline.
Remember owning a car? Nearly a century ago, owning a
Pontiac Firebird (or better yet, a Corvette) meant having ‘made it,’
at least in the US. By 40 years ago it was possible for most
city-dwellers to sell their cars and not replace them. By 30 years
ago, it become common-place. The taxi – the ultimate in shared
vehicles – was transformed from a niche mode to the mainstream.
Instead of having a high cost of owning a car but a very low cost
per trip, now there is a higher cost per trip, making people think
twice, and use cars less. With fewer trips by car, traffic dropped
even more.
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Remember the SUV? The Sport Utility Vehicle and pickup truck
were used for daily transportation by nearly half the population,
though few of them transported much in the way of goods. With
vehicles on-demand, when people use cars, they ride in
single-passenger cars, saving money and space.
Remember driving in downtown? Cities began to outright ban
cars within core areas. Since most residents did not own cars, this
became an easy political sell. In those cities, walking, bike, scooter,
and bus use soared. This affected not only residents, but anyone
going to the city. Cars remain popular for trips outside of cities, but
there are fewer cars, fewer car trips per resident, and relatively fewer
non-city residents.
Remember traffic lights? Without traffic lights, we never
would have managed to obtain urban auto-mobility. It was critical
scaffolding for the twentieth century auto-dominated city. Today
they are preserved in selected districts only for their historic
authenticity, not as actual control devices. Traffic is now controlled
by signals conducted invisibly through radio spectrum, rather than
with colored lights designed for the human driver’s eyes, while
discrete in-ground sensors detect and guide pedestrians across busy
intersections. Today’s downtowns are largely car-free zones, so
these new controllers are just at the edge of the urban core.
Remember gas stations? We used to pour liquid petroleum into
the tanks of our cars, and burn gasoline for energy, creating smog
and greenhouse gases as unwanted byproducts. Today all new cars
and trucks are electric, and the gas guzzlers have largely been
removed from the road. It will take decades for the environment
and climate to recover from the more than a century of pollution.
Remember waiting for the bus? Most areas built before 1950 in
the US (now housing roughly one-third of the US population) have
seen significantly improved transit service, with real-time
information about arrivals and schedules. With more urban
residents and fewer cars, the demand for transit picked up.
Agencies were able to run more buses with the uptick in demand,
further encouraging bus use, and now bus-powered urban transit
agencies (some of which have a few legacy rail lines) are one of the
few profitable branches of government. New autonomous buses
powered by now widespread renewable energy have lowered costs.
Transit organizations now see ridership levels they last saw in the
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1940s. Buses in the suburbs were canceled though.
Remember seeing the highway? Without the urban interstate,
today’s cities would look much different. For freight, we are now in
a world with self-driving delivery vehicles and aerial drones that
our parents scoffed at. Through traffic could always avoid the central
city, to traffic can be carried on surface streets as needed. Vehicles
are considered a nuisance when they are seen or heard, even when
they are safe and clean. Today’s freeways have been rebuilt as
high-capacity tunnels, carrying not-only driverless but especially
passenger-less vehicles. Construction of course was costly (and
disruptive), but with advances in robotic tunneling technology,
further automation, and the right economic model, this was justified
in cities across the world.
Remember parking your car? We eliminated most urban parking
lots and garages, both because cars can drive farther away to park,
and because shared vehicles can be in motion for much more of the
day. Urban space is too valuable to let it by used by idle cars. Cars
now drop you off near your destination and go on their way.
Remember free roads (and free parking)? Strangely, we
didn’t used to charge for the use of roads, or for parking cars, and
then complained when roads were congested and people spent
minutes cruising around blocks looking for spaces to park their
cars. In the early 2020s, the two-decade long decline in Gas Tax
revenue due both to declining demand and increasing electrification
of the fleet finally enabled the push for mileage fees. With the New
Rationalism movement, economists implemented their most
cherished idea, and most radical change on society: charging for
roads. First it was implemented for the new electric vehicles, which
didn’t pay gasoline taxes, but then for all cars after EVs came to
dominate. By 2025 the government enacted a number of reforms to
get the federal government out of local transportation, and
encourage states to toll their highways. While gas taxes were
eliminated, refinery taxes were implemented. The government also
put in place carbon and other externality taxes to replace income
taxes. More importantly, agencies implemented off-peak discounts,
with higher peak prices. Trips that were not urgent at rush hour on
Tuesday, Wednesday, and especially the very busy Thursday
afternoon in the summertime turned out not to be particularly
urgent at all, and total travel dropped more. These pricing reforms
finally drove the knife into the heart of traffic congestion. While
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there was grumbling, and a few riots, almost everyone valued their
own time more than they realized.
Looking forward, transport academics at the University of
Sydney’s new Boulder campus foresee that new light-weight
robo-copters will make roads and tunnels obsolete, and people will
just take off vertically from their driveway or roof, and go anywhere
they want. With newly-low cost housing conveniently available in
rural areas, maybe living in cities loses some allure, and travel will
rise rapidly again.
But no one thinks congestion is coming back; life is too short to
waste sitting in traffic.

Part I
History

1
Climbing Mount Auto: The Rise of
Cars in the 20th Century
Figure 1.1: Ford Model T.
Source: Wikipedia.
In the early 20th century, automobile commuters brushed
elbows along cluttered streetscapes with meandering pedestrians,
righteous wagon drivers, streaming electric streetcars, and
antagonistic horsemen. Rutted roads of gravel and dirt posed other
challenges. Amidst this chaos, a new prospect was viewed from
afar. Spurred by technological innovation, this new vision invoked a
radical process to restructure streets, cities, and society.
Governments, consumers, and auto-makers sighted prospects of a
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peak in the distance. Atop it supposedly contained wealth, freedom,
happiness, and everything in between.
In 1924, a Chevrolet cost $525.
(History 2017) Today a Malibu is about
$20,000. Similarly the wage in 1924
was $0.56/hour (Wolman 1930) for a
manufacturing worker, and today is
$19.70/hour. (Trading Economics 2017)
So the number of hours to buy a car has
gone from 937 to 1015 (or essentially
remained flat). Of course the Chevy
today is much better and more reliable;
and many more people have higher
incomes than manufacturing workers,
so more people could afford cars, and so
did.
Henry Ford began rolling a Model T off the assembly line in 1908
in the US. By 1911 one was produced every fifteen-minutes; 1923
saw one every 15 seconds (off of multiple assembly lines). Mass
automobility spawned new strategies to reach that peak. The
commoner could now acquire a car with four months of work.
From the 1920s onward, the automobile was increasingly the
dominant mode of travel in the US.
While the Great Depression slowed the auto’s growth, it did not
result in decline. Despite the brief downturn during World War II
and a few hiccups here and there,1 the pursuit to climb this
1 These brief slow downs in the
inexorable rise in vehicle travel are
usually attributed to the oil supply and
price shocks in 1973-4 (Yom Kippur
War), 1979-1981 (Iranian Revolution),
early 1990s (Gulf War), and early 2000s
(9/11).
uncharted territory was resolute. More than a dozen US Housing
Acts spread over the 1930s, 40s, and 50s made it easier than ever to
buy the pristine suburban home. General Dwight Eisenhower, while
serving as Supreme Commander during World War II, witnessed
the Autobahn in Germany. Recalling his earlier military convoys
across the nascent American highway system after World War I, he
recognized the military value of limited access highways. President
Dwight Eisenhower helped marshal resources for the US to build a
comparable system to that in Germany. The Interstate Highway bill
had been mired in Congress for nearly a decade, stuck in debates
about how to pay for it, much like his convoy had been mired on
the dirt roads and collapsing bridges of post-World War I America.
Coupled with policies in 1949 to stimulate ‘urban redevelopment,’
later broadened in 1954 to ‘urban renewal,’ monumental changes
took root in cities. For Americans, this new roadscape meant
accumulating more travel by car than other modes, or than
anywhere else in the world.
Tectonic forces reinforced a continued march up what became
Mount Auto. These forces include increases in:
Population. As there were more people, there was more collective
daily travel to everyday destinations like work, school, and the store.22 The population of prime working age
peaked around 2000.
Workforce participation. More women started working outside
the home.
Income. With money, people can satisfy wants in addition to needs,
and the means by which that income is acquired (work) required
more travel as well.
Auto mass production. Ford’s process spread widely, thereby
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dropping the relative price of auto-mobility.
Developed area. Urban renewal gutted blighted and working
neighborhoods alike. Metropolitan areas accommodated the
automobile, new residential lots (and the houses sitting on them)
got bigger. So did shops and offices – all of which were surrounded
with parking lots.
Road networks. Roads better accommodated the car by getting
wider, sparser, and more tree-like; new limited access freeways were
constructed. Cars, and improved transport generally, made it easier
for more people to reach more places in less time. By extending
one?s reach, meant more choices, more specialization, more division
of labor and more economic activity. Faster travel and more direct
routes are half of this. Where people locate relative to the places they
want to go is the other half.
With more people attaining automobility, increasing distances (to
attain larger lots and bigger buildings for less money) were
compensated by faster speeds. So destinations became less
convenient for the carless – the farther things are spread out, the
less effective is walking or public transit – and thus making cars
even more valuable. The growth in infrastructure supply fed the
growth in demand; the ascent to the summit of Mount Auto was
relentless.
Evoking the idea perhaps first popularized by Lewis Mumford,3
3 Mumford’s 1955 essay called:
“Renewed Circulation, Renewed
Life” can be found in the book The
Roaring Traffic’s Boom (Mumford 1955).
This title referred to Mitchell and
Rapkin’s Urban Traffic: A Function of
Land Use (Mitchell and Rapkin 1954).
The more formal name for the Iron Law
of Congestion or Triple Convergence
is now ‘Induced’ or ‘Latent Demand.’
The use of these terms has become
politicized. ‘Induced’ demand implicitly
blames the freeway for more congestion.
‘Latent’ implies the demand was always
there, and is now able to be realized. In
any case, the whole concept is obvious
from a micro-economics perspective.
Both phenomena simply move the
supply curve down and to the right on
a downward sloping demand curve.
Traffic engineers typically assume that
new infrastructure does not change the
demand for which they are designing.
Sometimes the discussion is broadened
a bit and goes by the ‘Cycle of Auto
Dependence.’ All underscore the same
thing. See: (Levinson and Krizek 2007)
for a textbook explanation.
Tony Downs, in his 1992 book Stuck in Traffic,4 described what he 4 (Downs 1992).
coined the ‘Iron Law of Congestion.’5
5 While the ‘Iron Law of Congestion’
(induced demand) implies that supply
creates its own demand, this is true only
to a point, while demand is growing
faster than supply can accommodate it.
If demand were not supply constrained,
as in many rural areas where roads are
well-below capacity, there is no induced
demand. If demand is falling for other
reasons, even if supply is rising, induced
demand stumbles. And once maturity
has set in and all the low-hanging fruit
(high-benefit, low-cost projects) have
been picked, the net cost of projects rises,
fewer and fewer roads get built.
By expanding capacity (i.e., building a road), much, though
rarely all, of the additional capacity gets used in the short term by
people switching routes, modes, and time of travel. Longer term
impacts (i.e., development or behavior change) further reinforce the
phenomenon.
The race to the summit of Mount Auto in the US persisted for
almost a century owing the supposed ‘joys of automobility.’6 But
6 Mel Webber wrote a paper “The Joys of
Automobility” (Webber 1992) in (Wachs
and Crawford 1992) that argued that
people rationally preferred the auto
because of its flexibility and efficiency.
more recently – since the mid 2000s – climbers have been ambling
around atop this peak of Mount Auto, asking ‘now what?’
Clouds have obscured their vision for years. Reports from the
Department of Transportation, at least in the US, say they are losing
elevation.
Figure 1.2 reveals that vehicle travel per person dipped for most of
the 2000s and the early 2010s (total vehicle travel has dipped too, but
not as severely owing to population gains). Per-capita vehicle travel
is roughly where it was in the late 1990s and total vehicle travel
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Figure 1.2: Climbing Mount
Auto. The graph shows both
linked and unlinked transit
trips, as the way transit trips
are counted has changed, and
there is no continuous series
of both over the entire period.
Source: (US Census Bureau
1992; Highway Statistics 2016). V
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only surpassed the 2007 peak in 2014 even with steadily increasing
population. Context helps put the significance in perspective. These
trends follow 90 years of steady, almost uniform increases in the
amount of automobile traffic. Barring a few exceptions owing to
war, economic downturns, or energy shocks, vehicle travel increased
almost every year in the US for the entire twentieth century.
When humans ascend new peaks, it is a celebrated event. For
example, during the writing of the first edition of this work, the
rock climbing world was in awe witnessing the determination of two
individuals, in January of 2015, who became the first ever to free
climb the entire Dawn Wall in Yosemite National Park in the US.77 (Bisharat 2015).
Has the true peak of Mount Auto been discovered? Is the decline in
car use permanent? Should it be celebrated?
Some transport analysts suggest the peak is similar to what
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happened to fixed route transit service in the US (which is now well
below one-fifth of its previous importance as described in Chapter
12). Others claim it is a brief hiatus from the steady march of
increasing per capita vehicle travel that followed the same drumbeat
almost continuously from 1910 to 2000. Some call the recent
patterns of vehicle travel ‘trendlets.’ But what has gone largely
unrealized was that travel began dropping before the economy
tanked.
History will be the ultimate arbiter. However, this much is clear:
evidence for ‘Peak Travel’ has been mounting.8 This does not mean 8 (Millard-Ball and Schipper 2011; Metz
2013).there will never be a year in which car travel again rises (It rose
overall and on a per capita basis in 2014-2016, for instance, years
with an expanding economy and falling fuel prices). As Figures 1.3
and 1.4 show, car ownership per capita, and paved roads per capita
are also down.
What about other dimensions of what has historically been called
travel? The best source for reliable, recent, and aggregate statistics
in this regard for the US comes in the form of the American Time
Use Survey. This data source, starting in 2003 and for every year
thereafter, tallies the amount of time Americans spend in various
activities, including travel for ten different purposes as shown in Figure
1.5. For a full decade’s worth of data, it draws the same sketch. The
amount of time spent in travel has declined six minutes – from 74.4
minutes to 68.4 minutes per day.
And as shown in Figure 1.6, at a more disaggregate level, persons
born in the most recent cohorts are traveling shorter distances than
people born earlier at the same point in their life. Similarly persons
born in the most recent cohorts make fewer trips than persons born
in earlier decades at the same age. We are not talking just about
Millennials; this is true of Generation X as well.
Almost all things appear to be going down. Little is going up.
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Data are suggesting that many people are driving less and ironically,
Americans are leading the charge in this respect. In the absence
of further external events (economic, technological, demographic, or
social), the curve appears to have peaked, or at least plateaued.
Does auto-mobility indicate progress? Some economists point to
high historic correlations between auto use and economic growth
(Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) to argue that a drop in one affects
the other. Few people support declining GDP. The transport industry
(car-makers, road-builders, service operators) has long insisted that
“What is good for General Motors is good for America.”9 In short,9 More precisely, Charles Erwin Wilson,
in confirmation hearings to be Secretary
of Defense, said:
“For years I thought that what
was good for our country was good
for General Motors, and vice versa.
The difference did not exist. Our
company is too big. It goes
with the welfare of the country.
Our contribution to the nation is
considerable.”
more is better: more cars, roads, and shipments are all better. On
a personal level, many people see less auto-mobility as a threat to
their personal quality of life – automobility provides most people
with freedom and value – the ability to engage in daily activities at
less time or out-of-pocket cost than current alternatives.
These arguments are short lived, however. Those in the transport
industry are being slowly (and rudely) awakened from their
dogmatic slumber by innovations from outside the sector. There is
good reason to celebrate the discovery of the summit of Mount
Auto. Not only can the climbers get onto more productive
endeavors, but less traffic is good thing. Economies are changing. The
old standby argument that society requires mobility to fuel
economic growth is being undermined. The longtime correlation
between GDP and distance traveled has broken.10 In fact, it would10 (McMullen and Eckstein 2012; Badger
2015).
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be quite depressing if it were otherwise, indicating that society
cannot make the economy more energy-efficient or time-efficient.
New transport patterns are taking root. If only there were a
single possible significant technological or social shift, these changes
might be predictable. But most societies, at least most those who
have been industrialized for some time, are currently dealing with
several – and simultaneous – shifts in play. Perched from the vantage
near the Peak of Mount Auto, both technological and social forces
clouding a view of a prospective Mount Next.
There is a convincing signal that driving, travel, and
technology are behaving differently. Technology has
devastated many industries. Remember, back in the day, when print
newspapers, travel agents, post offices, record albums, paper books,
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land-line phones, and broadcast television mattered? We do not
claim that technology is devastating travel in exactly the same way.
Quoting Mark Twain, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does
rhyme.”
Rather, technology is restructuring transportation in ways
different from the past. There is always more to the story. In the
end, traffic – and the automobile regime – as most have come to know
and both love and hate it, are both demonstrating considerable signs
of instability. A death may be coming. Just as cars rose to greatness
in 20th Century America, it appears as if they are now experiencing
wounds from several daggers.
2
Less Traffic is a Good Thing
Figure 2.1: Multimodal
environments, even with
separated bicycle facilities,
tend to favor the automobile,
as in this scene from Medellin,
Colombia. Photo by Kevin J.
Krizek.
My automobility is your traffic. And, if demand (the number
of cars making trips) outpaces supply (the amount of roadway
available), then congestion results. Such dynamics are efficient to a
point; they help spread the cost of road construction and
maintenance over more drivers. In the absence of any other drivers,
you would not enjoy a road network. Exceeding a threshold,
however, congestion kicks in, causing delays. The most widely
experienced negative outcome from auto-mobility within the
transport realm is wasted time. But angst, frustration, and of
course, being late for dinner are other effects.
More generally, using cars imposes negative costs beyond
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inconvenience for the carless and congestion for the motorist. In
economic terms, we refer to this as the full costs of travel. The full
benefits are largely internalized, those who travel get them. The
costs are partially internalized – travelers pay for their own time,
their car (which is often a significant share of income), their
gasoline, their insurance, and some of the cost of infrastructure.
Drivers don’t pay for all of the cost of roads and bridges just as
transit fares don’t cover the cost of transit service. Additional
externalities are not fully accounted for by drivers when traveling.
Below we outline arguments that demonize cars – arguments that
the two of us have heard over the past two decades. While all costs
need to be considered with offsetting benefits, from our current
position, we explain why a community – your community – with
fewer cars and less traffic is better.
Our colleague Julian Marshall reminds
us:
“Just as estimating deaths from
air pollution is inexact (no death
certificate says ‘air pollution’ as
cause of death; instead rates of
outcomes like heart attacks are
elevated slightly in the presence
of air pollution), so too it is
inexact to estimate contributions
from specific sectors (e.g., road
transport) to the air pollution
total. Some PM2.5 is emitted
directly and some pollution forms
in the atmosphere from chemical
reactions of precursor emissions;
the latter type (called ‘secondary
PM2.5’) is harder to attribute.”
Table 2.1: Deaths per 100,000
people.
Annual Transport Pollution
Deaths 15 36
Years lost 653 565
Units: Deaths per year per 100,000
people.
Pollution: Deaths due to ambient
particulate matter and Ozone, not just
transport-related pollution deaths.
Transport: Deaths due to road injury
plus other transport injury and is
comprehensive. This includes things like
driving off a cliff as well as driving into
pedestrians.
Cars crash. Cars collide – with each other, and crash into
pedestrians and bicyclists and buses and trains and inanimate
objects, and just about anything you can imagine. These crashes still
kill over 30,000 Americans (and over one million people globally)1
1 (Global Health Observatory 2010).
each year, and maim countless others. The numbers in the US have
declined significantly for a variety of reasons: better cars, better
emergency response, less drinking and driving, better roads, but are
still too high. While most fatal car crashes are not during congested
periods, congested traffic goes slower and thus cars are less likely to
collide at high speed, crashes do rise and fall with the number of
cars on the road, and are a source of what the industry calls
’non-recurring’ congestion, compared to the daily ’recurring’
congestion because too many cars are trying to use the same road at
the same time.
Cars pollute. This is mostly a consequence of the present engine
technologies based on the internal combustion engine and the type
of fuel used. However, electrification of the fleet without
simultaneous conversion of electric generators to clean or renewable
sources may be counter-productive.2 Estimates of deaths from
2 (Economist 2014) discussing our
colleagues’ work (Tessum et al. 2014).
motor vehicle pollution are on the same order as the number of
fatalities from crashes now, although the deaths due to pollution
affect a different segment of the population, disproportionately the
old and the young, see Table 2.1. There are other sources of
pollution besides the tailpipe. When your tires wear down, where
does all that worn out rubber go? (Hint: you might be breathing
some of it).3
3 Recycled tires go to many different
places, such as being recycled into
furniture or balls or astroturf, in addition
to being burned, but the rubber that just
wears off your tires is pure pollution.
The Global Burden of Disease Study4 for 2010 produces the4 (IHME 2014).
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results shown in Table 2.1. Those numbers include only fine
particles (PM2.5) and ozone. Using those numbers, air pollution is
worse than crashes in terms of total deaths, but not in terms of
years of life lost. Car crashes are feared more than air pollution
from traffic, but emissions are not something to be sanguine about.5 5 An MIT study comes up with more
annual deaths from air pollution at
about 200,000 per year in the US
(rather than the 100,000 or so the
GBS study implies). Air pollution
deaths (premature strokes, heart attacks,
lung problems, and so on) on average
shortens life by 10 years per person who
dies from air pollution. Car crashes are
more likely to shorten life of younger
persons, hence the greater years of life
lost per death. See (Caiazzo et al. 2013).
Our temperaments of course are affected
by the air we breathe.
Noise annoys. All noise has real economic, physiological and
mental health effects; the effects of car noise tend to be even more
acute. Hundreds of studies confirm that prices for homes near
freeways (and airports) are lower than otherwise similar homes
farther away, suggesting the damage of noise pollution.
Cars isolate. From spatial, psychological, and equity
perspectives, cars isolate people more than other modes.6
6 While fully acknowledging that, given
the prevailing land use structure in most
communities, cars serve the principle
means of connectivity.
Straightforward geometry suggests that lower development
densities prompt more driving between destinations and lower
accessibility for modes like walking. From an equity standpoint, the
argument is more clear. The land use structure in many suburban
communities, for example, favors car use, which is more expensive
than other modes. This prices out some who become the carless.
Thus, an auto-dependent land use system makes driving a
necessity; it has even been thought of as a right, not to be lightly
taken away by municipal court. Automobiles stratify society and
exclude the less mobile.7 Psychologically, cars effectively put a 7 (Preston and Rajé 2007).
barrier between the user and the environment. The enclosure of the
car physically isolates the driver from her surroundings. Some cities
have become so stratified that mass transit is the only space where
individuals from different socio-economic strata cross paths.
Figure 2.2: The state of Ohio
is equivalent to the paved area
of the United States. Source:
Wikipedia.
Cars consume lots of space. One estimate of the total
impervious surface (primarily roads and parking) in the US puts it
at 43,000 squares miles (111,000 km2), just a bit smaller than the
state of Ohio (Figure 2.2).8 Paved area has environmental
8 (Frazer 2005).
implications: less pervious surface to filter water, more pavement to
absorb heat; direct costs: paving roads and parking, asphalt and
concrete production and construction; and opportunity costs: land
that is paved for roads and parking cannot be easily used for
something else, money spent paving that land cannot be used for
something better.
Advances in technology will weaken some of these
arguments about less traffic being a good thing. We
discuss some impacts in later chapters of this book. Information
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technologies and new economic models of car use and ownership,
transit use and ownership, and road management and ownership
will allow cities to be more efficient using fewer resources: fewer
cars, less pavement, better capacity utilization, less need to travel in
the first place, and new (old) models of logistics.
3
What Killed America’s Traffic?
Figure 3.1: Murder on the Orient
Express.
In 1934, popular mystery writer Agatha Christie published
Murder on the Orient Express.1 To spoil the ending, she places the 1 (Christie 1934).
responsibility of one man’s death not on the shoulders of a single
individual, but rather, atop the shoulders of many. Some transport
analysts attribute the changes to per capita travel demand to
changing levels of employment and fuel prices. Further, the slower
rate of road construction limits the amount of induced demand that
may have driven travel growth earlier. Such reasons, certainly, are
part of the whole package, but they cannot explain everything. Like
Christie, we charge several culprits who have cumulatively
contribute to the crime of ‘killing,’ or at least maiming, traffic.
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3.1 Changing Demographics
Figure 3.2: Age pyramid in US
2014. Source: (Rogers 2016).
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Both Kevin and David are Generation X (born 1964-1983)2 – a2 It is important to recognize there
is no official definition ‘generations,’
and different analyses use different
time periods. Our usage is defined
by consistent 20 year periods. The
term ‘Generation X’ was popularized by
Douglas Coupland in an entertaining
book of the same title. (Coupland 1991).
group that has not radically affected aggregate transport behavior.
But the two generations flanking us – historically the two largest
current demographic groups in the US (see Figure 3.2) – are now
helping to diminish driving. These groups have received the most
attention in discussions about travel and the future of cities.3
3 (APA 2014). Millennials (or Generation Y) (born 1984-2003) are America’s largest
generation. It is larger in number than the Generation X cohort that
preceded it and decidedly more diverse (less white) than any
American generation that has come before, with a larger share of
immigrants. As with all generations, Millennials carry new
attitudes about communications, sharing, and urban lifestyles.
Relative to previous generations, they are objectively less
car-focused;4 their transport behaviors reduce driving.4 (US PIRG 2014).
The Baby Boomers (born 1944-1963) now comprise a slightly
smaller share of the population than their children and
grand-children. They have been emptying their nests for years now
and are slowly dying off. The extent to which they move to central
cities as opposed to staying in place or retiring elsewhere remains to
be seen.
Aside from strict socio-demographics and emerging preferences,
there are other changes that are more surprising. Many US central
cities, downtowns in particular, are gaining population again after a
long period in the mid-late twentieth century of depopulation.
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Why? Some say it is just generational, Millennials have different
preferences from their elders. As younger (middle-class) people
defer procreation for recreation, living in the central city is easier.
To be clear though, while population growth in the urban core may
be higher in percentage terms (than it was and than the suburbs), it
is still smaller than suburban growth in absolute terms, owing to
the suburbs’ much larger base.
Most cities, at least in the US, are now more pleasant than just
ten years ago. Such progress has less to do with urban policy, and
certainly ought not be attributed to economic development officials
penchant for convention centers, festival marketplaces, stadiums,
and streetcars. Rather, it is more associated with environmental
policy and technology, as well as drops in violent crime. Cities are
more entertaining as well, there is more to do. In the early twentieth
century, people fled over-crowded cities for suburbs in part because
of poor environmental quality. Relative to a century ago, water
quality in cities has significantly improved, sewers are sanitary, and
horses no longer befoul the streets. Air quality has also steadily
improved since the late twentieth century. Lower density areas still
claim the upper hand over cities when it comes to air quality.5 5 This has health effects, the beneficial
effects of greater walkability (and thus
walking) in urban centers is offset by the
additional pollution intake in those same
places.(Hankey et al. 2012).
Furthermore, the culture just may be different. The desire for
mobility, especially auto-mobility has dropped, as today’s youth
apparently prefer to spend their disposable income on the latest
internet-connected gadget (unlike older generations?), according to
a 2012 survey by Zipcar.6 The degree to which this is making a 6 (Zipcar 2013).
virtue of necessity – perhaps Millennials cannot afford cars and fuel
as easily as older, more well-situated, generations, and so choose to
embrace their relative poverty – is unclear, though demographics,
attitudes, and other external factors all play a role.
According to Noreen McDonald:
“Among young adults, lifestyle-related demographic shifts, including
decreased employment, explain 10% to 25% of the decrease in driving;
Millennial-specific factors such as changing attitudes and use of virtual
mobility (online shopping, social media) explain 35% to 50% of the
drop in driving; and the general dampening of travel demand that
occurred across all age groups accounts for the remaining 40%.”7 7 (McDonald 2015).
Others attribute much of the change to the economy, and less to
preferences and generational shifts.8 8 (Blumenberg et al. 2012).
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3.2 Changing Nature of Work
Figure 3.3: US labor force
participation rate: 1948-
2017. Source (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2017).
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The Economic Report of the President
2015 writes: “Overall, the most
important factor affecting the aggregate
participation rate in the recession and
recovery has been the aging of the
population. But there are a number
of important trends and developments
relevant for understanding the changes
in participation of different subgroups
of the population:
• Increased participation by older
Americans, which may be
attributable to an increase in
skills among this population and
also to changes in Social Security
retirement benefits;
• Reduced participation by younger
Americans as they stay in school
longer;
• Continuation of an at least 65-
year long trend of declining male
labor force participation, which is
especially stark for young minority
men; and
• Tapering of the long-term trend
of increasing female labor force
participation, which dates back to
before World War II.”
(The White House 2015).
The workforce in the US has continued its drop as
technology-enabled productivity reduces the economic value of
older and unskilled workers. While the total size of the workforce
is, at this writing, higher than it was at the depth of the Great
Recession, a smaller share of the working age population works
today. Fewer people are traveling for work, and fewer discretionary
trips are made by both workers nervous about spending money and
the unemployed who have fewer resources to spend. Starting in
2008 in the US, unemployment increased sharply, and though it has
since declined, employment participation rates remain much lower
as shown in Figure 3.3
Demographics are also part of this. Many employees have
dropped out of the labor market as their skills have been devalued
by the economy; older workers are choosing, or having imposed on
them, early retirement, while younger workers are deferring entry
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into the workforce, choosing to accumulate more education.
The rise in female labor force participation from the 1930s through
the 1990s has also run its course; labor force participation is roughly
equal by gender.9 The percentage of women in the workforce has 9 See: US Department of Labor -
Women’s Bureau (n.d.) Women
in the Labor Force in 2010.
http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/
Qf-laborforce-10.htm.
plateaued since the turn of the century. The percentage of men has
dropped.10 There is no indicator suggesting that this is likely to
10 Even recent decreases of labor
force participation are a consequence
of productivity gains among those
remaining, as the long-standing
connection between productivity and
workforce participation has severed.
People may be more willing to remain
unemployed looking for the right
opportunity, than to take any job that
happens to be available. Because of its
higher productivity than decades ago,
society can afford more unemployment
and underemployment rather than
matching people to jobs they may be
less than optimally suited for. The
economic shock of 2008 broke many old
arrangements, and the economy is still
sorting out the effects.
reverse significantly, and certainly not pass the previous peak.
Americans now work fewer hours over their career than their
working grandparents, and probably their parents (for annual
hours, see Figure 3.4), which shows little change over the past 7
decades). They start their careers later, extending the pre-work
period into their twenties, taking advantage of productivity gains of
parents and ancestors, and borrowing against future productivity.
They also retire earlier, post-work retirement starts into their fifties,
reaping the rewards of our collective productivity. Vacation time
has not changed much in recent decades.
Travel patterns differ by age group. One thing is for certain:
those who do not work daily do not make work commutes daily.
While some of the now available non-work time is made up with
out-of-home activities requiring travel, that does not require peak
hour travel, and so imposes fewer stresses on the transport system.
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Figure 3.4: Annual hours of
work: 1870-2000. Source:
(Huberman and Minns 2007).
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3.3 At-Home Working
Figure 3.5: Telecommuting in
Minneapolis- St. Paul Region
2001-2011. Source: Cao in
(Levinson et al. 2015).
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Modern economies increasingly work with information, thereby
loosening the need for physical proximity. While Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) is a broad term encompassing a
broad category, it is fair to say what used to require physical travel
has diminished. There is reduced need to be in particular places
to get work done; and, there is nothing magic about the five-day
workweek. Both are relics of the industrial age.
The amount of nonwork travel by those who work at home is
now greater than that of commuters. By relaxing the amount of
commuting, this increases the amount of other types of travel. It is
likely that communications and information technology serve as
both substitutes and complements transport at the same time.
However, while the substitution is direct (more time communicating
means less time traveling), the complementarity is due to a
reduction of the constrained resource, the time available for
nonwork travel (When information technology reduces the time
spent at activities with information technology, it means more time
is available for other things). The adoption of personal computers
and related technologies in the home in the 1990s appeared to
follow the emergence of the same on the desk of nearly every office
worker in the 1980s. By 1994, home computers were found in 32
million United States homes, and almost 7 million home computers
were sold each year.11 These levels pale next to the rise of the11 (Bryant 1 13).
Internet beginning at that time and mobile computing in the early
2000s. People were optimistic about the potential of telecommuting.
As computers and related telecommunication technology are
necessary, if not sufficient, criteria for performing office work at
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home, this trend of technology adoption should enable an increase
in the amount of work at home. Yet clearly, for most people (or their
employer), present technology does not allow working at home to
be a perfect substitute for office work. Communication is still slow
or expensive. Video, while significantly improving, remains choppy
except on dedicated connections.
The opposite hypothesis states that technology will encourage
workers to spend more time at the office. Businesses adopt
advanced technology earlier than homes, so being away from the
office will present a disadvantage. If the power of technology is
growing at an accelerating pace, the technological capabilities of the
home will fall farther and farther behind that of the office.
Both hypotheses could hold if technology increases the amount
of work, rather than reducing it.12 Some at-home work is in 12 Schor claims that the amount of time
spent at work per worker per week
steadily increased in the latter half of the
twentieth century. This contrasts with
Figure 3.4. (Schor 2008).
addition to that in the office, while other at-home work can
substitute for a trip to the office – technology and employer attitude
influence both of these kinds of work.13 Telecommuting continues
13 An implication of the influence
of information technology on travel
demand is that it calls into question
whether transportation is separable
from other aspects of the economy
in both monetary and activity/time
use analysis. This assumption is often
made, travel demand models rarely
incorporate non-transportation factors
except for some macroscopic income
indicator. But if communication can
substitute for transportation, this aspect
needs to be considered.
to rise, more as a complement to office work than a substitute (e.g.,
to check email upon awakening or going to sleep), but even as the
occasional substitute, people can work from home either sometimes
or regularly.
Figure 3.5 shows daily telecommuting dropped in the past decade
(2000/01-2010/11) according to a recent survey in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul region, but non-daily telecommuting (once a week or more,
once a month or more) rose. In contrast, the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ Time Use Survey reports:
“In 2014, on days they worked, 23 percent of employed persons did
some or all of their work at home, and 85 percent did some or all
of their work at their workplace, ... In 2003, the first year for which
comparable data are available, 19 percent of employed persons did
some or all of their work at home, and 87 percent did some or all their
work at their workplace on days worked.”14 14 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014a).
Enabling factors such as broadband internet, ubiquitous mobile
smartphone technology, and employer attitude are necessary for
significant amount of at-home work. The tax code, at least in the US
also helps. Taxpayers can write-off home offices for part-time
at-home work. Employers get taxed for office space. There has been
corporate resistance, especially at declining companies, as it is a
relatively easy way to reduce the labor force – return to the
workplace or lose your job – knowing some workers won’t for
personal reasons. Former Yahoo CEO Marissa Meyer (of the
formerly independent internet pioneer Yahoo) ended the company’s
work-at-home program before they were sold, as has Best Buy.15 15 (Bednarz 2013).
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Relative to the 1990s, high quality, inexpensive, point-to-point
video-conferencing is widely available, also with relative
instantaneous transfer of data. It is still not good enough though,
due both to standards (real-time video-conferencing should have
higher priority than downloading torrents of movies), and more
importantly, less than full deployment of broadband
communication in the US. Even so, like roads, demand will
eventually expand to fill whatever supply internet service providers
deploy.
Thus video-conferencing has yet to cause at-home work to
overtake commuting for even the majority of office workers. It is not
expected that these technologies will have much effect for most
non-office workers (about half the US workforce), though other
technologies may.
Further technological advances may increase or decrease the
quality of the home as a workplace relative to the office. If the
technology at an outside office remains significantly better than at
home, little progress towards an increased share of work at home
may be made. Technology adoption typically follows an S-curve,
with slow adoption initially until a threshold is reached, increasing
steadily until some saturation level. While increasing market
penetration of desktop and mobile computing along with the
Internet might slightly affect these trends, it is clear that those who
wish to work at-home will be early adopters of advances in these
technologies.
Nurses, construction workers, teachers, factory workers, farmers
and the rest of the non-office workforce may get disrupted by
robotics, information technology, and the like, but since their job is
not simply pushing bits (though that is certainly part of it), being
somewhere in particular will remain important.
Our colleague (Jason Cao) writes, “Although coffee shops have
become a new workplace for many workers, they are not expected
to materially influence vehicular travel, similar to neighborhood
telecenters. In particular, workers at neighborhood telecenters tend
to have a higher number of return home trips and other non-work
trips on telecommuting days and they also tend to shift from other
modes to driving alone.”1616 Cao in (Levinson et al. 2016), citing
(Balepur et al. 1998).
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3.4 Online Shopping
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Figure 3.6: Time spent shopping
per day in Minneapolis St.
Paul region (minutes) 1990-
2011. Source: Data analyzed in
(Levinson et al. 2015).
The rise of online retailing allows people to substitute delivery
for fetching, and reduce the amount of shopping trips. We both
remember our parents schlepping us to Sears and Montgomery
Wards, but many people would also order from the Sears Wish Book
or other catalogs, especially around the holidays. The logistics was
powered by the US Post Office’s Rural Free Delivery, the fastest
affordable supply chain of the time. Over the past two decades
catalogs have been slowly replaced by the Internet, seemingly a case
of the old being dismissed by the new: Sears by Amazon. Notably,
Sears phased out its Big Book in 1993 and started shrinking its Wish
Book that same year.17 Amazon was founded in 1994. But more than 17 (philly.com 1 29).
just replacing catalogs, online shopping has replaced in-person
shopping to a growing extent, and delivery is replacing fetching.
Estimates of e-commerce vary widely. For US retail sales, shares
range from 6%,18 or 7%,19 to 12%20 depending on definitions 18 (US Census Bureau 2014).
19 (eMarketer 2013).
20 (Center for Retail Research 2015).
(excluding food and car sales would make the share higher).
E-commerce sales in the US totaled $305 billion and were rising
about 15% per year in 2014 (while retail as a whole rose about
4%).21 Only England and China score higher in terms of percentage 21 (US Census Bureau 2015).
of online sales. Not only can shoppers do the same thing differently
(and better), they can do many more things enabled by the
technology of the web. Amazon, which now claims 1% of total retail
sales in the United States, has become the single one-stop shop for
everything. Given that Amazon is now over twenty years old, it is
hardly considered new anymore. However, its influence on how
people ‘go’ shopping is now unparalleled.
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Shopping trips are down by about one-third in a decade, they now
comprise fewer than 9% of all trips, down from 12.5% in 2000.22 Time22 Shopping trips based on analysis of
The Travel Behavior Inventory from the
Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul)
in Minnesota (US), see: (Brosnan and
Levinson 2015).
spent shopping per day is also down (Figure 3.6 ). Other evidence
for this trend comes from the UK, where sales of vans used for home
deliveries are at a record high.23
23 (Johnston 2015). There is further anecdotal evidence of these trends. On Black
Friday (the day after Thanksgiving in the US, reportedly the busiest
shopping day of the year)24 the community around the non-profit24 Sources dispute what is the busiest
shopping day, ShopperTrak says it is
Black Friday. (Shoppertrak 2016).
Strong Towns goes to major shopping areas and photographs
mostly empty (over-built) parking lots, as shown in Figure 3.7.
Cities like Minneapolis are beginning to relax and eliminate
minimum parking requirements,25 though the market may continue25 (McKenzie 2015).
to overbuild parking for years to come.
More significantly, peak-season (Christmas) retail travel has fallen
off a cliff. Total retail foot traffic for November and December 2013
was at 17.6 billion trips, down from about 33 billion in 2010, just 4
years earlier, according to data the Wall Street Journal obtained
from ShopperTrak.26 Clearly the rise of the tablet has facilitated26 (Banjo and Fitzgerald 2014).
shopping via couch rather than car. Assuming parking lot use is an
approximate surrogate for the overall health of physical retail, it is
becoming clear that physical retail should visit the doctor.
We discuss this further in Chapter 11.
Figure 3.7: East Brainerd
Mall on Black Friday (28
Nov 2014). Photo by Charles
Marohn. Other photos were
posted to Twitter using the
hashtag #BlackFridayParking.
A montage of such photos
can be found on Storify
https://storify.com/
yangbodu/blackfridayparking.
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3.5 Virtual Connectivity
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Figure 3.8: Travel by purpose
per household (km) 1983-2009.
Source: (National Household
Travel Survey 2010) Table 5.
It is now easier to virtually communicate with friends, in real-time
and asynchronously, regardless of physical location. Social groups
more easily grow and shrink with an evening out, as people can
know where others are.
With his family, Kevin lives close to the off-campus student
population of the University of Colorado who have many parties.
But in contrast to the college parties back when he went to
Northwestern University, these parties may last mere minutes.
Owing to the availability of instantaneous information, students
know which location is better, bigger, louder and is currently
holding beer-pong championships. Parties today start and end
much quicker. Party-goers migrate like ants to the best venue,
alcohol acting as a pheromone.
As with at-home work, mobile social communication is playing
out in at least two (semi-contradictory) ways. On the one hand,
communications can act as a substitute for physical presence. If I
am always connected to my friends and co-workers, seeing them in
person may be less critical, since the information exchange is
continuous. On the other hand, communications and transport are
often seen as complements, as mobile communications enable
dynamically planning meetings, for instance when two friends
discover electronically they are physically nearby, maybe they will
meet up, whereas before they would never have known (or not until
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after the fact) they were in about the same place at about the same
time.
Twenty-five years ago there were approximately no internet users
outside of information technology organizations. Five or so years
ago, it was easier to conceive of what it meant to be ‘online’ – an
amount that bumped up against 40 hours per month.27 Its ubiquity27 ‘Canadians clocked an average of 45
hours online in the fourth quarter of 2011
(CBC News 2012).
today suggests people with smart phones live in an ‘always-on’
world.
The evidence now shows people visit friends less. While we
don’t know for sure that the internet prompted this, time online
continues to rise, especially mobile.28 Time spent socializing off-line28 (Wallsten 2013).
has dropped about 8% in less than a decade, from over 40 minutes
per day in 2003 to 37 minutes in 2011 according to the American
Time Use Survey. As shown in Figure 3.8, recession impacted or
not, the National Household Travel Survey finds social and
recreational travel has dropped markedly in absolute terms from
1990. While lack of work obviously crimps work travel, the lack of
work in principle frees up time for non-work travel, particularly
things like visiting friends.
Social travel is less structured than commuting. It varies not-only
between people, but varies for the same person from day-to-day and
week-to-week, and depends not only on the traveler, but who she is
meeting. Such social connections are typically at varying locations
as well. The regularity of social meetings, especially non-family
meetings, results from the fixedness of other schedules due to work
and school and other constraints. Something, and technology is a
good guess at a major factor, is changing how people engage
socially.
We don’t claim face-to-face interaction is entering the dust-bin of
history. But the changes are real; and they are large enough to
measure statistically, but not so profound they are obvious to
everyone. Technology is not (yet, if ever) a full substitute for the
environment and benefits that in-person sharing of the same
physical space can achieve. People still like to talk to others with
human heartbeats in presence. New wearable devices like the
Apple Watch, with ‘taptic feedback’ have virtualized that too.
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3.6 A License to Roam
Figure 3.9: Roaming territory
over four generations. Source:
(Derbyshire 2007).
Despite living less than 20 yards from Kevin’s 6th grade
classroom, he set the school record with 33 tardies. Some call it lack
of parental guidance; others call it free-range child rearing. Life in
the 1970s (and earlier) was different. In kindergarten both David
and Kevin meandered alone in their neighborhood. By 3rd grade,
they cycled across town. By 5th they rode the public bus to the local
mall. They were not alone, as shown in Figure 3.9. Yet, parents in a
suburb of Washington, DC were recently accused of child neglect
for allowing their 6 and 10 year old kids to roam free; the children
were taken into the custody of Child Protective Services after
another citizen reported them as vagabonds.
Free range kids29 are thwarted because such freedom has 29 (Skenazy 2009).
vanished and the prison of home is much more enticing. Pulling
kids home, television, video games, and the Internet provide far
more and far better at-home entertainment options than were
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available when there were only ABC, CBS, NBC, PBS, and an
independent UHF channel visible through the static. Pushing kids
away from freedom, practicing pop sociology, one can attribute to
living in a more fear-based society. Nine doors down the street from
Kevin’s current home in Boulder (in the opposite direction from the
partying student population) lies the famed JonBenet Ramsey
house. The Ramsey event, in addition to the Atlanta Child Murders,
the Missing Kids on the back of milk boxes, Adam Walsh, and
Amber Alerts, make child kidnapping appear more common than it
was before or than it really is. Couple this with the decreased
number of children per family, we observe children, in contrast with
material goods, are far less disposable than they were in our
grandparents generation.3030 David’s paternal grandmother had 9
siblings. That is much rarer today. When both of our parents schlepped us to Sears or Montgomery
Wards, we sat in the front seat of the car. If our car was old enough,
maybe – just maybe – we wore lap belts because the three-point
seatbelt (the shoulder-belt) had yet to hit the American auto
market.31 Today children sit in the back seat because of the rise of31 Wearing a seatbelt habit formed
not just because it was good sense,
but because of the seat-belt ignition
interlock on 1974 model cars, like
David’s mother’s accursed Chevy Vega,
prevented the engine from starting
without seat belts. This was a one-year
experiment reviled by the driving public.
so-called ‘child safety seats’ and air bags.32 Today’s back seat kids
32 The safety effect of Child Car Seats is
far from clear, see e.g. (Levitt 2008).
have a much diminished independent range,33 and are more likely
33 (Fyhri et al. 2011).
to be chauffeured by a parent or school bus to their school.
But we contend there are things, tacit knowledge, one can learn
about driving just by riding in the front seat, which today’s kids are
slower to experience. These include laws of the road, etiquette, and
defensive driving. Both of us received our driver’s licenses upon
turning 16, not a day after. After a few weeks of restricted driving
we were on our own. Today it is more complicated for young
people to get driver’s licenses, and less valuable since they need
more supervision. More teenagers are deferring licensure and auto
acquisition.3434 The Governors Highway Safety
Association, a US watchdog outfit that
looks out for safety on the highways
summarizes some of the changes
affecting licensure by state. For instance,
most states have a three-stage driver’s
license (Learner, Intermediate, and Full).
Full now starts at 17 or 18 years old in
many states. The Intermediate stage
imposes nighttime driving restrictions
(48 states) and passenger restrictions
(47 states) in many states. Novice
drivers (under 18) are also prohibited
from using cell phones or texting while
driving.
Boys will be boys. Getting a license is also less valuable since it is
harder to get away with driving drunk, the way George W. Bush and
Dick Cheney did in their younger years. Driving While Intoxicated
(DWI) was as recently as 15 years ago not considered severe enough
a crime to keep someone out of the White House. We wish such poor
judgment were now. It certainly can affect employment prospects at
jobs society takes more seriously.
Ad Age reports:
“In 1978, nearly half of 16-year-olds and three-quarters of
17-year-olds in the US had their driver’s licenses, according to
Department of Transportation data. By 2008, the most recent year
data was available, only 31% of 16-year-olds and 49% of 17-year-olds
had licenses, with the decline accelerating rapidly since 1998.”3535 (Neff 2010).
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A recent study by the Center for Disease Control finds that “three
out of four US high school students aged 16 years drove at least once
during the 30 days before the survey.”36 36 (Center for Disease Control 2015).
This number fell from about 85 percent who drove in an average
week in 1996.37 Our own analysis finds38 licensure notably lower 37 (Shults and Williams 2013).
38 (Levinson et al. 2015).for the most recent demographic cohorts in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul region compared with earlier groups at the same age. Vehicles
per household is higher for the youngest demographic, which we
attribute to the youngest cohort being more likely to live with their
parents than earlier cohorts which left home never to return. Total
vehicles per capita (Shown in Figure 1.4) is off the peak in the US.
When you go through life as a back-seat passenger rather than a
driver or shotgun passenger, we contend your motivation for
driving is lower, since you are not modeling driving yourself as you
would watching through the front windshield. Thus you may defer
licensure. Further, your quality of driving is lower since you lack
experience from sitting ‘shotgun’39 and looking out the front 39 Shotgun is the front passenger seat,
where presumably, as in a 1930s gangster
film, someone carrying a shotgun would
sit to shoot out the window, while the
driver controlled the vehicle.
instead of side window growing up.
These two factors feed on each other, as people like doing what
they are good at. Drops in licensure are in part related to less value
associated with licenses, and there may be other causes as well,
including the factors described elsewhere in this chapter.
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3.7 Fuel Prices
Figure 3.10: Weekly average
US retail gasoline price
(dollars per gallon) 1990-
2016. Source: US Energy
Information Administration
http://www.eia.gov/
petroleum/gasdiesel/.
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Gasoline is a major input into trip-making as most vehicles use
Diesel or Internal Combustion Engines. The price of fuel increased
sharply in the run-up to the Great Recession, as shown in Figure 3.10
this certainly discouraged car travel. Interestingly, it also reduced car
crashes by more than the reduction in distance traveled, which the
research team attributed to worse than average drivers (especially
the young) being more likely to be priced off the road.4040 (Chi et al. 2013a;b).
How much less travel is there because of increases in the price of
gasoline? For every 100% increase in the price of gas, there is a 5%
decrease in gasoline consumption, which correlates to driving in the
short run. In the long run there is also a shift in vehicle fuel economy,
and a greater decline fuel consumption.4141 (Hughes et al. 2006).
While the relationship between between fuel prices and driving
levels is relatively weak in the short run, a larger context invoking
the costs of vehicular ownership, costs of maintenance, and ever
increasing costs of travel (i.e., parking fees, tolls, the price of gas, in
addition to an increased intolerance for traffic congestion itself) has
caused increasing populations to consider car ownership in the first
place. Though most adults of car-owning age still own a car, more
people are deciding otherwise, as shown in Chapter 1. Many
households are going from 3 to 2, 2 to 1, or even 1 to 0 motor
vehicles.
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3.8 Competing Modes
2001
2011
Mode Share (%), all trip purposes
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Auto Transit Bike Walk School Bus Other
Figure 3.11: Mode shares in
Minneapolis - St. Paul region,
Summer 2001 vs. Summer 2011.
Source: (Levinson et al. 2015).
Finally, an explosion of other mobility options in cities have
become more available, attractive and increasingly used.
Proportions of trips via carsharing, ride-sourcing and bikesharing
are are generally still too small to reliably measure. However,
walking, cycling, and even transit are holding their own or growing
compared to the automobile. Aggregate transit use across the US is
up, largely owing to large investments in rail lines; a 20 percent
increase in transit use in the last decade (amounting to about 1
percent of all travel) is far less the 10 percent drop in per capita
passenger travel by motor vehicles (about 8 percent of all travel).
Recapitalizing transit has had marginal effects. Rather, as is the
theme of this chapter, the decline in per capita auto use is a death
by a thousand cuts rather than one clear perpetrator.
Shares of walking, cycling, school bus, and telecommuting
appear to be generally increasing in many cities across the globe.
Illustrative data for the Twin Cities is shown in Figure 3.11. Such
rise is likely attributed to changing preferences, mostly, and the
economy, secondly, as discussed in earlier sections. Increase in
school bus travel in the US is likely due to changes in schools
(which are bigger and farther apart) and increased movement away
from the neighborhood school.
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3.9 Occam’s Razor
Figure 3.12: Billions of pieces
of mail handled annually by US
Post Office 1926-2014. Source:
(Historian, US Postal Service
2015). US mail volume increased
for decades upon decades until
the 1990s. And it started to
level off in the 1990s (forming
an S shape from 1926 to 1999)
with the rise of email and the
Internet, and then, since the
early 2000s has fallen off a
cliff (the beginning of a reverse
S). Nobody today expects the
number of letters delivered to
rise in a decade’s time. This
same pattern could confront the
conventional automobile as we
know it today.
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“Among competing hypotheses, the one with the fewest assumptions
should be selected” – William of Occam’s Razor.
It is too difficult to say which, if any, of these explanations have the
fewest assumptions, thereby satisfying Occam’s Razor. Instead, like
Agatha Christie’s novel, the guilt is spread over many shoulders. As
issues evolve over the upcoming years, more characters will be
added and the specific role of any one culprit might become more
pronounced. For the time being, however, it is safe to say that
conventional automobile traffic is suffering a slow death by a
thousand cuts. Interestingly, almost none of them can be attributed
to conscious public policy aimed at traffic reduction.
Furthermore, charging one culprit is less important than waking
up to the reality that transport operates differently these days. People
seek convenience in their daily routes. They seek not having to pay
attention when they drive. They definitely seek not having to drive
in traffic. Seek and ye shall receive. Convenience, safety, and
inattention are hallmarks of future mobility.
Such anticipation, however, needs to be tempered. All
technologies have a lifecycle associated with them – which can be
graphed with an ‘S-shaped’ curve. Things start off, they grow
slowly, there’s a period of steady, rapid growth and an eventual
leveling off. Something new happens and the S-curve begins to
move in the other direction as the technology declines.4242 This is discussed in more detail in
(Garrison and Levinson 2014).
4
Pace of Change
Figure 4.1: Pace of Change.
Photo by Kevin J. Krizek.
Vehicles might move slow or fast along city streets. More
generally, so do technologies. This chapter differentiates
technologies by their pace of change: Fast, Medium, Slow. Slow
technologies are the most rigid. Decreasing their rigidity has
advantages. More importantly, recognizing rigidity helps us
understand when various changes might take place.
Fast Change. Matching the prospects of decreased driving with
the wonders of technology provides fuel to buoy optimism. Trends
are bending around vehicle use, overall travel, and technology. Ray
Kurzweil,1 for instance, observes that technology advances at an 1 (Kurzweil 2005).
accelerating rate, and is deployed more widely more quickly today
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than yesterday. Horace Dediu has made a similar point less
breathlessly.2 32 (Dediu 2013).
3 The acceleration of technology is
admittedly a contested point, with
authors like Tyler Cowan (Cowen 2011),
Peter Thiel (Thiel and Masters 2014), and
Robert Gordon (Gordon 2016) notably
identifying the problem of economic
stagnation.
If not arriving at a ’technological singularity,’ we see accelerating
technical progress as fairly obvious; it applies most clearly to the
information technology sector, where Moore’s and kindred laws
show the period of doubling of various technology. David’s first
personal computer was an Apple ][+ with 48 kilobytes (kB) of
memory. He spent more than $100 to upgrade with an extra 16kB.
He is typing this book on an iMac with 16 Gigabytes (GB) of
memory. 16 Gigabytes is about 350,000 times as large as 48
kilobytes.4 This is not linear growth. That is not to say David is4 A kilobyte here is actually 1024 bytes,
not 1000, so the conversion is not
straight-forward in decimal math as
it might appear, moreover while disk
drives use metric definitions of kilo
(=1000), memory makers use the kilo =
1024 = 210.
350,000 times as productive with his new computer as his first, but
he is more productive. The problem is that just as technology is
getting progressively better, the challenges it is asked to address
become more challenging.
In recent years, the fastest changing technologies involve
computers and information. In general, the short-term forecast of
new technologies tends to be overly optimistic about rates of
adoption, market size, and its ability to displace business as usual.
However, society at-large has swiftly transitioned from pens to
keyboards; from keyboards to mice to swiping fingers across
screens; and to voice-responsive headsets, phones, remote controls,
and free-standing devices interacting with the digital world. Most
people now live in an always-on world via smart phones or
otherwise.5 By using the TouchID sensor on an iPhone5 As of 2013, 56% of all American
adults are smartphone adopters; one-
third (35%) have some other kind of cell
phone that is not a smartphone, and the
remaining 9% of Americans do not own
a cell phone at all (Smith 2013a).
accompanied by three light touches with an index finger, it is
possible to order a car from a taxi (ride-sharing) service (e.g., Uber,
Lyft) to pick you up in a matter of minutes and drive you anywhere.
Employing the same gestures, dinner is literally on-tap this evening,
delivered fresh. You can now have reliable video chat with friends
or family across the world while walking across town.
Medium Change. There are an estimated quarter-billion cars and
light trucks (including pickups, minivans, and sport utility vehicles)
on the road now in the US. The average car on the road is 11 years
old. By comparison, in 1933, in the depths of the Great Depression,
the turnover sales rate of the auto fleet was over 14 years. So what
are the odds that your next vehicle will last over 20 years?
The private automobile fleet in the US turns over slowly. This
frustrates those used to the fast change of Silicon Valley. Cars are
idle most of the time, and thus fail to wear out and don’t need quick
replacement. If instead of 250million vehicles operating 1 hour a day,
suppose society had 125 million vehicles operating 2 hours per day,
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or 62.5 million vehicles operating 4 hours per day. Vehicles would be
replaced 4 times as often (assuming they wear out with use), and the
average age of vehicles on the road would be under 3 years instead
of over 11 years. In contrast, David has had 7 (different generations
of) cell phones in the past 11 years.6 6 In contrast, for 43 years of his life,
Kevin was without a cell phone. It was
not until September 2014, when David
reminded Kevin: “how can you expect
to be a self-respecting and authoritative
voice on the future of urban transport if
you don’t own a smartphone?” that one
of the last of the Mohicans had fallen.
Newer cars have several advantages. They are more fuel efficient,
pollute less (both because they use less energy and because they
have better pollution control), are safer, have better user interfaces
(we hope) and are more in-sync with changes in information
technologies. Society wants fewer cars because that requires less
space devoted to the storage of cars (parking), and makes driving
less likely.
Efficient use of capital, keeping vehicles in motion 24/7, is a
hallmark of large, expensive fleets like shipping, airlines, railroads,
and to a lesser extent trucks. Furthermore, a single owner of the
fleet can achieve larger economies of scale. United Parcel Service
controls almost 100,000 vehicles world-wide,7 allowing them to 7 (Schlangenstein 2014).
innovate in use of alternative fuels. Transforming this mid-speed
technology to faster moving is an opportunity that new
technologies portend, an opportunity we discuss in Chapter 8.
Slow Change. In contrast, roads are among the slowest changing
of any technology still in active use. In 2006, David and his family
lived in London – a city which formed around a the shape of streets
from centuries ago. After the 1666 fire destroyed most of London’s
buildings, the city could not change its street grid despite an able
plan from Sir Christopher Wren. In 2014 Kevin and his family lived
in Bologna (in Northern Italy, just over the Apennines from
Florence). The street on which he lived for a year was the via Emilia;
this exact road was built in 187 BC by the Romans. It was a main
trunk road then and still is today. Once laid, roads do not move.
They continue to define the urban fabric. Too many institutional
arrangements (such as property rights) depend on the old layout of
roads. Almost always, new buildings are built where the old
structures stood, rather than in the void of empty roads. Similar
observations can be seen after San Francisco Earthquake and the
bombings of German and Japanese cities in World War II.
The life-span of buildings obviously varies a few years to
centuries; commercial structures in the US hover around a half
century.8 Property rights inevitably change slower than that, thus it 8 (ECPD 2014).
is not unreasonable to think that streets are not going anywhere
soon. Yet, there will be opportunities to reconfigure how the roads
themselves will be used, which we discuss in Chapter 14.
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“The future is already here – it is just not very evenly distributed.” –
William Gibson.99 William Gibson is reported to have first
said this in an interview on Fresh Air,
NPR (1993-08-31) “In the future, everyone will live and behave like the futurist does
today.” – The Futurist Fallacy.
Dyssynchrony Both Gibson’s uneven distribution and our
Futurist Fallacy may hold provided that the futurist is not in fact
behaving the way future will turn out. Of course every good
futurist will try to behave in a future-oriented way, living at the
cutting edge of technology and lifestyle. Many of those technologies
however turn out to be techno-evolutionary dead ends and those
futuristic lifestyles will be fodder for late-night television. Gibson’s
quote resonates well because it comports with our idea of pace of
change. Deployment takes time, and some things by their inherent
nature are harder to change than others.
Focusing on the auto/highway system, society is confronted with
a condition where slow meets fast.10 Permanent roads are used by10 Also worth reading on this is the
discussion of “Clash of Speeds” in an
interview of Alvin Toffler (Gardels 2016).
fast-moving vehicles whose reaction times will soon be in terms of
a fraction of a second controlled by traffic signals whose timings
vary by the second. Seemingly immutable roads, when coupled with
fast-changing newer information technologies, creates a dissonance.
People have come to see things change quickly on the Internet and
are frustrated by the pace of change off of it.
Such dissonance provides a window through which to see the
forces at work in shaping the future of transport. This slow pace of
change is a two-way street. Those seeking rapid change will be
frustrated; those seeking to make lasting change will be rewarded.
Part II
Technology

5
Electrification
Figure 5.1: Charging Electric
Vehicles. Source: Pixabay.com
(CC0 license).
A somewhat different version of this
appeared as “Electric Avenue” in Foreign
Affairs. (Levinson 2014a).
In 1900, over one-quarter of the cars produced in the US were
electric; however, this amounted to only 1200 vehicles.1
1 (Nye 1992; Schiffer 1994).Electric vehicles (EVs) competed with steam and gasoline for
market share. Observers believed each would find niches, a ‘sphere
of action’ they would dominate: electrics for the wealthy wives of
businessmen and professionals who wanted to travel in town,
gasoline for the longer distance trips, and so on. Yet, by 1905,
electrics comprised fewer than 10 percent of all vehicle sales. By
1918 Henry Ford’s gasoline-powered Model T was dominating
automobile sales.2 The rest, was, as they say, history. EV sales, even 2 Model T’s coming off the assembly line,
see (Georgano 1997).when growing slightly, comprised a smaller and smaller share of
the market.
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5.1 Charging Up
Interest in electric vehicles waned for decades. It wasn’t until 1969
that General Motors restarted experiments with hybrids, following
on a technological path abandoned soon after Ferdinand Porsche
built a hybrid in 1901. Other automakers similarly experimented.
The Energy Crisis of the early 1970s revived attention. In 1976, the
Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research Development and
Demonstration Act provided modest aid. The Electric Power
Research Institute also began support, seeing that EVs could
become important for their public utility members.
The production practices of the car, the use of it, and the
accompanying provision of land and infrastructure needs prompted
considerable consternation for environmentalists including both use
of non-renewable raw materials and the large impervious surfaces
associated with roads and parking. The primary source of this
concern, however, stems from both its intake of refined oil and the
tailpipe emissions caused by an ICE. Electric batteries address both.
By the 1990s, the market was getting more ready, with gasoline
scarcity, energy independence, and environmental concerns used as
rationales. California implemented (but later deferred) policies
requiring Zero Emission Vehicles on the road. The unfortunately
named GM Impact, designed by Paul MacCready, entered the
market with high hopes. Later dubbed the EV1, it plied the roads of
California for a few years before being recalled by GM, as
documented in the film Who Killed the Electric Car?, which
considered oil companies, GM, politicians, and consumers as
among the suspects. The main problem that dogged EVs in the first
decade of the twentieth century: insufficient range, how far the car
could travel on a single charge, had not been solved by the last
decade of that century. The second problem: the ability to recharge
quickly without wearing out the battery, had not been solved either.
The small EVs of the era saw about 70% of their weight made up of
nickel lead acid batteries.
In the early 2000s, Hybrid-Electric Vehicles (HEVs) started to
become visible (especially the Toyota Prius in California),
overcoming the range concerns as electric power would be used on
city streets, and the ICE could recharge the battery, at somewhat
higher sales price than conventional vehicles. As shown in Figure
5.2, US sales are generally rising, but are still small for Hybrids and
Electric Vehicles. Sales outside the US are similarly low.
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Plug-in EV and Extended Range EV Figure 5.2: US sales of electric
vehicles 1999-2016 Source:
(Electric Drive Transportation
Association 2016).
5.2 Symbolic Energy
In the United States, EVs have become status symbols, a way to
wear your concern for the environment, or your technological
progressiveness, as a badge. Owners of EVs once painted the word
‘Electric’ on their cars. With HEVs, the design of the vehicle itself
was a slightly more subtle signifier (known to all who matter) that
the Prius owner cared more about the environment than you did.
As social markers, hybrids also become fodder for the culture wars.
Some states gave hybrids, and later plug-in EVs, free access to
High-occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes, which had been designed for
carpools and buses, as a reward for their owner’s socially
commendable behavior, others disagreed.
Robert Laughlin wrote an essay “The Earth doesn’t care if you
drive a Hybrid” (later retitled “What the Earth knows” in American
Scholar:3 3 (Laughlin 2010).
“[The Earth] doesn’t notice when you turn down your thermostat and
drive a hybrid car. These actions simply spread the pain over a few
centuries, the bat of an eyelash as far as the earth is concerned, and
leave the end result exactly the same: all the fossil fuel that used to be
in the ground is now in the air, and none is left to burn.”
Symbolic action may make the actor feel-good, but cannot make
a real difference to the environmental problems it purports to
address. Laughlin, a physicist thinking geologically and thus longer
term than most ‘climate scientists,’ expresses a belief in the futility
of the response to global warming and skepticism about whether its
consequences are all that great when compared to all that has
happened to the earth before.
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5.3 Take Off
The number of green and technophile status seekers is insufficient
to carry the market beyond its current level. Something more
substantial, a product that is considered superior by most customers
for most purposes, is required. GM re-entered the plug-in EV
market in 2011 with the Chevy Volt, while Nissan entered with the
Leaf and Honda with the Fit.
GM and Chrysler, two of three largest
remaining large US automakers were
briefly nationalized following the
economic shock of 2008. Ford remained
private. Federal policies on emissions
and fuel efficiency were ratcheted up in
this period.
To provide a sense of the technology, the Honda Fit has an energy
efficiency of 18 kWh per 100 km (lower is better) combined City and
Highway, which the EPA scores at 118 Miles per Gallon equivalent
(50 km/liter) (higher is better), with an 82 mile (132 km) range. The
US government provides $2500 tax credits for plug-in EVs, and has
in the past provided other subsidies for fuel efficient vehicles. Many
states and other countries provide additional subsidies.
New companies formed to market high-end EVs. Leading the
charge, Tesla, was founded by serial entrepreneur Elon Musk, also
famous for SpaceX, Solar City, and PayPal, as well as Hyperloop
and The Boring Company, which aims to dig tunnels cheaper. Their
continued growth, occasional profits, and increasing sales are paving
the way (no pun intended). Tesla’s fame is derived in large part
from automobile production, but their real advances are as a robust
battery manufacturer.
Sales of EVs, shown in Figure 5.2, remain in the thousands, while
the US market is about 13 to 14 million cars and light trucks per
year.4 That has not stopped Musk from claiming most new cars will4 Estimated Battery plus Plug-in and
Extended Range EV sales were at about
0.7 percent market share in 2013, up
from 0.0 percent in 2009.
be EVs within 20 years. Tesla’s newest Model 3 obtained over 400,000
pre-orders within two weeks of announcing the car, and more than a
year before the first delivery.5 Indeed, Battery EVs are following the5 (Smith 2016).
same trajectory of growth as Hybrid EVs a decade earlier. And while
Hybrid growth was quite rapid in its early years, it has significantly
slowed in recent years. Market shares for hybrids are well off their
2013 peak, though battery and plug-in electric vehicles are gaining
share.
Running a best-fit logarithmic curve through the data, and
assuming an eventual market saturation at 100%, yields a 50%
market share of new sales in 2023 for EVs and HEVs combined, not
too different from Musk’s claim about EVs alone. As with any such
forecasts, a high dosage of salt is required.
Is 2023 reasonable for a 50% EV+HEV market share for new cars?
Note that even if that year holds, it will be some years still before
the fleet itself is 50% EV, as the median age of the car on the road is
about 11 years now. Unfortunately, extrapolation with such limited
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data is at best dodgy, as there are many factors are play.
In favor of rapid adoption is the potential of a policy-push
strategy. The US, or individual states, and other countries may
implement cap-and-trade for refineries or carbon taxes.6 California, 6 There are many equivalent
environmental taxes, some of which
may be politically easier sales than
others.
notably, already has a cap-and-trade system which implicitly raises
the price of gasoline, to date by a bit more than a dime a gallon.7 In
7 At about $13/tonne CO2 at the time
of this writing. See (Calcarbondash.org
2016).
such a scenario, battery vehicles will be more popular because the
alternative has become more expensive, though the degree of price
increases in gasoline affects the popularity of the alternatives, and a
dime ain’t much.
Similarly, if the price of fuel increases substantially over the long
term due to changes in markets (lack of new discoveries, increasing
demand in developing countries), that might also tip the market.
Also supporting adoption is the possibility that batteries will
eventually be better choices than the ICE from a strict efficiency
standpoint (range, and/or cost per distance). But that date is at
least a decade away at current rates of improvement in the battery
market. Figure 5.3. shows one projection of cost of Lithium Ion
batteries. The ICE is not a sitting target. There are still possibilities
for non-linear breakthroughs that could produce significant
improvements in range and energy density.
Moore’s Law, which predicts doubling of computing power every
two years or so, does not apply to batteries. However, there are
gains in energy density, which has been estimated at doubling every
10 years or so. Over the last six decades, the maximum energy
density of rechargeable batteries has increased tenfold.8 At this rate,
8 Energy density in the past six decades
increased from 25Wh/kg to 210Wh/kg.
As a point of comparison, the Tesla
Roadster was at 117 Wh/kg and the GM
Volt is at 140 Wh/kg and Leaf at 155
Wh/kg. Tesla is presently reported to
be using Panasonic batteries delivering
240 Wh/kg in the Model S. Prototypes
by GM claim to be at 400 Wh/kg. (Cobb
2013; Ottaway 2014).
it would be 2030 before the target of 500 Wh/kg will be reached
(where range for batteries is comparable to range for gasoline
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engines), recognizing the gasoline engine will improve over that
time as well.9 Not much can beat the energy density of liquid9 (Schlachter 2013; Zu and Li 2011).
petroleum.
Potential new adopters remain leery of vehicles with unfamiliar
maintenance requirements. As EVs become more widespread, and
prove themselves, this fear will diminish. Today, California also has
a more widespread EV charging network than the rest of the US.
Over time, EV charging stations will be more common than gas
stations. Gas stations have declined from 300,000 to 140,000 in the
US in a decade, and already there are no gas stations left in lower
Manhattan, while charging stations are becoming common.10 There10 (Nir 2016).
over 10,000 charging stations in the US, and many EV owners can
charge at home.
5.4 Beyond Batteries
On-board batteries are only one possible technology for supplying
electric cars with energy. Others include ultra-capacitors and fuel
cells. In the late 1990s there was excitement about the prospects of
hydrogen fuel cells.11,12 But while costs have been driven down,11 (Koppel 1999; Hoffmann 2012).
12 Some EV advocates saw federal
support of fuel cells in the Republican
Bush administration as a way to
avoid investing in the more promising
and near term technology, and thus
providing back door support to existing
oil interests). See e.g. (Foote 2015).
fuel cells have yet to be cost-effective comparable with batteries,
much less ICEs, and the most optimistic thing we can say is the
timeframe of the promoters has been stretched. Like fusion power,
fuel cells have been five years away from deployability for more
than two decades.
Another interesting strategy is Dynamic Wireless Power Transfer.
Charging coils embedded in the pavement transfer electricity to
on-board batteries while the vehicle is in motion. This allows the
battery to be much smaller since it is recharged more frequently.
The most obvious initial application is for electric buses, which
return to fixed points (bus stops) regularly. Over the longer term,
one can imagine freeway lanes configured for charging, particularly
on intercity highways, to solve much of the range issue. This is a
potential source of revenue for highway agencies.
While there are technology trials, this is still speculative, as
installation would tend to be expensive, and no agency wants to
undertake a widespread installation until there is a fleet ready to
use (and pay for it), and few will want to depend on this without a
network being in place. However it could ratchet up if a home
wireless charging standard for EVs becomes standard, and so EVs
already have the technology to be wirelessly recharged. It should be
noted that this would flip two of the greatest weaknesses of EVs
(range and charging time) into a strength compared with ICEs since
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the range would be anywhere with wireless charging, and the
’fill-up’ time would be used for something else simultaneously.
Electricity production still has considerable emission costs.
Furthermore, the disposal of batteries prompts environmental and
ethical issues.13 The overall environmental problems, however, are 13 Power plant emissions are far more
localized, and much more readily
addressed compared with the tailpipe.
less severe and more easily controlled (as concentrated local point
sources are easier and less expensive to manage than distributed
mobile sources). Electric vehicles (EVs) powered by electricity
generated from natural gas or wind, water, or solar power were
recently and robustly shown to have clearly superior air quality
quality impacts, surpassing the environmental benefits of almost a
dozen other energy sources.14 14 (Tessum et al. 2014).
The electric car has been long projected and hoped for due to
both environmental and energy reasons, yet the relatively low price
of liquid fuel and its advantageous energy density (giving it a
longer range than batteries) has deferred widespread adoption.
Technologies are finally converging to enable electric vehicles to be
competitive with, and eventually surpass, liquid fuels.
5.5 Range Anxiety
The EV’s range anxiety/charging problem may be solved by
fast-charging technology and a comprehensive charging network.
Standards here are an issue, as different autos using different
incompatible charging devices makes fast charging dependent on
the charging station being compatible with your vehicle. Just as fuel
pumps have standard size nozzles, chargers need to be
standardized. There is no guarantee that there will be a
convergence on standards in this market, though the industry is
working on this.15 15 The standard for EV charging in North
America is SAE J1772. The standards
for fast chargers (superchargers) are
still more up in the air. The Tesla
Supercharger is not compatible with
others. (Kane 2013).
Battery swap was first proposed in 1900 by L.R. Wallis and was
revived with Shai Agassi’s company Better Place in the 2000s, which
hoped to develop a network of battery exchange centers, before
entering bankruptcy. A third attempt at this, by Tesla, was
abandoned in 2015. This technology could, but probably won’t, help
the issue with limited range. The success of the idea depends on
economies of scale and standardization of batteries. Unless and
until electric batteries use an interchangeable standard, or one firm
dominates the industry, there is the risk that the right battery size
will not be in-stock. While this is sometimes true of other parts of
your car that require service (e.g. tires), tires are not promised to be
replaced in 5 or 10 minutes.
With Mobility-as-a-Service (Chapter 8), Pony Express type
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services, which swap the vehicle rather than the battery may be
possible.
Finally, perhaps the few long trips people actually make will use
a mode other than the car, or remain with liquid fuel, if the range
problem persists.
5.6 Electric Transit
For transit (Chapter 12), much of the network, particularly urban rail
(metro, LRT, and streetcar) along with electric trolley bus, is already
electrified. Battery powered buses are now being tested and are in
operation on some routes – London has ordered 51 and plans another
3300.16 Fuel cell buses have also been put into operational tests.16 (Brian 2015).
Other fuels, such as natural gas, as well as diesel/electric hybrids are
becoming more common. The same advances in electrification that
are expected to affect automobiles will play themselves out in the
bus market. Battery powered buses will likely win this competition,
as the economies of scale with battery production for automobiles
will have significant positive spillovers for buses. New technologies
such as in-road wireless chargers, especially located at bus stops,
provide the additional promise that batteries need not be too large
(or heavy), as the bus can periodically sip electricity from the grid
while passengers board and alight.
5.7 Alternatives to Electrification
US Federal policy is not engaged in a ‘bet the farm’ strategy of
putting all its research eggs in one basket. Instead, it is spreading its
money across a variety of technologies, each of which most
observers believe are not terribly promising, but each of which has
supporters. Battery EV defenders are skeptical of fuel cells, and
everyone is skeptical of the benefits of biofuels like ethanol, which
though mandated to be blended with fossil fuels, are likely to max
out around 5 or 6 percent of total US fuel consumption.17 Natural17 More discussion of Biofuels is in Boies
(2016) Electrification and Alternative
Fuels (Chapter 6) of (Levinson et al.
2016).
gas has its partisans, particularly for trucks, though again shares of
total heavy duty fuel use are likely to be no higher than 10 percent
of fuel consumption before 2040, and an infrastructure of fueling
stations is required. Technologically, all of these probably can work.
Which of these has the best business plan and will succeed in an
unsubsidized, or at least less subsidized, market remains open.
Many small bets are more likely to find a winner than a few large
ones. A Manhattan project or Apollo program is not called for in
this situation.
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Assuming continued economic growth, EVs or other
non-petroleum based energy sources will eventually be widely
adopted. Each energy source may have market niches or ‘spheres of
action’ for a temporary period, while the market is in flux and early
adopters experiment with an explosion of vehicle forms. In the end,
economies of scale dictate one of these technologies will come to
dominate for an extended period, but it remains an open question
which. While by the late 2010s most people have come to believe
the winner will be EVs, there remains the possibility an alternative
succeeds.
While one technology may come to dominate, unless prohibited
there is likely to be a niche market in use of gasoline engines, just
as some people swear by vinyl records. As Kevin Kelly notes in his
book What Technology Wants, no technology ever is truly abandoned:
“I say there is no species of technology that have ever gone globally
extinct on this planet.”18 19 18 (Kelly 2010).
19 One imagines a small back-to-the-well
movement, just as 1960s hippies went
back-to-the-land. Only artisanal, locally
sourced, organic, no GMO, gluten-free
gasoline for the cars of ‘wellheads.’
As with the automobile itself, this is in a sense inevitable, so long
as we still want private transport, and as long as the environmental
and supply problems with petroleum remain. However the timing
of such a change, and whether the new standard is electricity, or fuel
cell, or liquified natural gas, or biofuels, or something else, remains
unsettled.
5.8 Consequences of Electrification
The advent of electrification has consequences. Since its 1919 debut,
the gas tax has come to serve as the main source of road funding at
the federal and state levels. But with electrification, this will come
to an end. The US, in contrast with many other countries, dedicates
motor fuel taxes to pay for transport. We are already beginning to
see ‘the problem’ of better of fuel economy in transport funding.
The immediate solution is the politically unpopular step of raising
gas tax rates. Longer term, something else must be done. To be
clear, there is no obvious reason to move from the gas tax as a
funding source before it is necessary, the tax is administratively
very efficient, and accomplished the basic policy ends of raising
funds from drivers roughly in proportion to use, while
discouraging gasoline consumption. (There is an obvious reason to
move from the gas tax to tolling as a way to allocate roadspace, as
discussed in Chapter 15.) But change will at some point become
necessary as gasoline engines lose significant market share.
The price of electricity is dropping, and will continue to do so as
solar and wind gain efficiency. The price of large batteries should
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Figure 5.4: Tesla with Autopilot.
plummet as mass production kicks in. The efficiency of batteries will
make slow increases. More importantly, the network of charging
stations and the ability to recharge quickly will become standard.20
20 This is occurring as the network of US
gas stations is dropping, from 202,800
in 1994 to 156,065 in 2012. (NACS: The
Association for Convenience and Fuel
Retailing 2013).
We will witness the decline of complaints about tailpipe
emissions of vehicles, perhaps to be replaced with concern over the
visual blight from solar panels and wind turbines. And, transport
will be quieter, posing problems for the blind.2121 (Fermino 2014; BBC 2014).
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Automation
Figure 6.1: Autonomous Uber.
Photo by Dllu. (CC4 license)
In the Mojave Desert straddling the Nevada/California border,
that is to say, in the middle of nowhere, DARPA1 hosted the first 1 DARPA stands for Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency; it is a unit of
the Department of Defense, as driverless
cars have obvious military application.
Grand Challenge on vehicle automation in March 2004. With the
potential of $1 million going to the winner, the objective was for
driverless cars to complete a 150 mile (240 km) route. Carnegie-
Mellon University’s robot vehicle made it the furthest, completing
almost 5 percent of the route, but was ultimately not awarded the
prize.
A second run of the event in October 2005 saw five vehicles
completing the course with Stanford University’s team winning
with a time of just under 7 hours.2 Within 18 months, vehicle 2 Carnegie-Mellon teams took second
and third place. The Gray Insurance
Company from New Orleans and
Oshkosh Trucks also completed the
course.
automation technology rapidly improved.
Two years later, in November 2007, DARPA established the
Urban Challenge on a closed course at a decommissioned Air Force
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base outside of Los Angeles. The 60 mile (96 km) route resembled
an urban obstacle course. In this race, Carnegie-Mellon took first (4
hours) and Stanford was second (4.5 hours). In this event, unlike the
previous Grand Challenges, cars had to have more sophisticated
and intelligent sensors. Though road quality was better (paved
rather than off-road), the course of the Urban Challenge was far
more challenging.
Fast forward just a few years and we see that Google hired many
of the leaders of the Stanford and Carnegie-Mellon (CMU),
including Sebastian Thrun of Stanford and Chris Urmson of CMU,
for their own internal secret project, which they announced in
2010.3 These self-driving cars (the project has been spun off by3 (Markoff 2010; Guizzo 2011).
Google’s parent company Alphabet into a subsidiary named
Waymo) have since traveled over 2 million miles (3.2 million km)
autonomously, mostly around the San Francisco Bay Area, but also
more recently in Austin, Texas and Kirkland, Washington (Figure
6.3).
Waymo’s cars are map-dependent, operating where the roads have
been mapped out in detail, so that they can compare what they see
with what they expect to see4 – a strategy with obvious strengths4 (Madrigal 2012).
and weaknesses.
Strengths of using maps include a better understanding of the
environment. Weaknesses include that:
• not everywhere is necessarily mapped, there may be “Google
deserts,” for instances some places are private property, and
• the world changes, the map cannot be updated instantaneously.
Each AV potentially updates the map (by uploading sensor data)
each time it uses a route. The first Google style AV to pass the
unmapped or incorrectly mapped area will update the map as it
passes, but it will of course need the capability of traveling with
unmapped, incompletely mapped, or incorrectly mapped instances.
And if it can do that autonomously, does it really need the map to
proceed? If it cannot do that autonomously, there remain issues
with autonomous to human control interfaces.
In Fall of 2015, the electric vehicle automaker Tesla remotely
upgraded its most recent model year cars (about 50,000 vehicles)
with ‘Autopilot,’ making them semi-automated (SAE Level 2).5 Elon5 (Hull 2015).
Musk, the CEO of Tesla, said he expects fully autonomous vehicles
by 2018.
David took a test ride with a Tesla owner running the vehicle in
Autopilot. As countless internet videos attest, Teslas are able to
function in hands-off mode some of the time. They use adaptive
automation 81
cruise control to follow the vehicle in front at a desired speed
constrained by a fixed following distance, and use lane markings to
stay in lane. They change lanes automatically at the request of the
driver (who must hit the turn signal).
As was true in Fall 2015, and still true in Fall 2017, none of these
functions can be safely performed in a Tesla running ‘Autopilot’ in
the absence of driver observation and monitoring. In fact the vehicle
requires the driver to periodically return hands to the steering
wheel. The vehicles do not yet automatically stop at traffic lights or
stop signs, though it is understood that engineers are working on
and testing those functionalities. Ambiguities in lane markings (for
instance at freeway merges and diverges, or as a result of road
construction or restriping) still create difficulties for the vehicle in
Autopilot mode.
First person observations (from late 2015) are that vehicles still
over-react on curves (following the average of the inside and
outside curve, rather than a fixed distance from the inside curve).
The give-way game between merging vehicles and an on-road Tesla
cannot yet be safely conducted in the absence of driver intervention.
Teslas do not presently drive independently via a map from origin
to destination the way Waymo’s test cars do. There is no obvious
linkage between satellite navigation and mapping and the control
function. Teslas appear to be map-independent, and controls are
through on-vehicle sensors. They are an indicator of a future to
come, but which has not yet arrived.
The episodes described above are far from the first attempts at
autonomous cars. At Demo ’97 Automated Highway Systems were
successfully demonstrated.6 Cars could travel at high speeds, 6 See (Public Roads 1997).
without driver intervention when closely following each other at 1
meter spacing, on an isolated test track. Vehicle automation has
long been envisioned, dating back to the 1930s and the GM
Futurama exhibition at the 1939 New York City World’s Fair. While
a technological success, the Automated Highway Systems programs
were a political failure, and the program was cancelled. Lack of a
deployment path was the reason for the cancellation. No one would
build limited roads for very few specialized cars.
Similarly, no one would buy cars that could only be used on
selected lanes. Autonomous vehicles running in mixed traffic solved
this chicken and egg problem, since they would be useful without
special infrastructure, at the cost of much higher complexity.
However, after a critical mass of autonomous vehicles hits the
road, and once all the bugs are worked out, there will be potential
gains (closer following, narrower lanes) for them to travel in
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autonomous-only lanes rather than mixed traffic. Existing managed
lanes can be dedicated to AVs. Even general purpose lanes can be
designated and redesigned to AV-only traffic in order to increase
total system throughput. We may get special AV lanes on highways
as an interim step before all lanes on all highways are for AVs only,
and before non-AV cars are prohibited.
After six decades of technological dormancy, the automakers are
responding to the DARPA Urban Challenge. Waymo and others
(including Uber) are seriously investing in advances to remove the
driver from the loop for vehicle control. For instance, Delphi, an
auto parts manufacturer spun-off from General Motors, drove an
automated Audi 3,500 miles (5,600 km) cross-country in March of
2015, with hands-off control 99 percent of the time.7 In fact,7 (KurzweilAI 2015).
Delphi’s forerunner (GM Subsidiary) Delco sponsored a similar trip
in 1995 by Carnegie-Mellon scientists, where the computer
navigated 98.7% of the time.8 Just as in the early days of the8 (Business Week 1995; Spice 2015).
automobile, expect more such demonstrations.9 But be mindful of9 (Duncan and Burns 2003).
the number of times the driver has to take back control.
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6.1 A Note on Nomenclature
SAE level Name Steering and 
Acceleration/ 
Deceleration
Monitoring of 
Driving 
Environment
Fallback 
Performance 
of Dynamic 
Driving Task
System 
Capability 
(Driving 
Modes)
Human driver monitors the driving environment
0 No Automation Human driver Human driver Human driver n/a
1 Driver 
Assistance
Human driver 
and system
Human driver Human driver Some driving 
modes
2 Partial 
Automation
System Human driver Human driver Some driving 
modes
Automated driving system ("system") monitors the driving environment
3 Conditional 
Automation
System System Human driver Some driving 
modes
4 High 
Automation
System System System Some driving 
modes
5 Full Automation System System System All driving 
modes
Figure 6.2: Society of
Automotive Engineers
automation levels.
Today we have cars. In 30 years we will have cars. But in the
meantime, some cars will will driven by humans and others not, and
there will be terms to distinguish them.
Most people use the terms Autonomous, Automated,
Self-Driving, Robotic, and Driverless as interchangeable. Even
wikipedia does not differentiate. Yet some people in the field make
a point of the differences.
A self-driving car is not as advanced as driverless, in that
driverless doesn’t have the back-up of a person taking control, and
self-driving might. Driverless taxis are not merely self-driving, they
pick up passengers and may be personless. 10 In SAE terms, 10 See also The Economist, which
maintains they are not the same, as
self-driving cars are a step further
than autonomous vehicles, which lack
steering wheels and human control
(S.W. 2015). Google uses the term ‘self-
driving’ even for cars which humans
can control, thinking the name is softer
than ‘autonomous.’
driverless is Level 5, while self-driving is Level 4 or below.
Generally, the difference between automatic (or automated) and
autonomous is the degree of human intervention. An automated
car does not have the level of intelligence or independence that an
autonomous car has. So driverless and autonomous are nearer to
synonyms, as are self-driving and automated. A truly autonomous
car would decide on destination and route as well as control within
the lanes. An automated car would follow orders about destination
and route, and may only adopt some lane-keeping or car-following
guidance.
Nevertheless, these differences cannot be preserved linguistically,
even within the profession, the broad misuse and confusion will
drown small differences of meaning. Just as we had horseless
carriages, automobiles, and cars, eventually these will be called
autos and cars as well. We use the terms interchangeably.
Sometimes these terms are incorrectly conflated with ‘Connected,’
discussed in Chapter 7.
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6.2 Who’s in First?
Figure 6.3: Cumulative km
traveled in autonomous mode
by Google/Waymo self-driving
car and Tesla Autopilot. Source:
Google/Waymo/Alphabet and
Tesla.
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Waymo, a unit of Google’s parent Alphabet, is leading by some
metrics of AV research, Tesla by others. Waymo is far from profitable.
One of the great questions is how long does an organization like
Alphabet tolerate losses in an operation before it cuts losses. Many
projects are undertaken (ventures are funded) with great promise.
Technological change often happens one bankruptcy at a time,
where first movers borrow heavily to invest in new systems with
unproven demand. This creates second mover advantages. This is a
danger for initial massive investment in self-driving cars in the near
future, especially as there doesn’t seem to be any demand from the
public currently.1111 (Schoettle and Sivak 2016).
We caution that as Henry Ford never said (but almost certainly
felt) “If I had asked people what they wanted, they would have said
faster horses.”1212 (Vlaskovits 2011).
In the autonomous vehicle market, suppose someone claims
there will be gains in excess of losses, and someone else, with access
to a checkbook, believes them. Expected value depends both on the
potential and the probability of that potential being realized. In
practice both of those are uncertain and dynamic. Today’s potential
in current market conditions differ from tomorrow’s. Today’s
probabilities also differ from tomorrow’s. At what point do you
recognize the potential as lower than claimed, and the probability as
lower still? When, in Bayesian terms, do you update your priors?
In Waymo’s case, the potential of being the first mover is lower
because there are now many more people serious about AVs since
Google kick-started the latest wave of development of self-driving
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cars, following upon the DARPA Urban Challenge. In contrast, the
likelihood of success might be higher, since there is now more proof-
of-concept.
Unless Waymo imagines itself actually manufacturing cars
(probably in a contract facility), one assumes either it hopes to get
revenue from
• more eyeballs on Google-ad-powered screens (phones, dashboard,
and especially heads-up displays) in a world of AVs,
• cutting a licensing deal with manufacturers, or
• providing mobility services directly as an Uber-type of business.
There is likely value to the unit collectively above and beyond
the value of the individual workers (though we have no personal
knowledge), so one hopes they keep the team together, under their
ownership, or another patient patron.
In some senses Waymo has been overtaken. For services, all
major automakers have now partnered with some other company to
explore ride-hailing. Toyota and Volkswagen are the latest to
announce this (following historically on similar patterns where
automakers invested in rental car companies (e.g. Hertz by GM
1925-53 and Ford 1987-2005, Avis by GM 1989 - 96, Dollar-Thrifty by
Chrysler 1990-97). Daimler owns car-sharing service company
Car2Go and Moovel and is certainly looking at this market. Google
rival Apple invested in Chinese ride-hailer Didi. Google has had
ownership stakes in Uber, and Alphabet in Lyft.
For autonomous technology, Tesla has cars on the road already.
While Tesla Autopilot is not the equivalent of Waymo cars, as it still
requires driver attention, it is also a real product accumulating real
experience at an accelerating rate, as shown in Figure 6.3, with two
orders of magnitude more distance traveled and seemingly fewer
incidents per distance traveled (based on press-reports of Google and
Tesla crashes).
If the logic of machine learning is right, it will get better and better
over time. Autopilot crash experience is better than human driven
vehicles.
This is the incrementalist approach, leaving the steering wheel
and brakes facing the driver, which counters the more radical
Waymo approach of removing (almost) all control from the driver,
and trusting the machine completely. The risk has always been the
transfer, when the car tells the driver to take over if the driver isn’t
ready. But if that issue is small compared to the general safety
benefit of letting the machine do the steering, accelerating, and
braking, it is a risk worth taking.
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So will Waymo ultimately close its unit and set its code and data
free, let it wither away as staff start up spinoffs like Otto, (since
purchased by Uber) or sell it outright to a manufacturer if they
choose not to pursue it with gusto? Or, perhaps the rush to
dominate the initial market for AVs will lead to a unsustainable
bubble that hits everybody’s valuation (not just Alphabet’s). The
market will survive if it does, but there is surely value to the team
as a collective.
As of 2017, Waymo insists it will go ahead with public deployment
of driverless taxis.
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6.3 What: Consequences
Figure 6.4: WordCloud of
the use of travel time: Most
frequently mentioned activities
in motion activities. Figure by
Fan. (Levinson et al. 2016).
Autonomous vehicles portend a series of consequences affecting
both the transport sector and society. We highlight some below.
Safety.
“Have you ever noticed that anybody driving slower than you is an
idiot, and anyone going faster than you is a maniac?” – George Carlin
Autonomous vehicles, powered by sensors, software,
cartography, and computers can build a real-time model of the
dynamic world around them and react appropriately. Unlike
human drivers, they seldom get distracted or tired, have almost
instantaneous perception-reaction times, and know exactly how
hard to brake or when to swerve.
Cars would be much safer without the ‘idiot’ behind the wheel.
AVs promise an ‘idiot savant’ (i.e. a computer), with special skills for
the routine boredom of driving. With full deployment, it is possible
to plausibly imagine a reduction from tens of thousands to hundreds
of deaths per year in the US.
Vehicle Form. See the Demassification discussion in Chapter 9
about changes to vehicle form enabled by autonomy and sharing.
Parking. Autonomous vehicles save space on parking. Cars can
drop off passengers in front of destinations and go elsewhere to park
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as needed. Subsequently they can pick them up at origins. This
requires reconfiguration of drop-off and pick-up areas to avoid large
queues. Parking stalls can be narrower and parking decks shorter if
people are not required to use them. Cars can be packed more tightly
in such parking facilities. Further those facilities will be farther from
the high value real estate locations. Parking is further discussed in
Section 13.1.
Capacity. Because they are safer, autonomous vehicles can follow
other each other at reduced distances.13 Lateral distances can be13 There is an assumption that lanes
and roads are properly maintained.
Knowledge about maintenance
problems will be conveyed much
more rapidly to road operators with
driverless vehicles with automated
sensors which are connected to the
infrastructure provider. Because better
lane-keeping can reduce lanes width, it
should reduce total maintenance costs.
closer and therefore lanes can be narrower. Because they are safer
and more precise and more predictable, autonomous vehicles can
stay within much narrower lanes with greater accuracy.
If skinny cars emerge, designed for one-passenger, or several
passengers in tandem, enhanced by the stability provided by
automation, lanes can be narrower still, or be shared with two such
cars.
Thus, capacity at bottlenecks should increase, both in throughput
per lane and the number of lanes per unit road width. These cars
still need to go somewhere, so auto-mobility still requires some
capacity on city streets as well as freeways, but ubiquitous adoption
of autonomous vehicles would save space on parking and lane
width.
Shorter Paths. Currently most drivers do not take the shortest
path (though we don’t really know why that is so, we have
speculations). If we take humans out of the navigation decision,
cars will be more likely to find the shortest path. This may not be
system optimal (which would save a few percent of total travel
compared with user optimal travel),14 but will be a significant14 See Chapter on ‘Price of Anarchy’ in
Elements of Access (Levinson et al. 2018). improvement over current routing decisions. Not only should we
not let people drive, we shouldn’t let them route themselves if we
want an efficient system.
Cars without people. Autonomous cars can drive without people
at all. They can be used for pickup and delivery, in addition to
the dead-heading from drop-off to parking, or from drop-off of one
passenger to pick-up of another, or for recharging or refueling. All
of this can increase total travel on the road.
Mobility for the Immobile. Automated cars will enhance
mobility for children and people with disabilities. Parents, friends,
and siblings need not shuttle children around; the vehicle can do
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that by itself (assuming increasingly protective parents would allow
such). The child is securely identified with camera and biometrics,
and parents can even monitor their child with an in-vehicle video
camera – yielding an environment far more secure than the school
buses and carpools children currently ride. There likely will remain
debate about how old a child must be before she is placed alone in
an autonomous cars, but the consensus is likely to be, if they are in
kindergarten, they can ride alone, as with school buses. This is a
similar argument with ridesharing services today that offer rides,
but that is, to date, a small phenomenon.
Human travel will be much more point-to-point, with far fewer
pick-up and drop-off passenger trips required, as those can be off-
loaded to the vehicle without a driver. Deadheading autonomous
vehicles, driving around without a passenger to pick up their next
family member may become common, though logistics and shared
vehicles can minimize the amount of this.
Noise. Many of the sounds of the city are sounds of transport.
Engines whirring, car brakes screeching, horns honking, sirens
blaring. All of these will become sounds of the past. Electric
vehicles are much quieter (so much so that blind persons are
concerned), AVs will need fewer braking and acceleration
maneuvers, and AVs need not honk in general, as communication
between automated and connected vehicles can be silent. Sirens
themselves will also be a thing of the past as cars will be able to
identify emergency vehicles without the sounds.
Rationality. Autonomous vehicles are coming. Someday soon
drivers will pay even less attention to the road in front of them than
they normally do. Today, vehicle control is largely an emotional task.
In traffic engineering, one of our many abbreviations is PIET:
• Perception – driver sees object
• Identification – driver identifies object (understands stimulus)
• Emotion – driver selects action
• Reaction (Volition) – driver executes action
But this is all very fast, not contemplative, operating in what
Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman calls System 1 rather than
System 2 in his book Thinking Fast and Slow.15 In short, if we start to 15 (Kahneman 2011).
think intellectually about whether to apply the brakes, we are
already dead. Perhaps one of the causes of road rage is the
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continued operation within this emotional rather than rational brain
for extended periods.
With autonomous vehicles, an hour or two a day for the average
driver will be taken out of this high-risk emotional decision context.
They will be placed into a more relaxed, less stressful mode, where
the most difficult decision will be whether to listen to Pandora or
Spotify. In short, the car trip of the future will be more like an office
or home than then the uncertain dangers of the open road.
As admirers of Star Trek’s Mr. Spock, moving towards a more
considered, this less emotional world of the future is a good thing,
something humans have been doing for millennia as we evolve from
the apes.
As we take out what is often the most stressful element of the day,
will we ‘stress-compensate,’ just as we risk-compensate now, and
find some other activity to make needlessly emotional? Or will we
take our gains in a more civilized society?
Costs. The capital costs for autonomous vehicles are likely to be
higher than traditional cars, at least at first, until driver-facing
technologies (like the steering wheel, brake and accelerator pedals,
and so on) can be removed for cost savings, as the sensors and
computers add some cost compared to existing systems. Those
additional costs decline over time, as learning curves, paying off
R&D, and mass production all lower expenses.
In contrast, fuel costs should be lower, as autonomous vehicles
are likely to be more efficient, both due to less congestion and more
optimized driving styles ranging from smoother acceleration to
various hypermiling techniques like drafting to reduce drag.
Labor is a significant share of costs in transport, for vehicles such
as taxis, buses, and trucks, which today require a driver. With
automation, that labor cost vanishes. We imagine a transitional
phase where remote control drivers in a traffic center
simultaneously monitor and manage multiple vehicles for situations
when autonomous vehicles are not fully trusted. We expect those
operators to be bored. The elimination of labor cost benefits taxis,
buses, and trucks which had held higher costs relative to their
competitors like driving alone and trains.
Delivery services with online purchasing will become even more
cost-competitive compared to traditional retail. Transit will either be
more cost effective than it is now, or be able to offer lower fares, or
some combination of the two.
Right-of-Way Retrofit. To accommodate specialized low speed
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neighborhood or campus vehicles, most places will require retrofits
to enable a connected network of low-speed routes. Retrofitting cities
for transport has a long history as cities and transport technologies
co-evolve. Cities, which had originally emerged with human and
animal powered transport, were retrofitted first for streetcars, and
then for the automobile, and in some larger cities for subways. We
have also redesigned our taller buildings for escalators and elevators.
Some places where retrofits might be required and feasible
include cities laid out and built before the automobile. Much of the
street grid can be retrofitted (‘calmed’) to disallow high-speed
traffic. Similarly, retrofits are technically feasible anywhere there is
space to install a slow network in parallel with the existing fast
network, for instance, with barrier separated lanes on wider
suburban roads.
Vehicle diversity applies not only to a larger variety of motorized
vehicles of various sizes, but also to a greater variety of transport
using the existing streets, which today are highly segregated with
cars (both moving and parked) dominating the street and
pedestrians the sidewalk. Slow speed, light weight vehicles make
‘shared spaces’, which don’t differentiate between the road and the
sidewalk, much more palatable. See Chapter 13.3 for a further
discussion of adaptation.
Roadspace Reallocation. It follows that if transport systems
require reduced lane width and have adequate capacity, transport
agencies can reduce paved area and still see higher throughput.
Today, most roadspace is not used most of the time, but road
agencies cannot just roll it up when it is not being used.
However, on freeways the space can be deployed more
dynamically to increase either safety (by increasing spacing) or
capacity (by reducing spacing), simultaneously adjusting speed and
spacing accordingly. Dynamically reversible lanes are possible once
humans are out of the loop.
On local streets, roadspace no longer required for motor vehicle
movement can be reallocated to other uses (pedestrians, bicyclists,
transit, parks and so on), discussed in Chapter 14 about reuse of
roadspace. But for purposes of reliability and safety, bikes, bus-rapid
transit, and the newly emerging micro-transit benefit from priority
lanes, as discussed in Chapter 12.
Nomadism. For a select few, driverless vehicles may bring back
the recreational vehicle, as some choose the fully nomadic lifestyle,
spending much if not most of their lives in motion, especially with
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low energy costs.
Ownership. Ownership of autonomous vehicles is a looming
question. Will people with regular everyday trips find it cheaper to
rent than own? The cost of ownership may turn out to be cheaper
than the cost of rental in many if not most US markets (outside
central cities). Personally owned cars are not dead-heading
everywhere for passengers, lowering energy and operational costs
and wear and tear. Owners have more motivation to care for their
own car (in subtle, non-detectable ways) than for a rental, so the car
may last longer.
While most roads are public; most cars are private and
individually owned. Most transit also is public, though services are
sometimes performed under contract by private firms. Private roads
are emerging, but their use is impossible without public approval
and assistance. New forms of ownership and payment will
inevitably be a dynamic evolution.
Customers would need to pay for services of any type (either as a
subscription or a per-use basis). Advertising could offset – though
not entirely cover – some costs. It is conceivable that stores might
subsidize transport, as might employers, as benefits for the
customers or staff (as they do today with parking). This is discussed
further in Chapter 8.
Activity in Motion. One of the advantages of commuter trains
over long distance driving is the ability to do something else while
in motion. There are a variety of activities that new travelers can
undertake. Our colleague Yingling Fan in a recent paper summarizes
a number of these activities in the WordCloud shown in Figure 6.4.
Reading, talking, and watching are dominant categories. Eating and
personal care are likely rising categories in people’s own AVs. With
new heads-up displays (HUD) in vehicles we imagine new forms
of information and entertainment (and advertising) designed for the
windshield, projected on glass, but able to be seen through as well.
Travelers in their own, customized, space without concern for the
navigation task will not only be more productive (have higher utility
than) drivers who need to pay attention, but also train passengers,
or those who use Mobility-as-a-Service, who don’t own their mobile
space, as illustrated in Figure 6.7. This will further increase people’s
willingness to travel.
Status. Just as owning a car was once a class signifier in the US,
and remains so elsewhere in the world, and as owning a particular
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model of car (like a Prius or a BMW) persists as a signifier, we can
expect that during the transition period owning an autonomous car
will be a class-signifier. It indicates at once that you are wealthy
enough to own a new car, and technologically sophisticated enough
to trust your life to it. While eventually we expect this to be
uniform, early adopters will have very different economic and
social characteristics from the population at large. During the long
transition, those who cannot afford such cars may come to be
vilified as the cause of crashes.
—
While people, animals, weather, larger cargo needs, and so on are
still potential confounding factors, autonomous vehicles interacting
with only autonomous vehicles should be much easier to design and
manage than autonomous vehicles in mixed traffic.
Chapter 8 considers how ride-hailing services such as Lyft and
Uber compete with taxis. But with their added labor, such services
are too expensive for most people for frequent mobility.
Mobility-as-a-Service currently exists to some extent with the
current carsharing companies (Car2go, Zipcar, etc.) which compete
with rental cars. But again the cost is too high for most people to
use on a daily basis (as Cloud Commuting) for a primary mode of
transportation, and unless you live in a place with many other
users, the distance to the vehicle may be high. However, with
autonomous vehicles, the cost of the driver can be skipped, the car
can come to you (just like Enterprise, the American rental car
company).
Adam Jonas, Director and Leader of Global Auto Research Team
at Morgan Stanley, has a relatively simple idea that he claims will
consume his remaining career. As redrawn in Figure 6.6, he offers
two intersecting axes to, in part, foretell the future of the auto
industry. One axis traverses between ‘human driver’ and
‘autonomous’; the other indicates if the assets (the car) is owned or
shared. He believes we are moving from the lower left (human
driven, privately owned) to the upper right (autonomous and
shared).
In contrast, autonomous vehicle total costs will be significantly
lower, making it feasible that larger numbers of people replace their
personal car (which is parked 23 out of 24 hours) with one that comes
on-demand.
94 the end of traffic and the future of access
6.4 When: Timeline
Figure 6.5: US vehicle fleet by
SAE automation level. Author
estimate.
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Cumulatively, the driverless distances that have been ‘driven’ are
rising every minute.
The time to perfection is far from clear, but one day, soon-ish, you
will awake, give a voice command to a car, and never again touch a
steering wheel, gears, accelerator, or brakes (which won’t be available
for your use anyway) – and so will everyone else. You will step into
your car, tell it where to go, and not think about traffic. The window
in front of you will be a heads-up display giving you information
and entertainment, while allowing you to see the road coming up.
Today, many of the necessary features include lane-keeping,
adaptive cruise control, and automated braking technologies are
already standard on high-end cars, as is automated parking
assistance. Aside from the Cadillac Super-Cruise in freeway travel,
none of the automakers advises hands-off driving at this point.
In the meantime, the industry relies on incremental thresholds
for what ’automation’ really means. The Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) has a series of levels describing degree of
autonomy (from Level 0 - ‘no automation’ to Level 5 ‘full
automation’), shown in Table 6.2.1616 (SAE International 2014).
The Cadillac SuperCruise, which can be described as somewhere
between SAE Level 2 ‘partial automation’ and Level 3 ‘conditional
automation’ is now being advertised for sale (its actual use in
automated mode will be on the relatively controlled environment of
the freeway). The Tesla Autopilot, with similar capabilities, is
already available.
To give a rough timeline, we anticipate Level 3 (conditional
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automation) autonomous vehicles by 2020; then Level 4 to be
available in 2025. Level 4 might be required in new US cars by 2030
and in all US cars by 2040. Our best estimate of the the deployment
curves are shown in Figure 6.5.17 17 Details in (Levinson et al. 2016).
We expect share of travel distance driven autonomously will
initially trail the number of vehicles with autonomous capability, as
not all AVs will be used in automated mode on all trips, or for the
entirety of each trip. Eventually it will lead, as newer and more
capable AVs are used more frequently than non-AV vehicles.
Thus we anticipate that automated vehicles will go from their
current status of essentially 0% market share to an end state of 100%
of all new car sales (i.e. automated capability will be a requirement
of new car purchases) by 2030. Furthermore, older human-driven
vehicles will be phased out except for special purposes (car shows,
races, parades) during the 2030s. Self-driving cars in specific
contexts (e.g. freeways or isolated campuses) are expected enter the
market before 2020. In other words, human drivers will eventually
(around 2040) be prohibited on public roads most of the time, just
as horses no longer gallop down our streets.
Consumer acceptance remains an unknown, and depends on the
quality of the product being offered. Which companies wind up
bringing AVs to market successfully is also an unknown, it may
include a mix of existing and new players in the field.
Automated vehicles are probably already legal in most US states
(New York requires hands on the wheel),18 so the burden of proof is 18 (Smith 2012; 2013b).
on those who want to slow them down. Several states already allow
testing of fully autonomous vehicles on public roads, and eventually
all will.19 19 As of 2017 Nevada, Florida, California,
Michigan, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia, passed legislation enabling
testing of fully autonomous vehicles on
public roads.
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6.5 Where: Environments
Figure 6.6: Future of the auto
industry, as seen by Adam Jonas.
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The Cadillac SuperCruise’s 2017 entry into the ‘semi-automated’
vehicle market implies the first commercial market for autonomous
vehicles would be the relatively controlled environment of the
freeway.2020 (Nunez 2014).
However, entry into the relatively controlled environment of
low-speed places makes sense as well. These are two different types
of vehicles: high speed freeway versus low speed neighborhood.
While they may converge, this is no guarantee and perhaps today’s
converged multi-purpose vehicle will instead diverge. There has
long been discussion of Neighborhood Electric Vehicles, ranging
from golf carts to something larger, which are in use in some
communities, particularly southwestern US retirement complexes.
In Sun City, Arizona, for instance, people use the golf cart not just
for golfing, but for going to the clubhouse or local stores (usually as
the household’s second or third car, but occasionally as the primary
vehicle). Such a phenomena exists because local streets are
controlled by low speed limits, and there are special paths where
golf carts are permitted and other vehicles aren’t. Campuses,
retirement communities, neighborhoods in some master planned
communities, and true parkways are almost ideal for these types of
‘driverless carts’21 because these places don’t have heavy traffic and21 We heard the term attributed to Bryant
Walker Smith. discourage high speeds.
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6.6 Thought Experiment – Autonomy Island
“Look boss, Ze Car, Ze Car.”
“My dear guests, I am Mr. Roarke, your host. Welcome to
Autonomy Island. Yes, here on Autonomy Island, all of the cars are
autonomous. Your adventure will be to ride and drive and walk and
bike in a place without fear of a human running you over.”
An automaker (or collective of automakers, or government, or
Google) could buy all the cars on an island (and perhaps rent the
government), replace them with new autonomous vehicles, and see
what happens . . . to safety, to travel behavior, etc.
This is the kind of real-world laboratory experiment that would
be highly useful to understand the implications, the unintended side
effects, the bugs and so on of robotic cars.22 22 For instance, take the US Virgin
Islands. St. Croix has a population of
about 50,000 people. If it follows general
US patterns, it has about 33,000 light
vehicles. For about $1B [Less than the
cost of a single NFL stadium] all of the
cars could be replaced with autonomous
vehicles at about $30,000 each.
The US Virgin Islands collectively have between 10 and 20 auto
fatalities annually. At an official USDOT value of statistical life of
$9.1 million, that is at least $91M per year. In 11 years, the
experiment would pay for itself if in fact it eliminates fatal crashes
the way autonomous vehicles are expected to, leave aside any other
potential benefits.
The advantages of an island are that it is a closed system, it can
be fully mapped, and no one can drive on or off. A real island with
real people would demonstrate how these interactions occur in use.
98 the end of traffic and the future of access
Figure 6.7: Illustrative frequency
distribution of ‘utility’ of travel
time by mode. Source: Fan in
(Levinson et al. 2016) adapted
from (Lyons and Urry 2005).
7
Connectivity
Figure 7.1: Demo ’97 National
Automated Highway Systems
Consortium
Some discussions equate autonomous vehicle technology,
described in Chapter 6, with ‘connected vehicle’ technology.
Recently we have to come to hear the phrase ‘Connected and
Autonomous Vehicles.’
For instance, a UK organization writes:
“Connected and autonomous vehicles incorporate a range of different
technologies, facilitating the safe, efficient movement of people and goods.
Increased connectivity allows vehicles to communicate with their
surrounding environment. This provides valuable information to the driver
about road, traffic and weather conditions. Vehicles with increasing levels of
automation will use information from on-board sensors and systems to
understand their global position and local environment. This enables them to
operate with little or no human input (be driverless) for some, or all, of the
journey.” (Centre for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles 2015).
To the educated listener, the expression ‘connected and
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autonomous’ may sound oxymoronic, because in many ways, it is.
Attaching the governmental word ‘connected’ to the more Silicon
Valley ‘autonomous’ is a type of whitewashing. Autonomy is about
independence, connectedness is about interdependence. History
reminds that all of today’s networked technologies began as isolated
and unconnected instances. Personal computers (minicomputers,
mainframes) predated the Internet (Arpanet, etc.). Books,
magazines, and newspapers predated the World Wide Web. Motors
and generators predated the electric grid. Short, independent, often
differently-gauged railroads predated national and international rail
networks. Cisterns and septic systems predated water and
wastewater pipelines. Crystals and single-celled organisms
predated the web of life. It is the natural order of things.
To be clear, an autonomous vehicle needs to be able to make
real-time decisions independent of any explicit communication with
other vehicles.
A connected vehicle gets and provides information to
infrastructure (Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)) and other vehicles
(V2V) with Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. Proponents argue that if
connected vehicles were widely deployed, it would not only
improve safety for those in the vehicle, it would improve the safety
and environment for pedestrians, bicyclists, and other drivers.
Connected vehicles should enable vehicles to anticipate better and
negotiate with each other for use of a particular bit of road space at a
discrete point in time. Both autonomous and connected vehicles are
coming. It is important to recognize that cars may be autonomous
but not connected or connected but not autonomous, or both (or as
today, neither).
7.1 Types of Connectivity
There are a variety of different types of things that fall under the
family of ‘Connectivity’, this chapter lists a few.
Car radios. The first in-car communication was probably the in-
car radio, developed in 1930 by the Galvin brothers, who named it
‘Motorola’, a riff on the popular RCA ‘Radiolas’ of the 1920s. This
is certainly not what is typically meant by connected vehicles. The
first traffic report is unrecorded, 1 but provided traveler information1 According to Eric Fischer “In San
Francisco Chronicle radio schedule
listings, a radio traffic report doesn’t
show up until 5:40 PM, May 26, 1958.”
to the driver of the car. Radio traffic reports will soon be consigned
to the “Remember When” bin. Emergency vehicles have long had
two-way radios, well before the more widespread deployment of the
car-phone in the 1990s.
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Vehicle condition. Since General Motors deployed OnStar in
1996, there has been communication between vehicles and a central
control about the condition or state of the vehicle. This is especially
useful if there is a collision, but can also be of use for personal
navigation or vehicle breakdowns.
Electronic toll collection. The ability to charge vehicles a
toll using radio waves reduces the need for vehicles to stop, and is a
primitive version of vehicle to infrastructure interaction.
In-vehicle Internet. A ‘connected car’ sometimes refers to a
vehicle with it’s own Wi-Fi network, connected via cell-phone
networks to the internet. This allows people (hopefully passengers,
not drivers) to surf the web rather than staring out the window.
Traffic speed information. The provision of real-time traffic
information to drivers, and their traffic information like speeds back
to the system can be considered a form of connectivity. Waze is an
early version of this, but when you use Google Maps or Apple
Maps on your iPhone or TomTom in your car, your GPS location is
fed back, and if you are in motion, a speed is derived, along with a
timestamp. This is turned into traffic information which is
aggregated and packaged for consumer use. More complex reports,
like text based data from Waze or even Twitter, are additional less
systematic examples. If there is enough data, that can be weighted
appropriately, these kinds of data might be sufficiently accurate to
provide useful travel speeds where there are no inductive loop
detectors. It might even generate traffic conditions or flow data, if
the share of vehicles acting as probes at a given time is somehow
estimated.2 2 (Levinson 2002).
Upgrading vehicle software. Using an over-the-air update,
Tesla increased the battery capacity of vehicles in the wake of
Hurricane Irma.3 Normally owners would have to pay extra to 3 (Tsu 2017).
access the added battery capacity, which was software-limited. Tesla
routinely upgrades software remotely.
Road condition information. One example that is trotted out
for the value of connected vehicles is the ice patch. A vehicle driving
a road at too high a speed for conditions (because if it weren’t too fast
for conditions, the ice patch would not matter) detects an ice patch,
hopefully doesn’t crash, and relays that information using some V2I
protocol back to a traffic management center, which then relays it to
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all other vehicles traveling that section subsequently. This seems fine
enough. It would of course be better for the first car to have detected
the ice patch before driving on it at too high a speed, and decelerate
to an appropriate speed. But what harm can come from this? Very
little. More information, presuming it is accurate, is usually better
than less. Yet this example is rare. Usually roads are either covered
in snow and ice or clear of frozen precipitation. In Minnesota, prior
to global warming, the first condition was standard. This is a nice-
to-have feature and may reduce some number of crashes per year.
Infrastructure signs, signals, and markings. Connected
infrastructure could advise the vehicle about controls, as for
instance in Figure 7.2. Instead of relying on the vehicle’s cameras
(or the driver’s eyes) to read signs and signals, or digital maps to
know of their existence, the intersection would broadcast its state to
the vehicle. This could be an improvement, but unless all
intersections are so instrumented (a tall order in a big country with
many levels of government), it cannot be relied on. An
uninstrumented intersection does not broadcast that it is
uninstrumented. Instead, the vehicle or driver must know that.
Traffic signal timing. Vehicles broadcast their position to traffic
signals, and the traffic signals adjust their timing in response to this
information. This does not help pedestrians much.
Real-time platooning. Vehicles can follow other other vehicles,
followers receiving communication from the leader of the platoon of
accelerating and braking manoeuvres, and synchronize their
behavior with a minimum of lag. With this information, cars can
presumably follow at closer distances (1 meter following was tested
in the 1990s), and thereby increase road capacity and reduce energy
consumption.
Real-time negotiated control. What most people envision by
the term ‘connected vehicles,’ is the 4-way intersection where no one
has to stop. This is far more dangerous.
7.2 Real-time Negotiated Control Requires Autonomy
In 2002, David, with a student, Xi Zou, wrote a (sadly unfunded)
proposal (and this was hardly an original idea, it was in the air)
[Abridged]:
By integrating intelligent agents and Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
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(MANETs), the management of low-volume intersections can be
devolved to vehicles, without requiring conventional traffic signals, or
forcing extended stops at red lights. Advanced techniques such as
digital maps, GPS, in-vehicle computers, and mobile wideband
communications provide cornerstones of this new framework.
Intelligent agents implanted in the vehicle represent the aims of
drivers and management. The intelligent agents embedded in
vehicles know the vehicle’s destination, and like adaptive cruise
control, adjust the vehicle’s speed up or down. These agents
continuously announce their id, position, speed, and acceleration to
inform other equipped vehicles over a Mobile Ad-Hoc Network.
(While radar and GPS can be used by one vehicle to determine
another vehicle’s position and speed when it is in line-of-sight, it is
insufficiently accurate to determine acceleration, or other attributes
when the vehicle is obscured). Based on the
position/speed/acceleration of other vehicles, a vehicle proceeds
through the intersection at its current speed, slows down, or speeds
up to avoid a collision. A consistent protocol used by all vehicles
(based on each vehicle’s position, speed, and acceleration) determines
which vehicle passes through the intersection conflict point first, both
avoiding collisions and ensuring safety. Thus intersection
management becomes a decentralized operation of a community of
agents that might be part of a future mobile society.
In intersection management, the number of accidents and total
travel time of traffic can be reduced if drivers/vehicles are aware of
the states of other vehicles near the intersection. Current technologies
enable vehicles to be aware of their own real-time states such as
position, speed, and acceleration, and to communicate with other
entities (vehicles or management center). Furthermore, vehicles near
an intersection can acquaint themselves with the overall and detailed
information about other vehicles. They might evade each other
efficiently, avoiding potential collisions. Unlike conventional signal
control, we propose microscopic control in which the behavior of
each vehicle is adjusted individually. Instead of using stop-or-go
control, more flexible passing manoeuvres can be used to increase the
capacity in every approach and reduce average travel delay.
In short, Vehicle A approaches from the west, Vehicle B from the
north. They will both hit the intersection conflict point at
approximately the same time if neither changes speed or trajectory.
The traditional rule for this is a stop sign (or signal), either 2-way or
4-way, which delays at least one vehicle needlessly. With V2V (or
V2I) communication, some protocol is established whereby one
vehicle decelerates relative to the other, and they miss each other by
a fraction of a second, traveling almost full speed. There is no delay,
no needless braking, no collision, and best yet, for purposes of
greenwashing, the environmental impact is lowered because we
somehow still all drive gasoline powered vehicles in this imagined
future.
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Could this last case be done with autonomous vehicles? It can
only be done safely with autonomous vehicles.
You cannot safely rely on the other vehicle saying it will
decelerate, you must ascertain that yourself. What if it were you
who was to decelerate, how do you know the other vehicle doesn’t
decelerate as well, just because it said it would maintain speed? The
answer is, you measure it with your own sensors. Perhaps an
unconnected deer (or an unconnected child!) jumps out into the
road just past the intersection. The other car slams on its brakes
near the intersection. You cannot rely on the pre-established
protocol. Perhaps they communicate this change of plans to you.
But there is a lag (or worse, buffering). Even a fraction of a second
is too much. Your vehicle must detect the other’s change via sensors
(which are always faster than communications, just try to beat the
speed of light) and react accordingly (decelerate/ accelerate/
swerve/ brace for impact).
The algorithms, even if coordinated, would need to be able to
resolve the potential conflict without communicating. To illustrate
conceptually. Each vehicle, if it believes it would reach the conflict
point first (to, say, 8 decimal points of precision) accelerates, if it
believes it would reach second, it would decelerate. If one vehicle
accelerates, and the other vehicle decelerates, we have harmony, and
can avoid the collision as each vehicle continues to update velocities
and speeds in reaction to the other vehicle’s behavior until the
possibility of conflict is avoided entirely.
Certainly there are possibilities that
both autonomous cars accelerate or both
decelerate. This could be due to GPS
location measurement error (each thinks
it reaches first (or second)). In this case
a second tie-breaker might be required.
For instance, the easternmost car always
wins. Both cars should be able to
detect with sufficient accuracy which
car is easternmost (in this case, the
southbound car). So then the eastbound
car decelerates, and the southbound
car maintains speed or accelerates.
Hopefully there is harmony, both cars
adjust speeds accordingly as conflict is
avoided. No explicit communication was
required.
One can imagine other, better
tiebreakers, or the need for third
tiebreakers (the intersection is X-shaped
rather than +-shaped, so they both think
they are easternmost), but this can be
mapped out. In fact it only requires
one vehicle to be autonomous. If
after, say, three rounds of chicken (both
vehicles increasingly accelerating to the
intersection) which is ascertained in less
than a second, then the AV decelerates
hard to avoid a conflict.
You don’t have to like the conceptual
algorithm here to believe that such
algorithms are possible.
Now, if all vehicles were centrally controlled, what would happen?
While this might appear to improve safety (if the central algorithm is
indeed safe), it does so at huge cost. The prospects and magnitude of
systemic failure just increased enormously. Any bug, any hack could
shut down all transport or cause multi-vehicle collisions. This seems
terribly unwise.
7.3 The Death and Rebirth? of Connected Vehicles
So why this recent interest in connected vehicles from the US
government? It comes from the same people who were pushing
Automated Highway Systems (AHS) in the 1990s. It only worked
on dedicated infrastructure with dedicated vehicles. No one would
build dedicated infrastructure if no one owned dedicated vehicles.
No one would buy more expensive dedicated vehicles in the
absence of a large network of dedicated infrastructure. Full AHS
was a great technology with no deployment strategy, it was a classic
chicken-and-egg situation with no interim steps.
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This was obvious to some of us in the 1990s, but nevertheless
AHS was funded until after the technically successful NAHSC
Demo (Figure 7.1), at which point it was cancelled. Certainly there
were some autonomous technologies mixed in with the more
connected (platooning) technologies, and some of those have
reappeared, so we don’t want to imply the research program was a
total loss. In contrast, most progress in automated vehicles comes
from outside the traditional transportation community, namely the
roboticists. Their demos were funded not by the US Department of
Transportation, but by the more outward looking Department of
Defense, which supported the series of grand challenges described
in Chapter 6.
In short, connected vehicles, if used for information, can be a
benefit. If CVs are to be used for control, they are at best a luxury,
and possibly a threat, but definitely cannot be relied on. They are
neither necessary nor sufficient for safety. Autonomous vehicles,
designed with the appropriate algorithms, in contrast are both
necessary and more likely to be sufficient for safety (as
human-driven vehicles have already proven themselves unsafe).
The effects of autonomous vehicles are much more profound
than connected vehicles, as connected vehicles are only especially
useful in the presence of other connected vehicles, while
autonomous vehicles are valuable through the transition period
when most vehicles are neither connected nor autonomous.
In the end, all vehicles may be both autonomous and connected,
but it is far more important they be autonomous than they be
connected. Fortunately, that is the sequence in which the technology
will be meaningfully deployed.
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Figure 7.2: Connected Vehicle
Concept. Source: Florida DOT.
Note there are sidewalks but no
pedestrians in this worldview.
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Figure 8.1: Subarushi. Photo by
Kevin J. Krizek.
Robert Fulghum’s 1988 book All I Need to Know I Learned in
Kindergarten1 explains how the world would be improved if adults 1 (Fulghum 1988).
adhered to the same basic rules as children (i.e. sharing, being kind
to one another, cleaning up after themselves, and living “a balanced
life” of work, play, and learning). But the first one, sharing, is
relevant for transport infrastructure, the way it is used now, and
how it will likely be used in the future.2 2 Thanks to Kari Watkins of Georgia Tech
for the idea of linking Fulghum’s book to
transport challenges.
Outside of the things we talk about buying at the ‘store’ in
Chapter 11, households mostly own stuff they do not deplete on a
regular basis: homes, cars, bikes, lawnmowers, skis, or audio
records. Those physical things that are only periodically needed, are
rented or borrowed (e.g., library books, fertilizer spreader, pickup
truck, inflatable castle). Items privately owned become dated and
often antiquated. Those items that are rented may be run-down
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from use, unless the fleet or stuff receives considerable turnover.
As physical objects (rather than virtual) one person’s use prevents
someone else’s use. Still, most of the time, nobody was using the
object. Cars, for instance, typically remain unused 23 out of 24 hours
in the day. Pursuing a triathlon career in his early 30s, Kevin lacked
convenient travel to races and swimming practices. He therefore
purchased his first car for $700 – a 1981 Subaru that he later painted
with fish (subsequently labeled the Subarushi, see Figure 8.1 ). The
beloved Subarushi sat on the street outside his home unused all but 3
hours per week. This level of personalization is impossible in a rental
vehicle (though may make rentability higher). In the same way this
car sat underused, guest bedrooms rarely see guests. We suspect the
bouncy castle sees jumpers even less often.
But big (and real-time) data creates marketable assets from
under-used possessions. People still need physical things (those
things comprised of atoms), but increasingly they demand virtual
things (composed of bits, as described earlier). Either way, both are
increasingly shared. Dubbed collaborative consumption, the basic
idea is that things can be shared rather than individually owned
(e.g., one rents hotel rooms and cars rather than buying condos and
vehicles when on travel; it is now common to rent music, videos,
and books).
Previously cars, taxis, and hotel rooms were rented from
companies which could achieve large economies of scale. Now it is
possible to rent couches and cars and rides from individuals with
excess capacity. The degree to which economies of scale outweigh
the network effects of distributed suppliers awaits to be seen. We
roll out four dimensions of sharing – cars, rides, bikes, information
– that have emerging implications for transport.
8.1 Sharing Cars
While living with his family in Italy, Kevin was carless; his family
therefore used the town’s Hertz, renting a car once per month.
David did the same thing while a graduate student living in
relatively high-density Berkeley, California using the neighborhood
Avis once a semester. Getting to the agency in both cases was a
hassle; the contract paperwork was a nuisance; the continued
uncertainty over the rental agreement was frustrating. Resentment
built up and the relatively high rate led to infrequent use. Alternate
destinations were chosen, owing to the availability of reliable public
transport.
‘Carsharing’ is a warm and fuzzy name for modern car rental
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services. People are ’sharing’ the car just as they share a hotel room
– by paying a third party and using it at separate times.3 In most 3 Carsharing is by-and-large in the US
context not even analogous to a time-
share, where different people do share
ownership of a property, but get to use it
at different times.
US carsharing services, the ownership is by a private for-profit
company (a few are non-profits and the for-profits may not actually
be profitable); the service is not owned by its members. They
employ mobile information technologies to avoid the repetitive
contract negotiations that were once common when one wanted to
rent a multi-thousand dollar vehicle from a multi-national
corporation.
Zipcar was originally founded by Robin
Chase and Antje Danielson in 2000;
Danielson was forced out in 2001, Chase
in 2003. Zipcar went public with 8,000
cars, 500,000 members and $186 million
in revenue. Never profitable, it was
acquired by Avis in 2013 at about one-
third its 2011 market capitalization. Avis
assessed its net present value at over
$500million of profit over the discounted
future.
There are notable differences between traditional and modern car
rental. First, the car is reserved via a website (or more recently, a
smart-phone app) and unlocked via a special member card or the
phone itself, no real-time intervening labor is required between you
and the car. Second, the newest of these services allows you to pick
up and drop off your car at any legal on-street parking space, no
longer only at special stations or locations.4 Third, the rentals can 4 This varies by city, so in Minneapolis,
cars are on-street, in other cities like
Boston, restriction affect this.
be by the number of minutes, rather than days, so cars may be less
expensive to rent for a short trip. In the US the first break-out
company in this sector was Zipcar, which adopted a model widely
used in Europe5 and went public in 2011, but still contained some 5 For more on carsharing: (Fallon 2011;
Alspach 2013; Duhaime-Ross 2014).inconveniences.
As a member of a two-driver, one-car family, David used Zipcar
for about a year, but stopped due its inconvenience and cost. While
his experience was limited (he used it for only a handful of trips),
there were several problems. First the station was inconvenient from
his house, the pick up and return location for the car was a parking
space on campus, more than a mile from home. Second he had
to know exactly how long was the trip, since overage charges were
some $50. From the Zipcar perspective, with such a thin fleet of
vehicles, the overage charge was essential to guarantee the car would
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be available for the next renter, but to avoid being late, the renter had
to reserve the car for a longer time period. Third, the technology was
a bit wonky, leading to risk of having no car available at all.
Car2go (and others) all strive for various improvements on the
same theme, most notably the ability to park anywhere rather than
at a station.
Car2go, a newer service than Zipcar, worked better for users. At
its peak, some 535 cars were deployed throughout Minneapolis and
St. Paul, so a user could reserve a car (no more than 30 minutes in
advance) within walking distance. The app will show directions to
the car.
Once you enter the car, find the key, turn the ignition, fill out a
brief survey on car quality, and off you go. Unlike Zipcar, car2go
bills by the minute. When you are done, you check out from the car.
Car2go uses Smart Fortwo vehicles, which are the smallest and
least expensive commercially available road-worthy vehicles in the
US. The Smart Fortwo, despite being a unit of Daimler, best known
for the Mercedes Benz, gives you the feel of the road.66 Smart is a unit of Daimler, and US sales
help them satisfy Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, fuel
efficient Smarts are averaged with less
fuel efficient and much larger Mercedes.
When David once told a Honda sales
person that a test ride was bumpy, they
said Honda designs their cars that way
because of Honda’s “racing heritage,”
so we can chalk up the feel of the
road to Smart’s racing heritage. On
the city streets of Minneapolis, where
the pothole is more common than an
actual street surface, this is not a good
thing. Still the convenience of the service
outweighs the chintzy vehicle.
New economic models include RelayRides, which allow
individuals to rent their own car, and is perhaps best suited to
airports where cars are otherwise parked for a long time, and
CarNextDoor.
Like most automakers, BMW is entering the carsharing market
with DriveNow. Ian Robertson with the company says “As a
mobility provider, the BMW Group is not simply an automobile
manufacturer.”7 BMW also combines carsharing with leases, so for
7 (Vijayenthiran 2011).
instance, you can lease a small EV during the week and get access
to a larger vehicle on the weekend.
The importance of carsharing is not as a replacement for rental
cars, which are still standard in their traditional market of airports
and auto replacement during servicing – though that may change
as well. Carsharing also is not cost-effective as a replacement for
daily commuting trips. However if you walk, bike, or take transit to
work, it might be good to replace owning a car, or second car, for
the occasional (say weekly) trips that are too far to practically walk
or bike, and too inconvenient to take a transit system that serves
downtown well and little else. In crowded urban areas where paying
for parking near your home is a real financial burden, carsharing is
more promising than most of America where parking is practically
free.
The car-shedding question remains: how many households will
surrender a second (or first) car for the occasional trip?8 Is the
8 There are several studies on car-
shedding due to carsharing. It is too
early to form a conclusion, as early
adopters may behave differently than
later adopters. (Stasko et al. 2013;
Ter Schure et al. 2012; Shaheen and
Cohen 2013).
market thick enough that the likelihood of finding a car nearby is
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high enough that it is reliable enough to use? With car2go there is
no guarantee there will be a car within walking distance. Efforts to
rebalance the fleet can be costly. This is where other services (taxi,
transport network companies, transit) come in as backups. This is
also where autonomous vehicles can be important.
Nevertheless, people prefer not to think about every transaction.
If they are charged per use, they use less. But they are less happy
and more determined to get a car of their own to avoid transaction
costs. Individually owned cars of course have costs of their own, but
they are less frequent and less obvious. If the charges are invisible
people may not think about them. Just as we went from terminals
and mainframes to personal computers, and internet cafes to internet
at home, we went from trains and transit to private transport once
we could afford it. The cost savings will have to be considerable for
most people to want to go back. But habits are easier to form in the
young. An urban college student who joins car2go may keep it after
they graduate while they remain city-bound.
The best market for car2go may be the urban hipster – enough
money to afford, enough transit savvy to get to work and back with
minimum hassle, enough childlessness to have a simple schedule,
enough desire to signal greenness to avoid owning a car, but enough
sense and desire for dates in the country or trips to Ikea to recognize
the occasional need.
Car2go is expanding in some places globally, but in many others,
that market is not good enough, and car2go has retrenched; it has
withdrawn from Minneapolis, San Diego, and Miami in the US and
London and Birmingham in the UK.
Car-sharing is a network-effects driven business, for it to work,
the access costs must be low, generating demand, which will
increase vehicle availability (as suppliers respond to demand),
which will lower access costs, which will increase demand. Given
the idleness of existing car2go vehicles (which were rumored to be
as idle as private cars in Minneapolis), they clearly could have
accommodated more customers on the existing fleet. Access costs
were insufficiently low to get this positive feedback network effect
going. Perhaps a greater investment would have juiced the market,
it is unclear. At the time of its demise in late 2016, gasoline prices
were exceptionally low, the economy was at the peak of expansion,
so people readily buy and drive private cars. In withdrawing from
Minneapolis, car2go specifically complained about taxing, which is
an element. Clearly carsharing should not be taxed a the same rate
as rental cars, which are aimed to extract money from
out-of-towners (‘taxing foreigners living abroad’ in the famous
112 the end of traffic and the future of access
words of Monty Python) who don’t vote locally. This is a case of
public policy not catching up with changing technology.
It should also be noted there is an implicit subsidy to car2go,
which uses Smart ForTwo vehicles. Smart is a subsidiary of the
German company Daimler-Benz, and the good fuel economy of
Smart cars offsets the guzzlers produced under the Mercedes
marque in the US’s federal corporate average fuel economy (CAFE)
standards. Yet the market was not strong enough. In large part this
is due to the rise of ride-hailing apps, as discussed in the next
section, which provide a cost-effective substitute so-long as they
remain heavily subsidized by venture capital funds.
Figure 8.2 shows trends on carsharing in North America. It is not
clear where market saturation is, and whether the dip in 2015 (prior
to some of car2go’s retrenchment) is just a data issue or indicative
that perhaps ride-hailing apps are stealing some carsharing thunder.
Notably carsharing company Shift shuttered in Las Vegas in mid-
2015.99 (Totten 2015).
8.2 Sharing Rides
If carsharing was a warm and fuzzy name for modern car rental
services, ’ridesharing’ is a warmer and fuzzier name for modern
taxi services. You might have thought ridesharing was the same as
carpooling. And it is, if you think of the drivers as your friends
giving you a lift (or in the name of one company a Lyft), not for
money, but for a voluntary donation or paying for half the costs,
like the carpooling service and app Carma enables. Whether this
attempt to skirt the rules and regulations of taxis succeeds is a
battle to be fought out in thousands of local markets globally. In
markets where an agreement has been reached, the donation results
in an actual charge and the process – enabled by smartphones – is
taking off.
The terminology for this service is still in flux, sometimes the
terms ‘ridehailing’ or ‘ridesourcing’ are used rather than
‘ridesharing’ to cool and de-fuzzify it. ‘Ridehailing’ avoids
ambiguity.
The car you get with Lyft (or UberX) is the driver’s personal car,
not a fleet vehicle; it varies. David’s first Lyft ride and Kevin’s second
UberX was in a Mercedes.
How does Lyft (or any other Ridehailing
/ Transportation Network Company)
work? From the perspective of the user
(1 and 2 are one-time) the following is
the sequence:
1. Download the App.
2. Enter the required info
3. Open the App and summon a Ride.
4. Get in the Lyft vehicle when it
arrives (the driver will usually call to
confirm pickup location/time), it has
a small mustache in the window.
5. Tell the Driver the Destination – You
can enter this in the app as well,
though it doesn’t affect who picks
you up (yet) apparently. This is an
opportunity for efficiency, as drivers,
for instance, may be happy to go
towards their home near the end
of a shift, but not away. On the
other hand, that might lead to too
few drivers “bidding” on prospective
customers.
6. Ride
7. Get out of the Car.
8. Check App to rate the driver.
Payment is automatic unless you
want to change your payment.
Kevin’s first UberX ride was at the San Francisco Airport from
Rafaello who telephoned saying he was in the white Prius at the
stop-light by the end of the airport terminal. Kevin proceeded to the
supposed Prius and open the back door to enter the car – much to
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a woman’s astonishment and disdain. He walked to the next white
Prius and fortunately found Rafaello (and the correct car).
These social dynamics matter to services like Lyft. In contrast
with traditional taxis, the passenger sits shotgun (in the front row
passenger seat), and is expected to have a conversation with the
driver (which happens in some taxis, though not always).
Anecdotally, it appears people who drive for Lyft are more likely to
be (though not universally) American citizens or long-term
residents, and since they own their own car, less likely to be poor,
recently landed immigrants who comprise the taxi drivers in many
cities.
Lyft is in many ways simply an app with a back-end (rather,
‘cloud-based’) dispatch service. They claim to be a “transport
network company whose mobile-phone application facilitates
peer-to-peer ridehailing by enabling passengers who need a ride to
request one from drivers who have a car.” They insist the drivers
are independent (as are the riders). The difference between this and
a taxi dispatcher is thin. A taxi is “a car licensed to transport
passengers in return for payment of a fare, usually fitted with a
taximeter.”10 So for taxicabs, the arrangement between the rider 10 Source various, including (Dictionaries
2017).and the passenger is mediated by the government (which licenses
the vehicles).
Are Lyft drivers licensed to transport passengers for payment?
This is a major point of contention. They are licensed drivers, and
any licensed driver (above a certain age and level of experience) is
eligible to carry passengers. The cars are private cars (at least
sometimes) though that is little different than how taxis operate in
other parts of the world. Many Singaporean taxi drivers will take
fares when going between where they are going anyway, but
otherwise treat the taxis as a personal vehicle.
Lyft now does jitney (shared taxi, dollar van, informal transport)
type services, dubbed Lyft Line. (Uber has the similar UberPool)
These serve either one pickup going to multiple destinations, or
multiple pickups going to one destination, or multiple origins to
multiple destinations, and compete with both taxi and public
transit. (Though it would not be exactly fixed routes, one could
imagine regular runs with a known coterie of passengers). This is at
a lower rate than the traditional single party, taxi-like service. While
these services are at the time of this writing only in San Francisco
and New York, Lyft now claims that Lyft Line comprises 50% of
Lyft’s rides in San Francisco and 30% in New York.11 (Not all of 11 (Bregman 2015).
Lyft Line customers wind up in a shared ride, they just indicate a
willingness to for a lower fare, and get the lower fare regardless of
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whether another passenger can be found).
Typically at busy times, these ridehailing companies will either
face a shortage of drivers, or implement ’surge’ pricing, using
higher prices to manage demand and induce drivers. Another
solution would be to implement ’compression’ mode, whereby
travelers shared rides with strangers to better use seat and driver
capacity.
The ease of making ride requests and payments is what drives
many folks to choose Uber or Lyft over traditional taxis.
We suspect differentiating status and class is another important
element. Users are hip enough and wealthy enough to use the new
technology and not have to sit where others from other, less tech-
savvy classes have sat before. As these services become widespread,
humans will undoubtedly develop new forms of elitism.
Venture capitalists believe these will be very successful
companies. Uber has been valued at over $70B. While we believe
ridehailing is a useful market product, we remain skeptical of this
valuation, if only because there are so many competitors (including
of course Lyft, as well as BlaBlaCar, Didi Kuaidi,12 Gett, Curb,12 (DeAmicis 2015).
Hailo, Blacklane, Sidecar, Zimride, iHail, and Flywheel, among
others) and the stickiness of riders and drivers to any particular
company is weak and their limited advantages to larger services
over smaller ones.1313 A longer discussion of our skepticism
is at (Levinson 2014b). The competition from the new entrants has driven taxi
companies to step up their game, a number of the services listed are
better interfaces to traditional taxi. Drivers are already
simultaneously on multiple networks, so the expected pickup time
doesn’t vary much from one app to another. Waze, a subsidiary of
Google, is testing a true peer-to-peer, real-time, no payment
ride-sharing service. Shuddle, KangaDo, and HopSkipDrive aimed
to be the “Uber for kids.”14 (Though Shuddle is now deceased).14 (French 2015; Zimmerman 2016).
Lift Hero targets seniors. SheTaxis and Chariot for Women aim to
be an “Uber for Women.”1515 (Hatmaker 2014).
8.3 Sharing Bikes
A recent popular internet meme16 noted that in Europe, bicycles16 Apparently Based on (Calamur 2013).
were outselling cars.17 We were surprised it was news, since it is17 We use the term ‘bike’ to mean
the traditional human-powered ‘bicycle,’
unless otherwise noted as in e-bike or
motor-bike.
true in the US as well, and it seemed obvious to us (particularly for
Kevin who was rumored at one point to have a quantity of bicycles
well into the double digits). The National Bicycle Dealers
Association (NBDA) reports18 annual bike sales on the order of 18.718 (National Bike Dealers Association
2012). million for 2012. In contrast, US car sales are on the order of 8
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million, along with another 8 million light trucks. So where are all
these bikes, why are they not seen more on roads everyday?
Bikes for Kids. Many of the bikes sold annually are for children
(5.7 million of the 18.7 million are below 20 inches wheel (50 cm)),
but even so, 13 million are 20 inch and above wheel size, and 13
million is still much bigger than 8 million cars (and near 16 million
light vehicles, note also that many light vehicles are not for personal
use). Even just inspecting specialty bike shops, which sell at the
higher end, that’s nearly 3.1 million bikes per year, which while less
than cars, is still a pretty big number.
Yet, the volume of trips by bike and certainly miles by bike are
much lower than by car and are not poised to overtake in the US.
We don’t even see 3.1 million bike commutes daily in the US. The
American Community Survey reports 865,000, so these are more
likely for recreational than utilitarian purposes.19 19 ACS numbers are undoubtedly an
under-report of bike travel, but the
number remains small. (Schoner and
Lindsey 2015).The Short Life of Bikes. Another reason for this statistic is that
bikes don’t last as long as cars. The average US car on the road is
11.4 years; while no similar data exists for bicycles, it must be lower,
especially given the higher sales. At 18.7 million bikes per year there
would be 1 bicycle for every person in the US after 16.7 years of sales,
so the average age would be about 8.4 years if everyone had a bike
and there were no losses, and surely that isn’t true. This again is in
large part due to the growing up of kids.
—
So lack of bikes does not seem to be a problem, but bikes where
you want them may be. If I didn’t take my bike to work, I can’t use
my bike for a lunchtime ride at work. If I am a tourist, I probably
didn’t bring a bike with me. Wouldn’t it be great to just get a bike
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when and where I want it, and abandon it there at the end of the
trip. Well, it is not quite modern carsharing, but widely dispersed
bike stations make this closer to possible. As shown in Figure 8.3,
bikesharing systems have grown in many cities worldwide.
Station-based Bikesharing. Bikesharing, the modern version of
bike rentals, (just as carsharing is the modern version of car rental)
has both a membership and per-use model. Typically a member
signs up online, gets an electronic key in the mail, and can visit a
bikeshare station in their system and simply insert a key in the slot
next to the bike they want, and pull it out, and remove the bike.
They then have, say, 60 minutes to use the bike before it needs to be
returned to a station (any station, not just the one it was borrowed
from). A one-time user has to insert a credit card. These measures
ensure the bicycles are returned and not found in the bottom of a
nearby river, the sad outcome of early free bikesharing schemes.2020 Which isn’t surprising, by definition
socialists don’t respect property. The bikes, while functional, are unlikely to be a model a regular
bicyclist would purchase. They are especially heavy, and only 3-
speed, so the risk of theft is relatively low.
Stationless Bikesharing. Chinese companies have pioneered
stationless bikesharing, where the bikes can be dropped off
anywhere within the designated parts of the city, and located via
GPS and an app. The bikes are locked and unlocked with an app,
and each member has put down a deposit in advance. Hundreds of
thousands of these bikes, from different vendors, can be found in
each of many large Chinese cities. This upends some of the
weaknesses of station-based bikesharing, but it is not clear whether
the model translates outside of China. It is being tested as of
mid-2017 in Melbourne, Sydney, and Manchester. E-bikes are also
on offer in some cities.
—
Bikesharing is about active transport as much as recreation, and a
way of connecting these two things.
Maturation in the number of systems is a good thing in many
respects. A next step, however, is to stop adding new systems in
favor of increasing the services of existing systems, inter-connecting
and inter-operating (maybe even consolidating some). A related aim
is broadening the subscriptions globally, so that memberships can be
used on any system in the world.21
21 Few people will of course take a
bikeshare bike from Minneapolis to
Chicago, but Minneapolitans should
automatically be able to use the Chicago
system (and vice versa). And like
the electric inter-urban users of yore
(one could take an electric inter-urban
(trolley) from Elkhart Lake, Wisconsin to
Oneonta, New York, it was said), one
should be able to bike share between
major places, even if transferring bikes
periodically.
NiceRide, the largest bikesharing system in Minnesota, has
shown continuous growth from 2010 through 2015, as shown in
Figure 8.4. This is complemented by a significant increase in those
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years in bicycle-dedicated infrastructure, including separated
bike-lanes. More bike traffic is expected to have a safety-in-numbers
property that crash rates per bicyclist will decline with an increase
in the number of bicycles.
Bikesharing can function as an extender of transit service, as
people take transit, transfer to a bike-share to reach a final
destination (or for recreation), and to return to the transit stop. With
station-based bikesharing, this requires a station at the destination
end, or the destination to be short duration. With stationless bike
sharing moving from speculation (in the first two editions of the
book) to reality, the flexibility and thus usefulness of the system
greatly increases.
Figure 8.4: NiceRide’s Service
Area 2010-2014. Source:
(Dossett 2016).
8.4 Sharing Information
The advice from Kindergarten alluded to above mainly applied to
sharing physical items. A contemporary update relates to
information: my information could be used to augment your
information. Sharing information is like a rising tide that floats all
boats and big, real time information (data) creates new knowledge
to improve decisions.
If data are pieces of information, quantitative or qualitative, then
what the hype machine is now terming ’big data’ is really just more
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data – and lots of it. The transport industry has long employed loop
detectors in the road to count cars and provide information to traffic
signals. Traffic signals were first installed in Cleveland in 1914, and
there are more than 300,000 traffic signals now operating in North
America, affecting most daily trips. While great progress has been
made in terms of passenger safety and road efficiency by this
technique, there are still some limitations. Improperly operated
traffic signals cause excessive delays that sacrifice productivity,
waste fuel, and pollute the air. While side collisions are reduced,
rear-end collisions are increased at signalized intersections.
Dissatisfaction in intersection operation has become a serious
problem faced by traffic operator. Traffic signals suffer from
improper settings, delayed maintenance, and malfunctions.
Travel diaries, via self-reported information, have been around
since the 1940s. But there are now sensors everywhere, and users –
and cities – are just beginning to exploit this information. Travelers
themselves are now the probes with GPS units and wireless
communication enabling everyone to know (in principle) near
real-time speeds, traffic conditions, and transit schedule adherence.
Digital traces of everyone doing everything are everywhere,
including who is doing what, buying what, searching for what and
even physically where they are going. Furthermore, it is often
crowd-sourced and sometimes open. When it is not, legal issues
abound.
Relatively standard practices from e-commerce and business
analytics are infiltrating domains of public service provision and
urban governance. Generic commodities are being replaced with
identity preserved goods.22 You are no longer buying nondescript22 The television show Portlandia
satirizes this in the skit “Is the Chicken
Local?” https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ErRHJlE4PGI (The Chicken was
named Colin).
Grade 4 Durum wheat, but a 5 lb (2.2 kg) bag from a bushel of
Durum wheat from a particular row on a particular farm, planted
and harvested on particular dates, grown from particular seeds,
with known fertilizers and pesticides documented. The meta-data
about your product will be as detailed as the product itself.
Logistics firms have long used scanners to track goods through
the distribution chain, with a high degree of success. That same
level of knowledge is slowly percolating through public sector
transport organizations. We no longer lump like things together
without knowing where they came from, where they are going or
who bought them. Under monikers such as ’smart cities’ and ’civic
hacking,’ the use of centrally available data has made inroads into
the urban policy sphere, moving from an e-government tool that
aimed to increase public sector transparency into new forms of
public-private partnerships or urban laboratories that vest analysis
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and problem-solving in formal or informal institutional
arrangements outside of city agencies.23 23 (Karvonen and Heur 2014).
For many mobility options,24 we now have instantaneous 24 (Kitchin 2014).
knowledge of how soon a taxi or ridehailing service will provide a
pick up. Specific (and sometimes accurate) apps tell travelers when
the next bus will arrive. Via Twitter feeds, it is possible to even
know in advance if there is space on the bus for our bike. Because
GPS systems have real-time traffic, sitting in traffic owing to lack of
knowledge about crash or construction delays can be a thing of the
past. Plans can be changed on the go. Services such as Waze (now
owned by Google), TomTom, Inrix, and Here are competing in the
traffic information market.
In addition to providing value to the traveler, new
smartphone-based and vehicle-based sensors will be valuable to
transport agencies who are woefully uninformed on how people
actually use their systems. This information will prove useful not
only for planning, but even for real-time operations and controls,
identifying information that will feed algorithms that decide how to
time traffic signals or dispatch additional buses. Apps which
crowdsource vertical acceleration information and GPS locations
from smartphone sensors are already useful for automatically
providing agencies about road quality, like where is the latest
pothole.25 25 (UK Government 2013).
At the personal level, The “Quantified Self” suggests that the
outputs of many new sensors will be fed back to the individual
traveler. Yingling Fan of the University of Minnesota notes that
information about travel can lead to behavioral interventions.26 She 26 Fan, Yingling (2016) Quantified Self
and Quantified Networks (Chapter 5) in
(Levinson et al. 2016).
identifies three stages: awareness, informing the traveler of their
environmental impacts, motivation, describing the benefits of
change, and action, providing the tools to change behavior (e.g.
making it easy to rent a bike or take transit). Health apps of various
kinds are an early version of this, showing the user the number of
steps taken so far, or modes that they used.
Communities are still putting this all together to make it work as
well as it does in the pitch to the venture capitalists. But the
direction is clear: the world is in the process of transforming from
one of ignorance and static plans to one of planning (and
re-planning) travel on the fly with confidence. Plans are more
dynamic. With more confidence, people can freely venture farther
afield, away from their familiar haunts, in search of the novel.
Agencies can now better monitor conditions and make better
short-term predictions. Congestion and late buses will be less of a
surprise. Cumulatively, increased – and shared – information is
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mobilizing people in unforeseen ways.
8.5 The Future of Sharing: Cloud Commuting
The term ‘Cloud Commuting’27 refers to what we may now think of27 The term was probably coined
by David in his blog (2008-08-23)
https://transportist.org/2008/08/
23/cloud_commuting/.
as Silicon Valley’s promised future where you don’t own a vehicle,
but instead summon a ‘shared autonomous electric vehicle’ (SAEV)
on-demand, in real-time, right-sized for your party, maintained by a
fleet operator, and not just for special trips, but for your daily
commute and errands. This future contests with with the ‘private
autonomous electric vehicle’ (PAEV) for hearts and minds. As we
discuss in Chapter 13, both are possible.
For communities where densities are relatively low, incomes
high, and thus taxis scarce, the most reliable strategy for timely
point-to-point transport is for people to maintain personal transport
close at hand. Cars and bikes, which they own, are parked at their
homes, workplaces, or other destinations. But with more
widespread use of information technologies, ownership and
possession are no longer necessary prerequisites for on-demand
mobility. Widely called the ‘sharing economy’ or ‘collaborative
consumption,’ its present-day manifestations in transport:
carsharing and ridehailing are viable if not widespread. Couple
these technologies with autonomous vehicles discussed in the
Chapter 6, and one arrives at what we term ‘cloud commuting’ – the
convergence of ridehailing, carsharing, and autonomous vehicles.2828 This idea is also discussed in (Enoch
2015). More formally, this range of options can be termed Mobility-as-a-
Service (MaaS). While nascent today, clearly big players are placing
big bets that this will be a big change in how people travel. It is this
which explains Uber’s multi-billion dollar valuation.2929 Uber’s valuation has risen steadily as
we write this, at the first edition it
was in our view overvalued at $40B.
In December of 2015 it was $62.5B.
(Kokalitcheva 2015).
A vehicle from a giant pool of autonomous cars operated by
organizations based ‘in the cloud’ would be dispatched to a
customer on-demand and in short order, and then would deliver the
customer to her destination (be it work or otherwise) before moving
on to the next customer. Even more efficiently, it might pick-up or
drop-off some additional passengers along the way and may offer
customer specific features, though this depends on the size of the
vehicle, as discussed in Chapter 10.30 We quickly run down30 Vehicles may likely have customer’s
preferences pre-loaded (seat
position, computing interface, audio
environment, video entertainment,
computer desktop).
implications as MaaS emerges.
Smaller, more modern fleet. The customer benefits by not
tying up her capital in vehicles, nor having to worry about
maintaining or fueling vehicles. The fleet is used more efficiently,
each vehicle would operate at least 2 times (and as much as 10
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times) more distance per year than current vehicles, so the fleet
would turnover faster and stay more modern.
Fewer vehicles overall would be needed at a given time. It is likely
customers would need to pay for this service either as a subscription
or a per-use basis. Advertising might offset some costs, but probably
not cover them. This includes both advertising to the customer in the
car and using the car as a roving billboard.31 However retail stores 31 One of David’s students founded
Admo, peer-to-peer car advertising.
http://admocar.com.
(if they survive) might subsidize transport, as might employers, as
benefits for customers or staff.
Vehicular variety MaaS allows a variety of vehicles to serve
customers, rather than a single, least common denominator model.
This right-sizes the fleet to the customers, and should lower costs,
space use (see Chapter 9) and energy use.
Coverage, logistics. Like traditional fixed-route transit, MaaS
will function better in urban areas than rural areas. Response time
will be shorter (potentially faster than getting a parked car); size and
variety of the vehicle pool will be greater; parking in high value areas
becomes less troublesome. MaaS will also fit better for nonwork
rather than work trips, as the regularity of work increases the value
of either vehicle ownership or regularly using micro- or macro-transit
versus renting by the trip.
Autonomy solves the localness problem facing existing
carsharing services, since the cars come to you. Like current
bikesharing systems, there would need to be load balancing
features, so the cars were pre-dispatched to areas of anticipated
demand, and maybe coordinated carpooling at peak times.
Labor. Automation also structurally transforms the labor relations
of ridehailing services and transit, making it potentially both
massively more abundant. In general, automation is accompanied
by unemployment and social dislocation in the sectors it affects (in
this case transportation), with associated spillovers, as workers need
to find new skills and jobs in new sectors. Given this is not an
overnight change, but occurs over decades, it will appear important
but not urgent, and much of the labor force reduction will occur
through attrition and lack of new hiring.
Payment structure. An interesting aspect of this from the
perspective of travel demand is that with MaaS, people will
probably pay by the trip, either directly, or through choosing the
right plan of service roughly proportional to use. While the average
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cost of car ownership, now a quite significant share of household
expenses, goes to zero for those who join this system, the
out-of-pocket marginal cost per trip rises quite significantly. The
implication is fewer trips assuming people give up on vehicle
ownership. People paying by the minute or the mile will want to
reduce trip distances.
Electrification. Autonomous and shared vehicles will interact
with electrification. A rental service of self-driving autonomous
vehicles, that are ordered on-demand may provide you a fully
charged electric vehicle for your trip. Much like the Pony Express,
which swapped horses rather than requiring riders to wait for their
own horse to rest, the service may provide a replacement vehicle
mid-trip rather than requiring you to wait around to charge your
vehicle.32 There is no requirement that cloud-based, self-driving32 Assuming range issues have not been
resolved. vehicles be electric, but as cars get smarter they should be able to
charge themselves, alleviating some of the concerns associated with
EVs.
Street Design. Streets designs will need to accommodate pick-up
and drop-off as a major feature, so curb space will need to be re-
arranged so people know where to meet their car (and vice versa),
so they don’t get into the wrong white Prius. While we lose the
need for parking, we might think of channelizing roads more like
airports or multi-way boulevards than the monolithic pavement they
are today. Street design is discussed more in Chapter 14.
8.6 Sharing vs. Ownership
Sharing – be it cars, bikes, boats or information – has strong
network effects driven by convenience (a characteristic the
time-starved seem particularly mindful of). But, macro versus micro
transit discussions in Chapter 12 bring up matters of economies of
scale versus economies of scope. There’s a role for both.
For example, one is more likely to use carsharing if more
neighbors use it, since that makes it more likely there will be a car
in front of one’s house, workplace, or wherever, when it is desired.
Reducing vehicle access time from 10 minutes to 5 minutes, or 5
minutes to 2 minutes is significant, especially when most trips are
only 20 minutes long.
There are many blocks in Minneapolis (1100 miles of street), so
moving from some 500 cars in Minneapolis and St. Paul to some
5000-10000 (as a rough approximation of where it needs to be so
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a member doesn’t have to walk more than a block to find one) is
a 10 or 20-fold expansion over the peak of car2go. Finding one of
Minneapolis’s 300 cars (assuming the other 200 are in St. Paul) in a
city of 58 square miles meant about 5 cars per square mile. As of
the first edition of this book, there were 6 cars within a 10 minute
walking distance (an area of about 50 very non-square blocks), and
1 within a five minute walk of David’s house. On 1100 miles of
street, this is not going to be a dominant mode without significant
expansion. But 5000 cars is less than the several hundred thousand
registered in Minneapolis, and could replace many of them.33 33 Some of this information
was gleaned from the car2go
website (2015-04-03) https:
//www.car2go.com/en/minneapolis/.
The car2go model did not put in enough capital, nor did it have
enough demand, so there was a car waiting on every block. To do so
is no small step, and may require automation.
There is also the rise of ridehailing apps like Uber and Lyft,
which are only slightly more expensive and loads more convenient
than carsharing for many trips. That they are only slightly more
expensive is due to tremendous venture capital (VC) subsidies,
which are great to exploit as customers, while they last. This also
did not help carsharing.
As with any social network, it is not clear in advance which if any
will take off. As with many networks, there needs to be a large up-
front capital investment. But unlike rail transit systems, carsharing
is dealing mostly with mobile capital. If the program doesn’t work
in place A, cars can be redeployed to place B, or at worst, sold in a
used car lot. Further the programs are privately funded, which is
more suited to innovation and adaptation, and accepting of failure,
than publicly funded transit agencies.
The economic and environmental benefits of renting rather than
owning are clear, but the sociology and the the role of regulation34 34 For forecasts of the shared economy
and local regulation, see: (Rauch and
Schleicher 2015).
remain unclear. People willingly use hotel rooms, or bikes, or
library books that have been used by others before, but not,
typically, cars. How do cars get transformed from an owned good
to a rented service? In part this is generational. If you have never
owned a car, new habits can be formed. But that type of change is
very slow, perhaps as slow as generational shift. Early adopters and
the carless may be quick to join. Some/many/most Americans use
their cars often enough, in places remote enough, or customize their
cars sufficiently that MaaS will not be advantageous in most
circumstances. The question is: What is the winning fraction? We
suspect the answer is related to land use patterns. Where people
live in apartments, MaaS will be successful if not dominant. Where
people live in single family homes, MaaS will be far less successful,
though not nonexistent.
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Nationally 35% of the US population are renters and 14% are
apartment dwellers.35 To be clear today, not all apartment dwellers35 (National Multi-family Housing
Coalition 2015) from 2014 American
Community Survey.
are transit riders or walk to work (about 20% do), and not all
single-family dwellers use the automobile to get to work (though
96% do). Any change from a ownership-dominated to a MaaS
regime will take decades, and likely be slower than the introduction
of automation in the first place. Replacing the car is easier than
replacing the way the car is owned or used.
Whether, when, and where fleet ownership/sharing/renting
replaces individual ownership is less so. Certainly Manhattan is the
kind of place this will be common, as taxis are already very
important. Existing customers can easily shift, as doing old things
better is the first step in a new technology. But most of the US is not
taxi-reliant now, so is not a mere conversion but a major behavior
shift. Doing new things is the second step.
9
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Figure 9.1: Car2go. Car2go
carsharing vehicles are Smart
Fortwos, the smallest car sold on
the US Market. While generally
car2go is allowed to park on-
street on City of Minneapolis
roads, this poor car received a
ticket as it was parked on a
road maintained by the Parks
Department, a separate unit
of government, a distinction
without a difference for most
Minneapolitans. Photo by David
M. Levinson.
Technological advances have been shrinking consumer goods,
and getting more output per unit of energy and matter, for a long
time. Microwaves can substitute for ovens, the Walkman, the iPod,
and now just a music app substitute for the stereo and boom box.
Increasing productivity and usefulness is hard-coded into a
Darwinian market economic system. Dematerializing from things
into data is perhaps the final stage of shrinkage, discussed in
Chapter 10. But even just reducing the number of atoms required to
deliver a service is progress. GM for instance had a project in the
1970s, (Figure 9.2) the Lean Machine that aimed to do that, which
reduced both the matter needed for the vehicle and the number of
molecules needed to be burned for fuel.
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Figure 9.2: GM Lean Machine
concept vehicle. Photo source:
Evo.
One foreseeable future involves moving less mass in the form of
vehicles, and therefore consume less energy. Moving two tons of
metal and plastic to transport one or two humans is excessive, to say
the least. Small cars have longer range per unit battery than larger
cars. The gasoline powered Smart ForTwo, shown in Figure 9.1, is
one of the smallest mass produced cars on the market in the US.And
while not exceptionally popular in the US (sales are under 1000 units
per month), they are a hit in Europe owing largely to the fact that the
costs of owning and operating cars are higher than they are in the US
due to public policy like higher fuel taxes – and furthermore, space
on roadways and in cities centers is a premium. Bicycles (Figure
9.3) and skinny cars (Figure 9.4) are much more efficient in terms of
capacity than traditional cars
With even less mass, powered two-wheeled vehicles
(motorcycles, mopeds, electric scooters, electric bikes and all the
variations in-between) have been enormously successful in
developing countries. Electric scooters and bikes have recently
exploded in China (e.g. Figure 9.3) – resulting in mountains of
disposed lead-acid batteries piling up in landfills on the outskirts of
Chinese cities. Two-wheeled vehicles (mostly motorbikes) are the
most rapidly growing form of urban mobility in rapidly developing
cities of Asia and increasingly in Latin America and Africa. Are
they stepping stones to eventual full-blown automobility? Are their
safety, nuisance, pedestrian-clash impacts greater than those of
traditional cars? Motorized, electric, and pedal-powered
two-wheelers are different worlds, yet they overlap in their
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Figure 9.3: Shared, stationless e-
bike in Shanghai, China. Photo
by David M. Levinson.
demands for space.
Powered two-wheelers provide an upgrade path between the
inexpensive, but speed-limited bicycle and the much more
expensive, and rationed, automobile. Their path to dominance has
been slower in more developed countries, as they are perceived as
an inferior good, with less flexibility (to carry more goods and
passengers) and comfort (e.g. seats, climate control) than an
automobile, which is preferred by those who can afford it (which is
most adults in developed countries). The same infrastructure that
supports bicycles (bike lanes, bikesharing networks, and so on) has
been adapted to serve electric bikes as well, to the consternation of
some bicyclists.
Yet bikes, and e-bikes are likely to remain niche modes in much
of the US, and while that niche may increase in size, existing land
use patterns, notoriously slow in their ability to change, contributes
to a larger context that is far from conducive for cycling for the
majority of trips. American consumers may be reluctant to
downsize too much. Safety of vehicle occupants is cited as a
concern. Until self-driving vehicles alleviate most safety risks, and
as long as the US is wealthy, US cars will remain larger than
average.
Interestingly on the freight side, results differ, as larger trucks are
more fuel efficient (as they spread the fixed weight of the vehicle over
more cargo and have less wind resistance). Adam Boies writes:
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Figure 9.4: Tango thin cars share
lanes, reducing capacity needs.
Photo courtesy of Tango.
Figure 9.5: Toyota iRoad. Photo
courtesy of Toyota
“emphasis on fuel efficiency in the light duty and heavy duty vehicle
fleet is likely going to drive the weight of the vehicle segments in
opposite directions. Light duty vehicles are likely to get lighter,
especially as different ownership models allow for dedicated light
duty vehicle fleets that focus on fuel efficiency for personal mobility.
Heavy-duty vehicle fleet operators are likely to lobby for increased
vehicle weight limits . . . in order to reduce the energy intensity of
goods deliveries. The growing disparity in weight between the two
vehicle classes may necessitate increased safety measures to reduce
the severity of crashes between the disparate vehicle classes.”11 Boies, Adam (2016) Electrification
and Alternative Fuels (Chapter 6) in
(Levinson et al. 2016). Autonomous vehicles promise a Cambrian explosion of new
vehicle forms. Evidence for this is already emerging.
Google/Waymo has proposed and built prototypes of a new, light,
low speed neighborhood vehicle designed for slow speed (25 mph
or 40 km/h) on campuses. The UK has four pilot programs
starting.2 Singapore is testing similar vehicles.32 (Topham 2015).
3 (Matheson 2016). This has important implications. For example, cars can be better
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designed for specific purposes, since, if they are rented on-demand
or shared, they don’t need to be everything to their owner. Narrow
and specialized cars like the Toyota iRoad (Figure 9.5) are more
feasible in a world of autonomous vehicles. The fleet will have
greater variety, with the right size vehicle assigned to a particular
job. Today there is a car-size arms race, people buy larger cars,
which are perceived to be safer for the occupant even if more
hazardous for those around them, and taller cars, which allow the
driver to see in front of the car immediately in front of them. Both
of these advantages are largely obviated with autonomous vehicles.
The car-size arms race ends.
The low mass of neighborhood and single-passenger vehicles like
the Renault Twizy (Figure 9.6) will save energy and reduce
pavement wear, but also cause less damage when it (inadvertently)
hits something or someone. Combining the low mass with the lower
likelihood of a crash at low speed will magnify its safety advantage
for non-occupants in this environment, compared with faster,
heavier vehicles, which privilege the safety of the vehicle occupants.
These savings will be passed on to consumers. Insurance
companies will recognize the lower risks and lower rates. This will
help drive adoption of autonomous vehicles. Alternatively, the
auto-companies themselves may choose to accept liability for
autonomous vehicles in autonomous mode, as some are already
proposing.
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Figure 9.6: Renault Twizy. Photo
from Wikipedia
10
Dematerialization
Figure 10.1: Record player.
Source: Pexels.com (CC0
license)
Transport, as every textbook will tell you, is about the movement
of people and goods. Communication is about the movement of
ideas. To the extent people and goods have been moved to exchange
ideas, the opportunity to dematerialize that transaction, and
transform carriers of ideas from a physical (transportable) form to
an electronic one emerges. This chapter investigates opportunities
for dematerialization.
10.1 Dematerializing Music
In 1977, singer Shaun Cassidy took the cover of “Do you Believe in
Magic" to a top 40 hit. The 45 rpm version of this song was the
very first record Kevin bought from his hometown record shop in
Glenview, Illinois. Such shops used to exist. They eventually gave
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way to the national (mall-centric) chains (e.g., Sam Goody, Tower,
Musicland), then big boxes like Best Buy and the booksellers started
to get in on the act.
Thomas Edison first captured sounds as waveforms and recorded
them as physical deviations (i.e., grooves) etched into a disc. The
means of production, acquisition, and sound dissemination changed
over the years. Physical reminders of this progression are apparent
every time Kevin visits his parent’s home. His grandparents
phonograph sits next to the turntable stereo (his mom’s first
purchase after she graduated from college in 1960), next to the
compact disc player, next to the recent streaming device. The fact
that all devices work, transmit sound, and are still used by his
parents is more remarkable. Historically, these all required
physically marrying two or more devices: the source, the
instrument on which it is played, and the means of dissemination.
Record players are largely gone, now trumped by modern forms of
music playing (though admittedly, vinyl is coming back in vogue
among hipster music fetishists). Stereo speakers are one-tenth the
size of what both of us used in high school – long gone are those
from Spinal Tap’s famous brag: “these [speakers] go to 11!”
The technology of music changed faster than the book, moving
from vinyl to tape (with the detour of 8-track tape) to CD to mp3
over two decades. In contrast with books, customers in large
Prior to the availability of ‘the cloud,’
bits of information were made available
in different physical locations (not unlike
records or tapes or CDs, but much
moreso). Most commonly, this meant
inserting a floppy disk (or connecting
a hard drive) into one computer,
transferring data, and then ejecting
that disk and physically moving the
information storage device to another
computer. Sneaker-net (a play on
Ethernet, except a human wore sneakers
to physically move stored data) is the
term to refer to the process by which
files were transferred before broadband
became widespread. Big data producers
(e.g., Google) continue to rely on Fed Ex
to move large data more quickly than
the internet can. Depending on the
size of the data file and the capacity of
the digital networks, it may still be a
preferred means of exchange. That too
will one-day end. See also: (Munroe
2012).
numbers digitized and shared their own music before the music
industry could get their act together. Apple’s iTunes was ultimately
responsible for lowering digital music prices far enough that
listening to music is again (maybe – who really knows?) more legal
than illegal. Then, new distribution mechanisms changed the
market again. Music is standardized, commodified, and the
sequence in which one listens is customizable via internet radio
services like Spotify and Pandora. Influential artists can hold the
upper hand with respect to availability,1 but songs are ubiquitous.1 e.g., Taylor Swift banning her music
from Spotify and others, and affecting
the policy of Apple Music regarding
artist compensation.
10.2 Dematerializing Books
Books – with the advent of online retailing (Amazon) – took a
similar turn. In contrast with the home grown digitization of music,
Amazon eventually took the next step and started to completely
dematerialize books, by demanding eBooks from publishers, so that
the entire product could be delivered over the Internet. In contrast,
while there is copyright-violating sharing of ebooks, it is not the
same order of magnitude as music.
Consider the purchase of something as straightforward as a book
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– a product that has only recently endured considerable change since
Gutenberg’s 15th century invention of the printing press.
• I visit a monastery. I provide the monk a sack of coins and a goat
in exchange for transcribing a book. I return home. Months later,
I get a book.
• I go to a physical store. I provide the clerk a $10 bill in exchange
for a book. I return home.
• I go to the store and purchase a virtual good such as a gift card,
paying for it with a debit card which I just tap on an electronic
card reader. I return home, scan the gift card with a camera built
into my computer. The virtual good (e.g., book) is available to me,
via several formats.
• I go online and request a book from an online retailer’s database.
I provide an electronic string of numbers ascribed to my credit
card (which is already stored). Upon receipt, the database
communicates with a warehouse, which dispatches a physical
book on a physical vehicle down a physical right-of-way and
delivers to my home.
• Via TouchID, (or FaceID) I order a book on my iPhone. Upon
receipt, the Amazon database dispatches an eBook through the
Internet, which after traversing fiber optic wires and local WiFi,
automatically appears on the Kindle book-reading app on my
phone.
Search for your favorite book followed
by PDF, you might be surprised to
find it on a non-US website). While
searching the internet, David discovered
a Russian pirate copy library site, which
had lots of books available for download,
including The Transportation Experience,
which David wrote with Bill Garrison.
Two points come to mind:
1. Hey, cool, my work is worth pirating,
and
2. Is it illegal for me to download this?
(It is probably illegal for you to
download it (unless you work at
Oxford University Press), but the
real crime would be if you uploaded
it). It is obviously not immoral to
download a book I wrote and have
copies of, even if I did license Oxford
University Press to publish it. Could
I be prosecuted for downloading a
copy of my own work?
Is downloading a book that I already
own a paper copy of illegal? (Yes,
probably.) Is scanning it? (Maybe.) Is
there a difference?
10.3 Dematerializing Movies
Analogous processes have transformed video. The acquisition of
movies has even more options.
• I go to the movie theater, wait in line to buy tickets and sit down
in the theater to watch the movie.
• I buy my tickets in advance on-line via Fandango (to free myself
of worry about a sold-out theater) and whisk myself to a seat,
• I go to a video rental store – or more likely a RedBox DVD rental
kiosk – rent a piece of plastic to put into a specialized player
connected to a large monitor, and return it.
• I go to a Flix on Stix movie download kiosk, insert my own USB,
rent some bits to put into a computer, which expire after I watch
it.
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• I watch a movie at a scheduled time on an ‘over-the-air’ or cable
TV network
• I download a film on my tablet or TV (rented for a 24 hour period
or bought to own) and watch it on my own schedule.
• I stream a film on-demand from a subscription service (e.g.,
Netflix).
• I find a magnet file, pointing me to a torrent file of a video stored
in pieces across the Internet on many different peer computers,
download the video which is, transcode it to a standard format,
and watch it on my computer or stream to my TV via an app like
Plex.
Figure 10.2: US home
entertainment revenue 2013-
2016 ($B). Source: 2013 data
from: (Fritz 2014) 2016 data
from (Digital Entertainment
Group 2017).
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Electronic delivery is easily automated for bit-based goods like
books, music, video, and software; it is in the active process of being
transformed from shop-based selling to screen-based, as shown in
Figure 10.2. By 2013 the legal video market was split between
declining physical and rising electronic delivery. This does not even
consider the unknown amount of illegal video traffic (such as
BitTorrent), nor the fact that some legal downloads (like Netflix)
show many more hours of video per dollar spent than legal rentals.
Eventually (and not too far away) about 100% of this genre of
product will be acquired online. In 2016 the US Video Game market
was about $12.1B for comparison, a similar magnitude, and down
from $19B in 2010.22 Game data from (Statista 2017).
10.4 Dematerializing Architecture
Architecture in one sense deals with the most material of human
creations, structures. Buildings are physical entities in the realm of
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atoms as much as bits. The physical layout of buildings, their mass,
structural elements, and so on are the work of architects. But there
is another aspect of architecture which is primarily aesthetic. The
surface form of structures, the gargoyles appended to buildings.
This art lies firmly in the realm of information, even though it has
historically been presented in concrete, wood, and masonry, rather
than on paper, vinyl, or plastic.
The advent of augmented reality (AR) will allow us to
dematerialize this aesthetic aspect of architecture. Instead of seeing
the building as the architect designed it, we can see it according to
our preference, with the skin we wish to attach. In a world of
augmented reality, no one will pay for any ephemerally fashionable
aesthetic attachments when they can subscribe to a set of aesthetics
in software.
The form will still matter, as we still need to be inside buildings
to stay dry, and need to know where the entrances and exits are to
avoid walking into walls. Buildings as housers of beds and
containers of furniture and tools will remain important, as will their
spatial location. But ornament will decline in importance, as that
will be in the eye (or the AR glasses) of the beholder. We can expect
the emergence of new construction based on the plainest surface
which will be the easiest to adapt to computer models.
In this, admittedly speculative, world, we will no longer need
worry about historic preservation, bridges with egregious sight
lines, or other offenses to our sensibilities. We will simply look
through a heads-up display, or don the appropriate glasses or
goggles (or farther into the future, jack our brains into the
appropriate computers), and find ourselves presented with the
world as we wish it to be.
This implies people will be less place-attached, and favors the Out
scenario of Chapter 13.
10.5 Materializing Information
Producing three dimensional solid objects from a digital file (3D
printing) is clearly in its infancy, but it is here.3 Alternative 3D 3 (Hart 2012).
printing scenarios are currently playing out with varying
implications, depending on the context.4 As 3D printers improve 4 (Birtchnell 2012).
more goods will be manufactured closer to their point of final
consumption. Freight shipments will still occur, and the dry weight
will be similar, in that the material used in the printing is still
shipped as a raw commodity, though the water will be added later,
similar to freeze dried camping meals or Coca-Cola from a fountain.
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Overall volumes will be much smaller as water, air, and packaging
will not need to be shipped for as long a distance.
The nearest scenario centers on prototyping only. 3D printers
already are used for this purpose, but who gets to prototype, or
design, consumer products might be turned on its head as serious,
enthusiastic consumers (prosumers) show manufacturers what they
want, even if they don’t have the materials to build a working
version.
A second scenario involves considerably advanced desktop
printers in the home. People will design and share Intellectual
Property (IP) – data files describing goods such as, cups,
kitchenware, pens, guns.5 There are already several repositories of5 (Greenberg 2014).
files to download. Subject to reverse engineering, pirated files might
become the norm (following the well-worn path of music and
videos). To the extent that personal travel is occupied with
acquiring small, printable objects, travel will decrease.
A third scenario envisions a new industrial revolution focused on
a new form of manufacturing. Smaller printing ’factories’ will
spring up across communities with the ability to make products.
These may be private enterprises (new market opportunities will
arise) or these resources may be provided in central locations.
Libraries will continue to reinvent themselves away from the
traditional reading-and-learning mission and transform into the
digital age of providing a wider range of club goods that are
under-provided to society thanks to transaction costs. Thus,
libraries, together with community centers, might be the homes for
community 3D printers. Mass customization will likely be a
hallmark of these products but customized designs would shortly
follow suit; altering designs will not require retooling, merely
tweaking the code for the software. Large communities of
‘modders’ are likely. In this model, there is still a role for traditional
freight (matter along physical networks) but based on much shorter
distances, the ‘last-mile’ from the printer to the house.
The rise of online shopping for material goods detailed in Chapter
11 is a prime culprit in traffic’s slow death. The dematerialization of
information goods has also profoundly affected how the access to
goods is conceived of and acquired.
The tactile is being substituted for, if not replaced, with the
appropriate devices.6 The miniaturization of consumer goods has6 See e.g. teledildonics.
been ongoing for decades now (e.g., microwaves substituted for big
ovens; portability also kicked in – master-blasters, boom boxes,
Walkmans, laptops, tablets, and iPhones are all smaller than their
predecessors)
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10.6 The Matrix of Access
Table 6.1 Matrix of Accessibility
Networks
Physical Networks Digital Networks
Nouns
Things [almost all focus 
has been here]
Travel, Goods 
Delivery
3D printing
Data Mail, Books, 
Newspapers, CDs, 
DVDs
Streaming music or 
movies
Figure 10.3: We offer a Matrix
of Accessibility to help redefine
these fresh means of access and
flows. We populate the box with
some examples. We encourage
the reader to think of others.
Some things that once required moving things can now be
achieved by moving data. Subsequently, the ease and nature by
which humans satisfy their desires is undergoing a revolution. Sure,
people still transport themselves to do some things; they expect
other things to come to them – digitally or not. Less important is
how the transaction occurs.
But differences in the above exchange scenarios have notable
transport implications. Roads have historically been the principal
form of movement, for humans or things. But their utility is being
overshadowed by data sent over digital networks. There are two
foundational issues at play in these dynamics.
The first has to do with the noun being transported. Nouns may
be things in the form of physical matter that one can feel, smell or
touch. Alternatively, nouns might merely be data.7 7 One could also think of data nouns
as bits, the smallest unit of information
that can be stored or manipulated on a
computer, where eight bits equals a byte.
The second is the transport network. Sometimes the means of
transport is in the form of physical roads (in the traditional physical
notion, the corridors that separate buildings and connect places
across space). Data is often transmitted across digital networks by
cables or radio waves, though a hard drive on a FedEx truck is also
data in motion.
Classifying two types of nouns and two types of networks
provides four cells to consider new models of accessibility, as in
Table 10.3. Moving things (particularly humans) along physical
rights of ways has been the staple of transport planning. For
millennia, discussions focused on this first cell. Societies have built
roads, expanded roads, built neighborhoods, expanded
neighborhoods. Transport planning has been consumed with
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finding the best ways to connect matter moving along physical
networks.
But it is now easier to conceptualize other forms of exchange. Or
think of how instead of meeting in person, people transmit moving
pictures of themselves in the form of data over digital networks,
e.g., Skyping, FaceTime, or broadcasting live with Facebook Live or
Periscope. While it is difficult to conceive of things moving over
digital networks, the rise of 3D printing means data is being sent
and instantly manufactured at physically remote locations.
Ordering – and delivering – a pizza over the Internet, might be here
sooner than later.88 Examples of 3D printing of pizzas or
other food are (Prisco 2014; Opam 2014). In Table 10.3 we offer a Matrix of Access to help redefine these
fresh means of access and flows. We populate the box with some
examples. We encourage the reader to think of others.
11
Delivery
Figure 11.1: The Balmain, New
South Wales Post Office. Photo
by David M. Levinson.
Chapter 13 alludes to ways in which changes in travel will
change the built environment. People are changing how they spend
their time and their frequency and purpose of travel. They are
mixing physical and virtual travel in previously unseen ways. In
this chapter we use fetching (or more formally shopping travel) and
its substitute, delivery, as a lens through which to better understand
how transport’s demand from land use is also changing the land
use in more nuanced ways than appear at first blush.1
1 We encourage the reader to think about
transitions of other obsolete spaces, most
notably offices.
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11.1 Stores and Shops
“Shine that up and put $7.50 on it. . . Shame to let a good toaster go to waste
over a frayed cord.” – Proposition Joe, The Wire.
In the American crime drama The Wire, Proposition Joe, a gang
leader and drug dealer hangs out at his front, an appliance repair
shop. Noting that it is in decline, in one episode he relays the quote
we opened the chapter with. Given foreseeable changes in acquiring
goods and services – alongside advances in freight distribution – a
reasonable question revolves around the multi-purposed, changing
nature, and future of place-based enterprises.
Prior to civilization, there was little trade and few ‘stores.’ People
did not store much as they hunted or gathered the necessary
provision of goods. With farming, surplus created stuff that
required storage. Inventory was held. Trade emerged from the sale
of surplus. When inventories were sold from fixed locations – in
exchange for debt2 and what ultimately became what is commonly2 (Graeber 2011).
recognized as money – retailing was born.
The idea of a store, where things that are desired by customers
and stored by distributors, is ultimately one of sharing community
resources.3 I may need tools or screws at some point, but rather3 A shop is simply the location where
trade takes place or things are made or
fixed. Implicitly, a store holds lots of
things. This distinction is somewhat lost
in modern use, ‘shopping’ and ‘storing’
have differing meanings. Yet there are
still hardware stores and grocery stores
(which are relatively large), but dress
shops, tailor shops, auto repair shops
(which at least the first two are relatively
small, and the latter two refer to where
things are made or transformed rather
than pre-made things are sold).
than own all the tools or screws I might need, the neighborhood’s
hardware store is available to rent or sell things on a just-in-time
basis. The outfit who owns the hardware store (an individual, a
firm, a cooperative) is secondary to the necessity of such a function
to achieve economies of scale and ensure variety. Lacking stores,
everyone would need to inventory everything that was needed; they
would need to truck and barter for goods with their makers, or
exchange with neighbors and figure out who owned what, a much
less efficient system.
Society needs both places to store items people may need in the
future (and then acquire them when needed), and it needs
shop-places to work on things, making them, repairing them,
altering them. With the move toward a disposable society, where it
costs less to make things than fix them,4 the relative share of space4 After all, repair is a laborious
process; there is only one way to
make something, which can thus be
automated, but an infinity of ways to
break it.
devoted to shops rather than stores has declined.
But given the need for shops and stores, how do you get to them,
or do they come to you?
11.2 Antecedents to the New Logistics
The Post Office was once the center of community activity, and in
Australia, post offices were among the grandest buildings of the
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Victorian era (Figure 11.1 shows a post office in Balmain, a suburb
of Sydney). People would get mail twice a day from a mail carrier,
and visit the post office frequently to mail letters or collect
packages. In the US, the Post Office was thought so important for
democracy, it was one of the few responsibilities set out in the US
Constitution for the Federal Government. In Figure 3.12 we saw
that mail delivery is falling, and attribute its decline to substitution
by electronic forms. We further called out online shopping as one of
the culprits in the decline of travel in Chapter 3.
The dot-com boom (lasting from 1997 to 2001) was all about the
widespread leveraging of new forms of technology. Even then,
companies like WebVan promised to deliver select goods within the
same day; Kozmo claimed to do so within the same hour. Highly
opportunistic investors and entrepreneurs were blinded by visions
of early success. After the dot-com crash, markets invested in new
technology ventures more cautiously.
Like video conferencing and automated cars, buying more things
online is still an inevitable part of the future. But how soon? How
much? In what ways? These continue to be outstanding questions.
It has been common for some years now to acquire some goods
from the digital shopping world. Amazon stormed the market with
books and dethroned the big box book sellers like Crown, Borders,
and Barnes & Noble (who had earlier acquired and then shut many
mall-based bookstores (Walden, B-Dalton), which had themselves
pushed out many independent neighborhood bookstores). The
reader now has access to far more content than just a decade ago.
For the nostalgic, something has been lost as well. Such is progress,
supposedly. Books were relatively easy kindling for this revolution,
the ISBN code had been around in some form since 1965. While
books can be dematerialized (Chapter 10), most goods cannot.
11.3 The Informed Shopper
Left unknown in all of this is the extent to which basic utilitarian
shopping is transforming into entertainment and leisure. A likely
cornerstone of place-based venues will revolve around retail
establishments that amplify web-based purchases or cater to the
impulse, artisan, or even tourist markets. Retailing is
simultaneously undergoing an evolution – not quite the one leading
to the replacement of the quintessential Main Street, but rather a
necessary supplement, upgrade, and diversification into emerging
forms of ‘click-and-mortar’ retail that integrate internet and
traditional retail channels. The retail industry now talks about
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e-commerce, m-commerce (mobile e-commerce), personalized
products, reverse show-rooming (browsing online and purchasing
in-store) and more. These synergistic strategies combine to form
what is coined omni-channeling – availing of all channels to
leverage the benefits of e-commerce (more information, product
selection, convenience, speed, price comparison) with the drawing
power of physical stores (e.g., sense of community personal
relationship, easy returns, full sensory experience). A logical next
step is intelligent consumerism. Amazon is seeking to patent
pre-cognition, sending you what you are going to order before you
order it.
A related layer is that consumers are getting smarter. Almost two-
thirds of Americans have a smartphone and 80 percent of them are
‘smartphone shoppers,’ researching products and comparing prices
while in a store.5 While 63% of people in the US made a purchase5 (Grieder et al. 2014).
online in 2014, 80% of sales still occur in a physical store and e-
commerce only accounts for about 6% of retail sales worldwide.66 (eMarketer 2015).
Clicks still benefit from bricks. And though e-commerce is increasing
its momentum, it has progressed slower than anticipated by some
during the DotCom boom of the 1990s.77 (Pavitt 1997).
11.4 Drive-thru
Like many pedestrians and bicyclists, we are annoyed with the
hostility the drive-thru poses to non-auto modes. David was
reprimanded for walking up to a drive-thru ATM at a Maryland
National Bank in Columbia (after many acquisitions, now part of
Bank of America) . . . of course there was no walk-up ATM there, or
he would have used that. If he doesn’t want to, or can’t deal with a
person, he still has to walk-up to the 1980s era drive-thru ATM at
his Minneapolis Credit Union, which still does not have a proper
walk-up ATM. The drive-thru ATM is the wrong height for standing
customers and provides a poor user interface. The drive-thru is a
cross-subsidy non-driving customers give to the driving customers,
who pay no extra for the larger building and infrastructure they
require.
Drive-thru businesses have a long history in the US, dating at least
from 1930 in the banking sector. Obviously gas stations were drive-
thru. McDonald’s gets 65 percent of US sales from drive-thru.8, and8 (Vanderbilt 2009).
there are an estimated 100,000 drive-thru quick-serve (i.e. fast-food)
restaurants in the US.99 (Allain 2008).
Banks still use yesterday’s future mode of transport, the
pneumatic tubes. It’s not just gas stations, banks, and restaurants,
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we have seen:
• Drive-thru dairy store.
• Drive-thru film development stores (Fotomat) (now obsolete).
• Drive-thru liquor and gun store, everything for good-ole-boys to
have a really good time on a Friday night.
• Drive-thru romance store in Alabama, which gives a different
meaning to the term ‘quickie’.
The US may have saturated the drive-thru market. Whether
delivery can make this go down even further is unclear. It is still
speculative, and future data will be required to confirm this, but if
so, we may be facing a more walk-up America.
11.5 New Logistics
Advances and changes in logistics distribution also are important.
One can expect similar levels of murkiness from freight transport –
a transition that will be influenced by enhanced graphical interfaces,
3-D printing, and changes in freight delivery. The less that is
fetched, the more that is delivered. Stuff needs to get in the hands
of consumers. While most people shun trucks and delivery vehicles,
potato chips still need to get from the factory to the shelf of the food
store or your home somehow, as the immaculate conception of deep
fried crisps has yet to be discovered. The amount of freight moved
by various modes plummeted during the recent recession. Now
truck travel appears to be generally slowly on the rise (Figure 11.3),
even at the per capita level, in the US.
The US currently has three major national networks (USPS, UPS,
FedEx) that deliver stuff to consumers in ways that are cost effective
for many goods. Specialty services are on top of this – local stores
and restaurants that deliver their own products (furniture,
appliances, grocers, newspapers, milk, pizza), and one can certainly
imagine others emerging.
New delivery models are available and coming. For the ‘last mile’
connecting the home with the final distribution point, new models
include:
• Lockers (akin to PO Boxes) where stuff can be deposited for you
to collect,10 10 The Amazon acquisition of Whole
Foods may in part be about this.
• Peer-to-peer delivery services (friends or strangers will pick up
goods for you and deliver them to your home or workplace),
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• Firms depositing goods directly in the trunk of your car while you
work,1111 (Rubin 2015).
• Deliveries of small packages by drone or robot,12 and12 (Huston 2016).
• Neighborhood refrigerators for grocery dropoff.
Google and others are trying to uncover a workable economic
model for same-day delivery of many of these services. Amazon,
the e-commerce giant is seeking permission from the Federal
Aviation Administration to deliver goods less than five pounds (2.3
kg) via drones. Considering 86% of their inventory are goods less
than five pounds, this in and of itself would be a game-changer for
the delivery business. Fortunately, no one is yet seriously proposing
catapult-based freight delivery. Even drones will create
controversies. How high above a house can you prohibit unmanned
aerial vehicles? How often will they be shot out of the sky in the
land of the Second Amendment?
Today simple delivery – following the revolution in online
ordering in the 1990s – is itself transforming. Customers in
Manhattan can order a mattress this morning (via Casper), have it
delivered this afternoon, and sleep on it this evening; if it fails to
meet their standard, they can have it picked up tomorrow morning
for a full refund. The same holds for eyeglasses (via Warby Parker)
and apparel. It used to be important to lay on the mattress, or
actually see how new eyeglasses looked on our face, though getting
to the store to do so was an inconvenience.
With Amazon’s decision to rent a warehouse in Midtown
Manhattan for the next 15 years,13 Manhattanites were introduced13 (Bensinger 2014).
to guaranteed one-hour delivery which is doing away with such
inconvenience. And now, via tiny plastic adhesives affixed to your
dishwasher, coffee machine or refrigerator, you can order your
favorite household products with the touch of a single, physical
electronic button. Amazon places the order, sends an alert to your
phone, and it arrives within 24 hours. AmazonFresh delivers
groceries to your door same day or early morning. Amazon Prime
Now offers delivery within an hour of selected goods in selected
areas. Done. The dream of the DotCom bubble has been revived
and realized, though whether it can be sustained remains unknown.
11.6 Eating-in / Eating-out / Take-away / Delivery
Trends are transforming retail from a functional and transactional
activity into a service and entertainment one. Restaurants and bars
seem poised to enter this void.
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Figure 11.2: Food and alcohol
expenditures (by share) 1869-
2014. Source: (Economic
Research Service 2017). This
is largely attributed to both
efficiencies in food production
and higher incomes enabling
more of it to be spent on more
expensive options.
In contrast with reduced shopping, and perhaps because of it, the
trends in eating differ from those of retail. Over more than a century,
eating out has eaten a larger share of the food budget, as shown in
Figure 11.2. Going to restaurants is an increasingly important social
(and personal) activity, and in 2014 overtook food at home for the
first time.
For the family seeking to eat at home but not prepare the food,
urban dwellers have options. Some restaurants offer delivery as
well as take-away, others offer take-away but don’t deliver, and
some specialize in delivery and avoid the storefront. For the
customer who is not out and about, delivery is more convenient.
For the customer who is passing by the restaurant anyway, ordering
ahead and doing take-out14 wins out, since there is no waiting for 14 Take-out is often called take-away or
carry-out or parcel in different localized
variants of English.
the delivery, the additional distance is small, and tipping charges
(or delivery surcharges) are avoided. Drive-thru (Section 11.4) is
take-away for fast food, which avoids the pre-ordering step,
arguably at the cost of food quality. There are now subscription
services for dinner.
The blocks on which both David and Kevin currently live are
comprised of mostly single family homes with some duplexes and
apartments. Both neighborhoods once had two small grocery stores,
founded before the days of cheap at home refrigeration and large
grocery chains. These grocery stores are now gone. In David’s
neighborhood, one is now housing, the other a small restaurant.
Where these things are located relative to where people live and
work depends on the frequency of use. People want vendors of
things they desire more frequently (e.g., milk, coffee) to be closer
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than things desired less frequently (e.g. furniture). But closer and
farther are relative, not absolute terms. They depend on context:
location with respect to others (density or community demand), the
cost of travel (technology), frequency of use (individual demand),
and so on. Relative locations have changed over time as density,
technology, and demand have changed.
In the mid 2010s, food and grocery delivery has turned into a hot
sector receiving huge investments from venture capital.15 As the15 (Mignot 2015).
Wall Street Journal says “There’s an Uber for Everything: Apps do
your chores: shopping, parking, cooking, cleaning, packing,
shipping and more.”16 The article cites startups (mostly Bay Area)16 (Fowler 2015).
with apps that dispatch someone for flower delivery (BloomThat),
delivering anything in town (Postmates), package pickup (Shyp),
healthy meals (Sprig, SpoonRocket, Munchery), less healthy meals
(Push for Pizza), washing your clothes (Washio (now Rinse)),
washing your car (Cherry), parking your car valet-style (Luxe),
packing your suitcase (Dufl), babysitting (UrbanSitter), dog sitting
(Rover), medical house calls (Heal), self-medicating alcohol
(Saucey), medicinal delivery (pot) (Eaze), and in-home massage
(Zeel). Sadly, we don’t expect most of these (or their customers) will
survive the revolution. (Update for Second Edition: SpoonRocket and
Cherry are no longer with us).”1717 There was once a Twitter account
[@uber_but_for] mocking such services
that auto-retweets posts that say things
“like Uber for . . . ”.
Australia, among other places, is crawling with restaurant
delivery companies (e.g. Foodora, MenuLog, Deliveroo, UberEATS,
The Fork, Delivery Hero). Fresh ingredients in meal kits so you can
cook yourself (Hello Fresh, Plated, Blue Apron, Home Chef, Purple
Carrot, and Peach Dish) are also rising in popularity for people with
too much money or not enough time, though these tend not be as
on-demand. Hot lunch delivery is common in China and India,
facilitated by smartphones. Instead of 100 people at an organization
going out to lunch, 10 couriers deliver food, decimating
trip-making. There are lots of ‘Uber fors . . . ’ in the transport sector.
Replacing many activities by delivery will create demands for new
and different out-of-home activities.
In the 1980s people mocked the idea of ordering a pizza from a
(very large) ‘car-phone’ and then having it delivered to you in your
car while moving. Today, pizzas are routinely ordered from mobile
phones or apps, often sparing the need to talk to a clerk with the
associated mis-order. Still, while airplanes can refuel in mid-air, the
consumerist nirvana of synchronized in-motion pizza delivery has
yet to be realized outside of television ads.
This also evokes the famous Grey
Poupon television ads from 1991,
featuring two famous television prime
ministers, Jim Hacker (played by Paul
Eddington) from Yes, Prime Minister
and Francis Urquhart (played by Ian
Richardson), from the original House of
Cards. Hacker is enjoying his mustard
in the back of his Rolls-Royce, and
Urquhart pulls up in another Rolls, and
asks “Pardon me, would you have some
Grey Poupon?” To which Hacker replies
“But of course”, and, in some versions
of the ad, drives away. All of which is
just anticipation of ad-hoc, real-time,
peer-to-peer delivery, or an ‘Uber for
Mustard,’ if you will.
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11.7 The Digital Battleground
Anything that is standardized and commodified, and whose delivery
is easily automated is prime ground for the new logistics. All of
these deliveries reduce travel to the store, while increasing travel in
the logistics supply chain, but generally reduce travel overall.
How far will it go and how fast is informed by preferences for
ensuring quality. Kevin recently built a treehouse for his son; he
could have had 2x4s delivered, which would likely have been
crooked with many imperfections; alternatively, he could have gone
to the lumber store and selected ‘good’ ones himself. Preferences
for lifestyle (how much time, on average, will people want to spend
inside versus outside the home), technology (how quickly can the
product arrive), and countless other factors also shape choice of
in-person shopping vs. delivery.
On the other end of the spectrum are goods like fresh food that
people like to inspect or touch before purchasing. Culture plays a
role. Having lived for a year in Italy, Kevin knows few (if any)
self-respecting Italians who would conceive of having an unknown
person select tomatoes on their behalf – fish and meat products are
not far off. Americans, on the other hand, have relegated themselves
to commoditized food products, even tomatoes.18 18 We are told that in Los Angeles, there
are snooty vegetable delivery services.In between these two extremes is what analysts term a ‘digital
battleground.’ This domain includes home decor, office supplies
clothing, footwear and all the rest (mattresses, eyeglasses, sweaters,
souvenir items). Left to be determined by the market are thresholds
for when particular goods transition to e-commerce for any given
consumer.
There remains a long-tail of desired, but still standard, goods that
one cannot find at the corner store because it lacks the space to
inventory everything. Many goods are easy to ship (and even easier
to ship in electronic versions). Other goods – all commodified
though not digitized – would be amenable to new distribution
systems, which can all be ordered and delivered within 48 hours (if
not sooner). Even custom goods get sold on places like Etsy. While
used (and new) items both standard and non-standard are offered
on Ebay.
Pressing an Amazon Dash button that is placed in your home
that is emblazoned with a product logo, sends a Wi-Fi signal to the
Amazon Shopping app. The signal would automatically order new
stock of whatever product the button is configured to order; the click
would also send a message to the user’s mobile phone, and the user
would have a half-hour window to cancel. This might be ideal for
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commodities like detergent.
The future of shopping will fall along a continuum of
commodified versus uncommodified products. Sometimes it is the
overall experience of ‘shopping,’ regardless of the product, that
people seek. Stores are revolutionizing the physical shopping
experience – as an entertainment option of sorts. While online
shopping will continue to grow, we doubt it will reach anywhere
near 100% anytime soon. Where shopping is a chore, online
shopping and automated ordering will replace it. When shopping is
a pleasure, it won’t.
11.8 Will Freight Rise?
Figure 11.3: US ton-km of
domestic freight by mode (per
capita) 1980-2011. Source:
(Bureau of Transportation
Statistics 2017) Table 1-50: US
Ton-Miles of Freight (Millions).
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The USDOT’s Beyond Traffic report says that though the population
of the US will increase by 70 million people by 2040 (about 22%) and
freight will increase by 45%. Why should freight rise twice as fast
over this period?1919 (US Department of Transportation
2016). Certainly there is a rise in teleshopping, so local logistics will
increase. Currently e-shopping is on the order of (and likely under)
10% of retail sales, but it is growing. Shopping is less than 10% of
personal travel.
There are several aspects to logistics. There is the shipment from
factory to distribution center, from one distribution center to another,
and from the final distribution center to the final destination (usually
home), the last mile. If the total goods consumed remain the same,
the first two stages are essentially unchanged.
If the freight delivery system currently covers every street (that is
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the UPS guy comes down your street once a day, every day), it will
continue to cover every street, just with more vehicles dispatched
from the dispatch center to the last mile(s), as with more deliveries
there will be more trucks dispatched and each truck will have a
shorter, but more intensive route. Ignoring automation in this field
(and surely there will be some), once the appropriate optimizations
are made in terms of grouping shipments, this still has to be more
efficient than individuals going out and coming back from shopping
trips, but may net out as more freight travel and less personal travel.
We might also see a delivery system covering every street twice a
day, or four times a day, as real-time deliveries become more
significant. It is a large bet by Amazon that Prime Now – type
services will be a thing for most people most of the time (testing the
assumption that most people can wait for their lightbulb if it saves
some money), but nevertheless if those trucks are not optimally
filled, it would increase total freight travel.
There is then the question of whether more material will be
consumed overall. We expect total matter shipped should decline
on a per capita basis. By the time period in question, 2040, the US
should be off of coal and oil, replaced with renewable electricity
(whose transmission does not count as transportation, unlike coal,
oil, or gas). This will devastate the railroad industry, which will
then try to use its surplus capacity to move into markets now
served by trucks.
Further think about things you use. Many of them are smaller
than their equivalent 25 years ago (phones, TVs, computers, cars).
Now we may have more of them, or they may have different shapes
(TVs have more screen and less depth with the loss of the Cathode
Ray Tube) and we might need more furniture to occupy our large
houses, but that is relatively small in the scheme of things, most
freight are things which are consumed daily (food products, energy),
not long term capital goods.
We might also increase freight travel if we increase the distances
that freight is shipped, but keep the quantity the same. Can supply
chains become even more global? Will they? With automation, the
advantages of cheap labor in the production system will diminish,
and it will be easier to manufacture locally (to reduce transportation
costs and make just-in-time more viable). With cheap energy, things
that are now difficult and expensive (like growing exotic fruits and
vegetables indoors) will become more viable.
The net is uncertain, we cannot know whether freight shipments
will grow faster or slower than population, but the claim of a 45%
increase is an assumption that should be pushed back on. It is used
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to justify government investments in highways (and ports and
railroads to a lesser extent) for freight which can no longer be
justified based on rising per capita passenger travel.
11.9 Deconsumption
The rise of delivery does not imply less consumption, but they are
related. The decline of shopping travel is one aspect (both a cause
and effect) of the decline of personal travel overall, and has many
knock-on effects. Cities need fewer roads to get to stores and shops.
Centers warrant less parking. Today residents need fewer stores and
shopping centers since they inventory more in their large homes with
second freezers. Delivery might entail different economies of scale
than fetching from the store, as people can get what they want when
they need, just-in-time consumption. Travelers might engage in other
out-of-home activities, especially eating, to substitute for shopping
as ‘entertainment,’ but it won’t fully substitute.
Similarly, the same underlying trends portend a decline in work
travel, as workers take some of the gains of automation and
information technology with less time in the office or the factory (or
hospital, or school, or any of the thousands of other worksites).
Eventually there may be replicators, or pneumatic tubes, or aerial
drones, or good 3-D printers, and delivery as most people think of
it now will also decline. Or, there may be less overall consumption.
But we can fairly safely extrapolate that, for a while, 20th century
retail infrastructure and supporting transport system of roads and
parking is overbuilt for the 21st century last-mile delivery problems
in an era with growing internet shopping.
12
Transit
Figure 12.1: Clouds, valleys, and
mountain peaks. Photo by Kevin
J. Krizek.
From the 1880s through the early 1920s, transport explorers in
the US spent their time climbing Mount Transit. It was not until the
mid 1920s that they switched routes to ascend Mount Auto. At the
turn of the century, transit was the most important mode of travel
(after walking) in large and medium-sized US cities. Transit’s ascent
was enabled by the electric streetcar, first deployed in Richmond,
Virginia in 1887 by Frank Sprague. It’s widespread distribution was
as a product of electricity harnessed by Thomas Edison, Nikolai
Tesla, George Westinghouse and others, and the modern railroad,
developed beginning in 1825 with George Stephenson’s
steam-powered Stockton and Darlington Railway. The transport
climbers in the US came upon false summit of Mt. Transit in the
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Figure 12.2: Descending Mount
Transit. Note: The graph
shows both linked and unlinked
transit trips, as the way transit
trips are counted has changed,
and there is no continuous
series of both over the entire
period. We estimated linked
transit trips to improve clarity
of presentation, but these are
unofficial estimates. Source: (US
Census Bureau 1992; Highway
Statistics 2016).
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1920s; the real one was discovered two decades later with transit’s
peak during World War II when oil and rubber were rationed,x
crimping the automobile’s use, shown in Figure 12.2.
Transit is hardly a new idea. The endpoints of the spectrum for
non-human powered mobility have remained static for a long time.
On one end lies small capsules carrying single individuals to
geographically dispersed destinations (e.g., cars – human driven or
not – or bikes). At the other end lies larger capsules carrying many
individuals to geographically concentrated destinations (i.e., mass
transit). The space between these end-posts has historically been
barren, leading some to refer to the ‘goldilocks problem.’1 But both1 See: (Nisenson 2015).
the characteristics of the endpoints and the in-between points of this
spectrum are rapidly changing.
Cars, as people have come to know them, will soon share a few
advantages that have traditionally been afforded only to traditional
mass transit such as the ability to work while traveling (multitask).
Then, modified (and likely shorter) versions of the 40-foot bus will
start acting more like cars. Those modes which have historically been
distinct and separate are morphing as new modes emerge to fill the
space between. Most future of technology discussions thus far have
focused on the role of the Internet or energy. Advances in vehicle
technology forms a perfect third.
Many dimensions differentiate transport modes.2 Key elements2 See Taxonomy of Modes in Elements of
Access (Levinson et al. 2018). include the degree of personal control of personal space,3 freedom
3 Car seats that fit your children is
another factor of personal space that
favors ownership.
and flexibility of schedule, and proximity of the vehicle boarding and
alighting location to actual origin or destination (convenience). In
this chapter we differentiate macro-transit from micro-transit.
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12.1 Macro-Transit
A feature that distinguishes the far end of the spectrum of
(non-human powered) mobility lies in the onset of a fixed route.
These systems usually come in the form of grade-separated metros
(as found in roughly 150 cities across the globe), tram systems,
exclusive busways, and high frequency all-day commuter train
service.
Differences are notable and important, but most elements about
these macro systems are high. High costs invoke high stakes; they
require high development intensity (to be successful) and high
frequency of service with high capacity to invoke high ridership to
pay for them. When these systems are appropriately placed within
the urban fabric, they do wonders for mobility. These systems will
retain their prominent role in large central cities.
But many questions and challenges also surround macro-transit
systems – issues which vary for existing versus future systems –
which differ from system extensions. Rail transit is rigid.
Recognizing that rail can help influence development patterns, fixed
rail’s lack of flexibility limits its ability to adapt to uncertain futures.
In the absence of new cost-saving tunneling technologies and
changes to environmental and planning review regulations, rail will
not have the ability to quickly and suitably address transport problems in
emerging corridors.
To some advocates, inflexibility is an asset rather than a liability.
Rail cannot be easily repurposed to other modes in the same way an
HOV lane or Busway could easily be repurposed for cars. However,
it was the inflexibility of the streetcars that led to their removal, and
the lanes were repurposed anyway; and it is not like transit service
itself disappeared, corridors with enough demand for streetcars
obtained bus service. Like anything, different surveys with
different assumptions produce different
transit mode shares. For a comparison
see (Polzin and Chu 2005). Current
numbers are reported by (Bureau of
Transportation Statistics 2017) Table 1-
41 “Principal Means of Transportation
to Work.” Expenditure data can be
found in Table 3-35 “Transportation
Expenditures by Mode and Level of
Government from Own Funds, Fiscal
Year”.
The use of fixed rail to spur development in the modern era has
usually been disappointing, as US cities are mature and indifferent
to marginal changes. Los Angeles’s massive $22 Billion investment
in rail transit has served many riders, but lost market share overall.
Despite spending nearly a quarter of federal surface transportation
dollars on public transportation investments over the past four
decades, transit work trip mode share has fallen nationally from 9
percent in 1970 to 5 percent of all work trips in 2012. In short,
public expenditure per transit user far exceeds public expenditure
per highway user, and has failed to significantly reverse long-term
trends.
Fixed-rail transit is far less flexible than bus (or micro and
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traditional bus transit, MaaS, or the automobile) and thus far less
attractive when not traveling to downtown or other high demand
locations. The key decision is whether to build it. Once present, it is
stuck there and few such systems are abandoned after opening. As
economists would appropriately say about subway systems, “sunk
costs are sunk,” meaning one cannot worry about whether the fixed
costs were worthwhile after we embed the capital into the ground.
Society has paid for it in any case, and the relevant question is
whether it is worth paying for continued operations.
Land Use. The critical issue dictating the success of these systems
lies in the land use conditions surrounding the stations. Put simply,
‘mass transit’ needs masses of people.4 There is a market demand for4 (Pushkarev and Zupan 1977).
higher density living, just look at the recent building boom in urban
centers from Seattle to Minneapolis.
It is worth noting that much of the urban building boom of six
story apartment buildings is due to recent changes in construction
standards (such as the International Building Code in 2000)
responding to improved wood building materials and allowing
woodframe construction (which had been prohibited due to fire
concerns).55 See e.g. (Lewington 2014).
There remains market demand for lower density living, the
suburbs keep rolling along and still get the most growth. The future
success of transit depends of the size of urban area.
Given most of the best routes have already been built in places
like New York and Chicago, new fixed route transit systems will be
heading toward markets with both less development intensity and
less potential. Diminishing returns have already set in; but that
does not necessarily mean there are no worthwhile investments. If
the demand for more intensive land uses (bigger and taller
buildings covering a larger share of the ground) rises, the big
question will revolve around reconciling tensions between attracting
more ridership versus construction costs. Higher densities increase
both ridership and construction cost.6 But one thing will be clear.6 Looking at 59 transit projects showed
that a 10 percent increase in total
population per acre corresponded with
a 3.2 percent drop in capital costs per
rider. The same 10 percent increase in
jobs per acre resulted in per-rider capital
costs falling 1.5 percent. See: (Guerra
and Cervero 2011).
With increased diversity of options that are developing along the
other end of the mobility spectrum, fixed route systems will not
have the ability to successfully address locations without relatively
high density. More on Land Use is discussed in Chapter 13.
Access and Egress. With the onset of autonomous vehicles, MaaS,
and new forms of micro-transit – together with walking and cycling (both
conventional and e-bikes) – the current barriers of access and egress to
these systems will be lowered. With autonomous vehicles, the whole
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concept of park-and-rides and dealing with parking around stations
(presently a large enabler of patronage at suburban rail stations)
enter the dustbin of history, since the cars can either drive farther
away to park, or better, serve other travelers. MaaS transport and
micro-transit services will be readily available.
Reliability. Certainty is important, but it is quite possible for
transit to become certainly unreliable. Improving the reliability of
transit services is another step to increasing ridership. Transit signal
pre-emption and priority are two technologies that help keep
on-road transit moving, providing a leg-up to macro-transit bus
rapid transit systems, vans, and other micro-transit services. Transit
engineers like to talk about others: locating stops so that transit
vehicles stay in the lane (admittedly blocking cars), and don’t have a
merge manoeuvre; boarding via all doors simultaneously; and
speeding boarding times with all passengers having prepaid, it
turns out most time is lost in payment. This is no longer
high-technology, but it is application of technology in a way that is
uncommon in the US (though widespread in so-called ‘developing’
countries like China, Brazil, and Colombia, which are far-superior
in their public transit than the supposedly ‘developed’ US).
Reducing uncertainty is certainly a key characteristic for the success of any
transport mode’s ability to attract users.7 7 It is a common observation in the
travel demand modeling community
that waiting time is at least twice
as onerous as in-vehicle time. Why
should that be? One of the main
problems with waiting is uncertainty
about when transit vehicles will arrive.
Real-time information is now becoming
widespread, so with the touch of a finger
on a smartphone or watch, one can
know down to the minute when the next
vehicle will arrive, can have suggested
routes, and soon with that same smart
device, pay in advance or with a tap
while boarding the vehicle. It is expected
that as certainty comes into the system,
the perceived time of transit trips will
drop, which should attract more users.
New versus old. So called ‘legacy’ metro systems in the US
account for over half the nation’s fixed-rail transit passengers
(especially Boston, Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco
MUNI). Middle-aged US systems born in the 1970s like San
Francisco’s BART, Baltimore and Washington DC’s Metros, and
Atlanta’s MARTA now face issues associated with aging
infrastructure, brittle labor relations, and fixed networks unable to
meet changing demand patterns.
The challenges facing older systems differ from those that were
first launched after 1980 in the era of Light Rail. Expanding and
extending existing networks is immensely easier (sclerotic New York
excepted), and given network effects, more promising than starting from
scratch. New and emerging systems (at least in the US) are sold on
their ability to yield under-appreciated environmental and societal
benefits. Where there are large volumes of people already moving
in key corridors, the leap to fixed route service is inevitable. But
elsewhere, the assumption is precarious because MaaS transport
and micro-transit will suitably serve these markets.
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Pricing. The rationale behind pricing structures across existing
transit systems, however, has as much predictability as the lines and
location of the paint in Jackson Pollack’s artwork. Pricing schemes
may be distance based, trip based, or transfer based; others are
policy choices based on tradition and inertia. In most macro-transit
systems, fares cover less than half of operating costs and none of the
capital costs.8 Raising fares to cover operations with separate subsidies8 The farebox recovery ratio, the share of
operating expenditures covered by fares,
nationally was 33.4% in 2003 and 32.8%
in 2012. (Office of Budget and Policy
2013).
for those who need them is a likely direction. This requires auto travel to
be appropriately priced as well.
Payment. Adopting payment systems that seamlessly integrate with
all other forms of transport, and the rest of life, is an integral step
forward. While smart cards are better than ticketing and tokens, transit
doesn’t require its own currency. Integrated and multi-modal smart
payment systems based off of location-aware smart devices will be
available, reducing the headaches of ticketing.
The bus was a frequent source of mobility while Kevin lived in
Bologna (Italy). For those without monthly passes, the process was
relatively simple. You would buy tickets at the local newspaper
stand or the tabbacharia or some other local shops. Otherwise, you
could purchase a ticket from the machine on-board (in many
European models of bus transport, the driver does not handle
money nor does he interact with the passengers). The system was
straightforward. That is, unless the newspaper stand was on-strike
from selling tickets, and the tabbacharia had no more tickets to sell,
and the other shops were closed, and the ticket machine on the bus
was not functioning. The only option was the ride the bus sans
ticket – and this culmination of events occurred surprisingly, and
unpredictably, often. And, of course, by riding the bus without a
ticket prompts the undercover transit police to issue an 80 euro
penalty. This happened to Kevin once.
An app on your phone, watch, or other device, or even a
biometric account linked to a thumbprint or eyeball scan, will
connect with the station or vehicle once you board, and when you
alight, automatically debit your account. In exchange, the agency
knows that you are on-board and where you are sitting. This
information is potentially valuable to advertisers, helping defray
costs. Removing the payment delay as people board vehicles is just
the first stage.
Membership. Most transport systems worldwide currently charge
on a per use basis, either by cash or with a stored-value card. Many
allow a season pass for unlimited use.9 But so far, this is just a
9 For the individual traveler, a season
pass is worthwhile at current fares if you
are essentially a daily user for commute
trips, or use it for a lot of non-commute
trips as well. In the Twin Cities 9.5
million rides of a total of ~71 million
(which depends on what numbers you
use) on Metro Transit use MetroPass.
“Unlimited” use still has limits, for
instance in the Twin Cities you still need
to pay for services > $3 per ride, i.e.
Northstar Commuter Rail line.
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payment mechanism, not a change in how the passengers view the
system or the system views the passenger.
Consider payment differences for holders of season passes vs.
pay-as-you-ride. There are probably a lot of existing riders who
would benefit from a pass who don’t get one. Possessing a pass
would induce the rider to make more trips by transit (since the
marginal cost of use would now be zero). At a relatively lower
price, more people would get a pass. We would expect more people
to have passes than use the passes on the system every day (not
every pass-holder need be a daily rider). People pay for the option
without having to think about price, offering several benefits.
Loyalty programs are a related strategy, now employed by airlines,
to keep customers coming back.10 10 Some cities have Bus Riders Unions,
but they are often at odds with the
transit agency. Almost everywhere has
an Automobile Association (Minneapolis
and St. Paul each have one), about which
I may have warm feelings since they
help start my car when the battery is
dead, or change a tire, or tow it when
something else breaks. Transit workers
are members of their workers union.
Even transit agencies are members of
APTA trade association. We cannot
find an example of a transit system
that organizes and treats its riders as
members. We believe this will change.
Why shouldn’t riders be members
of the non-profit organization that
provides them transportation services on
a regular basis? And why shouldn’t they
help govern that organization? And why
shouldn’t there be more than one so that
they can both compete and coordinate to
better serve travelers?
Now couple the season pass with a change in system
organization. Season-pass holders are members. Membership changes
the perspective from being a customer to being a long-term stake-holder
and owner of the system. As a member of a club, I want there to be
more members, as it helps spread the costs and raises money for the
services provided. I become an advocate for the organizations I join.
If executed well, I may even feel part of a larger social whole
(though we expect few identify with their car rental service like
Hertz or Avis). I help maintain it, since it is my property.
Psychologically speaking, users act differently when they feel they
have meaningful input into decisions, thereby affecting outcomes.
Automation. It is surprising that, in 2015 in the US, outside of
airports, most modern, grade-separated rail systems fail to all have
automatic train operation (ATO). Administering organizations might
still be licking their wounds from previous mishaps.
Two mishaps stand out:
1. Bay Area Rapid Transit: Fremont Flyer crash (October 2, 1972) – a
train under testing with automatic control overshot the end of the
track;11 11 (Middleton 2003).
2. The Dockland Light Railway (March 10, 1987) test case failed to
stop at the terminus.12 12 (London Reconnections 2013).
In one case (San Francisco’s BART), drivers were re-inserted into the
system, in the other (London’s Dockland Light Rail), driverless trains
remained standard (and safe).
Eventually, trains and buses will be routinely driverless. However,
given the general technological torpor, and institutional rigidity,
along with public union strength, in the macro-transit sector, this is
likely decades away from full deployment.
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12.2 Micro-Transit
Bridging the gap between single user transport owned either
individually (car) or delivered as part of a service (MaaS Transport)
and fixed-route public transit (Macro-Transit) lies a rapidly
emerging form of mobility dubbed ‘micro-transit.’ Users share their
slightly larger capsule (a vehicle larger than a car but smaller than a
large bus or train) with others.
This ‘great middle’ is being contested by vehicles of various sizes
and shapes. While currently driven by humans, they will eventually
be led by machines that dynamically match vehicles, passengers,
and destinations in a way that is cost-effective and attractive to
consumers. Operating on everyday streets and accessing relatively
low-density destinations, access and egress distances for these
systems are less than fixed route transit. But here, increased
flexibility can be purchased; small distances can be eliminated by
paying more. Micro-transit exists in a variety of small forms today,
as described below. But it can ramp up by applying real-time
information and mobile communications. Notably, conventional
micro-transit typically focuses on work trips, while the newer MaaS
systems are primarily for anything but commuting. Intercity trips
have their own and separate dynamics.1313 Firms like Megabus and Bolt serve
the intercity market in a way with
lower prices and WiFi that appeals
to passengers more than Greyhound
or Amtrak. Yet these kinds of
services cannot work point-to-point in
all markets. Most pairs of origins and
destinations are too small. But that
does not mean they cannot work in any
market. Finding the customers best
served by any new technology, such
as this new information-powered bus-
sized vehicles is what market economies
are best at. (Schwieterman et al. 2007;
Fischer and Schwieterman 2011).
Vanpool. Micro-transit is on a continuum from the automobile
and MaaS. This is best illustrated at the most basic level, the
vanpool, which gained popularity with the oil shocks of the 1970s.
Ranging from a scaled-up carpool where riders chip in to pay the
driver/owner who is also a commuter to systems that are organized
collectively with professional drivers, vanpools have long served
niche markets. They face the dilemma that passengers must forego
any demand for schedule flexibility. There will not be a vanpool
following if you miss this one.
Jitneys. Today Via, a smartphone app-powered service operating in
Manhattan advertises “Smarter than the subway. Better than the bus.
Cheaper than the taxi.”1414 (Via 2015).
Often illegal dollar vans have long served immigrant communities
in New York, Los Angeles, and Miami, serving over 100,000 riders a
day in New York.15 These jitney services run regular routes based on15 See (King 2012).
where the market lies, serving a particular set of passengers better
than competing modes. The risks with such services are poaching
from traditional transit services, which have developed markets in
the first place. This issue is discussed in Klein, Moore, and Reja’s
transit 159
1997 book Curb Rights,16 which suggests assigning a property right 16 (Klein et al. 1997).
in stopping to pick-up passengers in a time window at a particular
location. These services have also been targeted to better serve the
commuting needs of migrant enclaves.
Private Buses. Upstart firms like short-lived Leap and Bridj, and
Chariot have started to employ smart technology to take advantage
of the flexibility of the bus to serve specific passengers rather than
general markets.17 17 Upwards of almost 200 public
transit startups were identified
at the time of writing, https:
//angel.co/public-transportation.
Leap has recently been shut down by
California for operating illegally.
Employer-based Transport. Companies like Google, Apple, and
Facebook operate buses for their employees who wish to live in the
City of San Francisco but work in 30-50 miles to the south in
Mountain View, Cupertino, and Menlo Park. They differ from
traditional macro-transit in that the routes are far more dynamic
and personalized for the actual riders, rather than for random,
prospective riders. In other words, these are far more demand
driven, and despite the size of the vehicle, the networks are
typically much smaller (though in the future they may grow). A bus
is a bus, but these are institutionally different, as large corporations
are assuming the role of transit provider for specialized markets
when no one else does.
Paratransit. Paratransit and similar mobility services provide
door-to-door shared ride transport for the disabled and elderly in
most metropolitan areas. In addition to doing new things,
technologies of course enable doing old things better. A thick
market in on-demand shared ride micro-transit services may
provide a cost-effective, time-saving substitute for current
paratransit services.
Airport Shuttles. Companies like SuperShuttle have long
operated airport shuttles to connect arriving and departing
passengers (who did not bring an automobile aboard their flight!)
with hotel or home destinations for less money, and less directness
but more time than a taxi.
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Information technology is enabling large scale shared rides, or
micro-transit, just as it enables individual vehicles to provide shared
ride service between a handful of passengers. Micro-transit has the
potential to address problems in far more markets than it does today.
Most notably, one possible void is that micro-transit services (as
well as MaaS Transport) become feeders to public transport’s core
routes. Addressing the proverbial ‘first-mile, last-mile’ problem (a
space that bicycling also could address) – that gap at the start and
end of every trip that’s difficult for traditional transit operators to
serve in a cost-effective way.
The hub-and-spoke strategy will continue to serve transportation
well. How these trunk and feeder systems are organized remains
open. Perhaps the public retains the monopoly, capital intensive
trunk (macro-transit), but the feeders (micro-transit, MaaS, personal
transportation) are private, potentially competitive services.
Perhaps the trunks are publicly regulated franchises. Perhaps they
are private for-profit firms, as they were originally in many cities.
The degree to which people are willing to share rides to save cost
in the future is one of the large unknowns. Will we see a shedding
of cars? The twentieth century saw the opposite, a shedding of
persons per ride, as first transit, and then carpooling, steadily
shrunk. With automation driving costs down, that might continue.
But that is offset by information technologies making matching
people with others going to almost the same place at almost the
same time much more feasible, lowering the penalty associated with
ridehailing. How this nets out will determine which technologies
will be more successful. There is room for both, but one will
undoubtedly be more successful than the other.
What about traditional fixed-route, scheduled bus service? We see
it as scaling up to macro-transit bus rapid transit with high frequency
on exclusive or prioritized rights-of-way, or scaling down into the
more flexible micro-transit market, depending on the route. Real-
time, multi-party ride-sharing (MaaS transport) will shave off the
very low end of fixed route transit buses that are today provided
because a constituency demanded the route decades ago and no one
has bothered to remove it. Many of these routes now serve low
densities of people who cannot afford a car or cannot drive.
High ridership transit routes will still be best served by high
frequency, often rail-based, but also rapid bus, service. But if
demand is too low to support high frequency (say 10 minutes),
perhaps it is too low to serve with fixed route transit. Admittedly
this depends on a variety of factors, like whether fixed route drivers
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and MaaS transport drivers have similar compensation.
Post-automation, of course, it depends on whether we have
driverless buses as well as cars. We will eventually get there, but
slowly in the US because of institutional constraints. Fixed route
networks will shrink. Low-quality, low-frequency, low-occupancy
transit is a flightless bird stumbling toward extinction. However
where fixed routes remain, they will increase in frequency and
dependability.
Although macro-transit may show some growth in limited
markets, alternatives that are already available together with
soon-to-be services will outcompete transit for most potential
origin-destination pairs. Macro-transit will remain significant in
large cities, particularly serving downtown destinations. This has
been falling as a share of the total travel market for decades, and
while that fall has recently been arrested, the changing nature of
work will not restore downtown to its former preeminence.
(De)Centralization. The tension between centralized versus
decentralized employment of technology is old. It has played out in
factory vs. piece work, trains vs. cars, and mainframes vs. personal
computers among other domains. We argue this tension will play
out between autonomous privately owned cars and
Mobility-as-a-Service. Similarly in transit, this will be an issue.
Zealots are convinced there is one true way. This is ultimately a
question of costs and benefits, and who bears those costs and
benefits.
Equity. The problem of transport for those who cannot afford
higher quality service will remain, but more efficient means of
providing those services than fixed route transit will be sought and
eventually enacted, for instance transport vouchers that can be used
in a variety of modes.
The transformations of public transit may be more significant than
those affecting automobility, occurring for much the same reasons.
But while those transformations are larger, in the US, they affect far
fewer people, people who live and/or work in medium and high
density central cities that can be effective served with transit, but not
those in rural and lower density suburbs without a good street grid.
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Figure 12.3: Relax. There’s more
than one way to get there. Work
from Home. Ad on Seattle
Metro Transit Vehicle (2001).
Photo by David M. Levinson.
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Up and Out: The Future of Travel
Demand and Where We Live
Figure 13.1: New York City
is the Up model in extremis,
with shared vehicles and
transit creating a transport
framework that would be
unsustainable with mostly
private automobiles. Source:
Pixabay.com (CC0 license).
If there is one thing for certain about the future of transport in
cities, it is that autonomous vehicles (AVs) are coming. When AVs
will arrive is disputed, and the length of time for their deployment
from the first consumer-grade cars to all new cars to replacing the
existing fleet is far from clear. Conditional factors include the
society’s acceptance of technology, regulation, market conditions,
and the like.
There are differing projections about the effects of autonomous
vehicles on travel demand. Figure 13.2 illustrates these trends
relative to a demand line, concomitant with various pressures and
effects. We present, on one hand, how automation, in and of itself,
is a technology that makes travel easier; it pushes the demand curve
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Figure 13.2: The effects of
accessibility on cities.
to the right. For the same general cost, people are more willing to
travel. Exurbanization has a similar effect (and automation and
exurbanization form a positive feedback system).
We also present, on another hand, how the move from private
vehicle ownership to mobility as a service, which is likely in larger
cities, suggest that the marginal cost of a trip might rise from very
low (since the vehicle is already owned) to high (since the cost of
the vehicle has to be recovered on a per-trip basis). This moves the
demand curve to the left. The effect is similar in effect to
urbanization (and urbanization and mobility-as-a-service also form
a nice positive feedback system). Many other changes also move the
demand curve to the left, including demographic trends,
substituting information technologies for work, socializing, and
shopping, and dematerialization.
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Income moves the willingness to pay for the same amount of travel
up or down. Changes in the price structure of travel move along the
demand curve.
The culmination of these factors suggests one scheme to consider
the effects of new technologies on travel demand. How these
vectors net out is a problem that could be solved with analytical
geometry, if only the relative magnitudes were known. We suggest
herein that demand in the US is generally moving a bit more to the
left than the right. Yet, transport conditions in the US within the
past year witnessed relatively low fuel costs and growing incomes;
thus, aggregate behavior signaled movement to right than the left.
We also note, however, that new automation technologies change
the available capacity of roads through improved packing of
vehicles in motion and smaller vehicles. Less demand layered on
more effective supply reduces congestion effects in the net.
Relative to traditional cars driven by humans, AVs will generally
allow individuals faster travel. There will always be exceptions, yet,
all else equal, faster vehicles increase demand. Each technological
advance in mobility over the past 100 years heretofore increased the
size of metropolitan areas. The ability to go faster, either owing to
new technologies or more connected networks, allows people to
reach more things in less time. Subways drove the expansion of
London.1 Streetcars did the same for many American cities.2 1 (Levinson 2007).
2 (Xie and Levinson 2009).Historically, the time saved from mobility gains was reflected
mostly in additional distance between home and the workplace,
maintaining a stable commuting (home to work) time.3 3 Autonomous vehicles clearly alter
the impedance function of accessibility
calculations – in which direction
remains an open question. One reliable
estimate suggests a one percent increase
in accessibility leads to a 0.6 percent
increase in travel. Couple this increase
with the new mode of cars deadheading
without people, and perhaps the
doubling of capacities and speeds leads
to a doubling of total travel, assuming
nothing else changes.
Will autonomous vehicles reverse the trends that have been
witnessed with current car technology? Will people make more
trips? Will people make longer trips? Will people relocate? All are
good questions. There are increasing anecdotes – soon to be
solidified with loads of empirical data – to shed light on these
important questions. Nonetheless, any findings will likely be highly
contextualized and therefore, perennially difficult to claim for
aggregate populations.
Recent evidence on reduced travel distances and time spent
traveling is less about reducing trip distances between home and
work (which if anything are still rising in the US) and more about
reducing the shear number of work and other trips being made
across the whole population. In short: speed decentralizes.4 And, 4 In addition to speed, anything that
lowers the generalized cost of travel
decentralizes development.
some places, including suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas will likely
see increased decentralization. But in cities, we observe faster
growth rates than the suburbs and then seen in cities in recent
decades. These phenomena will likely be context dependent.
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Autonomous vehicles will likely be faster, particularly on
freeways, especially after widespread deployment once either
human drivers are banned or a network of separate lanes are
designated for autonomous cars.
Coupling with just the faster speed, the fully autonomous vehicle
lowers the cognitive burden on the former driver/now passenger.
Modes with lower cognitive burden tend to have longer trip
durations. Time matters. What you does with that time (the quality
of the experience) also matters. If you can work while traveling, the
value of saving time is less than if you must focus on the driving
task. This phenomenon helps explain a premium commuters are
willing to pay for high-quality transit and intercity rail service.
Pursuit of high-specification ride-quality raises interesting issues
about acceleration and motion sickness (which is worse for
passengers than drivers as passengers cannot anticipate as well as
drivers).55 (Le Vine et al. 2015).
If the time or money cost of traveling per trip declines, the
long-held theory of induced demand predicts, all else equal: more
trips, longer trips, and more trips in the peak period. Logically, if
the time or money cost per trip rises, there should be fewer and
shorter trips, or reduced demand.
Privately owned autonomous vehicles lower the cost of travel per
trip. Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) eliminates the fixed cost of
transport, and exchanges it for a higher per cost trip. The share of
ownership versus MaaS is thus an, if not the most, important
predictor of travel demand in the coming years.
But two seemingly contradictory, but complementary, outcomes
are likely as vehicular automation and Mobility-as-a-Service play
out.
As the chapter title suggests, we label these scenarios ‘Up’ and
‘Out.’
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Up: Less vehicle ownership
with increased use of MaaS
in cities, raising the value
of cities.
Cloud Commuting via
Shared Autonomous Electric
Vehicles (SAEVs) which can
be summoned on demand
allows people to avoid vehicle
ownership altogether. This
reduces vehicle travel, as people
pay more to rent by the minute
than exploit the sunk costs of
vehicular ownership. By saving
total expenditures on transport,
more funds are available to pay
for rent in cities, and more trips
are by walk, bike, and transit.
People who seek the set of
urban amenities (entertainment,
restaurants, a larger dating
pool) will find these amenities
increasing in response to the
population. The greater value
in cities with the new more
convenient technology leads to
more and taller development.
(Hence the use of the word Up.)
Out: More vehicle
travel with increased
exurbanization.
Fast Private Autonomous
Electric Vehicles (PAEVs) that
allow their passenger to do other
things than steer and brake
and find parking impose fewer
requirements on the traveler
than actively driving the same
distance. Decreases in the cost
of traveling (i.e., availability
of multitasking) makes travel
easier. Easier travel means
increases in accessibility and
subsequently increases in the
spread of development and
a greater separation between
home and work, (pejoratively,
sprawl), just as commuter trains
today enable exurban living
or living in a different city.
This reinforces the disconnected,
dendritic suburban street grid
and makes transit service that
much more difficult (as if low
density suburbs weren’t hard
enough). People will live farther
Out.
13.1 America’s Greatest Natural Resource
“Parking is America’s greatest natural resource.” – David King.
A direct knock-on effect of the Up scenario is that it will transform
the need for parking. It also means vehicular dead-heading.6 6 Dead-heading is not a continued tribute
to the psychedelic band formed in
1965, but rather cars driving without
any occupants to their next call, a
phenomenon common with transit and
rail, though even those vehicles usually
have drivers.
At the more local, urban level, the Mobility-as-a-Service model
implies spaces now devoted to cars can be repurposed – everything
from street space to buildings. Garages turn to accessory dwelling
units. Gas stations and parking lots to anything with a “higher and
better use.” Autonomous vehicles can drop off their passenger at
the front door, and then park themselves in far less space than
drivers currently require (or move on to their next passenger), and
that space need not be so close to the most valuable urban areas.
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Furthermore, MaaS signals an end to on-street parking, suggesting
yet another implication for the future of how roads will be
reconfigured. “Redeveloping surface parking may be the single
biggest challenge facing US cities, but is also a rare opportunity for
cities and many suburbs to rebuild themselves fairly easily and
quickly.”77 Email correspondence with
transportation planning professor
David King.
13.2 Humanity, the Future, & Its Implications for Cities: A
Quick History
We present a short history of humanity:
In the beginning, people lived in caves. Once they ran short of caves,
humans built huts. Before agriculture, the only land uses were caves, huts,
and vastly more space for hunting and gathering.
Eventually, enough was gathered (and agriculture was developed) that
warehouses of a sort were constructed to store foodstuffs for future use.
Enough was traded, that a blanket on the ground became a table became
a tent became shops (retail land uses). Places of worship moved out of the
living room into a common structure, or communal fire pits were enclosed.
Manufactured goods moved from the home to a workshop to a factory.
Bureaucracy itself required its own spaces.
The modern world was created.
In the book, The Great Good Place,8 Ray Oldenberg references a8 (Oldenburg 1989).
Third Space – neutral spaces on neutral ground where people gather
and interact. Third spaces differ from First space (home) and Second
space (work or school). Oldenburg and other sociologists bemoan
the fact that Third Spaces are in rapid decline.
One reason for this emerging phenomenon is that First space has
increased in size. There is less reason (and it is costlier) to go to a
pub or a coffee shop when one owns their wet bar in the basement,
complete with video game entertainment system. With many
homes currently spread out in a low density environment, the
preference for remaining put is easier to understand. Importantly,
today’s large homes with their ability to leverage information (and
entertainment) technologies are much more attractive than homes
just five years ago. People don’t want to leave. The notion of
free-range children is the exception, and this is not just because
parents are overly protective [David’s neighbor returning his son
Sam back home because Sam was pretending to stand guard
outside her house across the street], but because children aren’t as
bored in the home with their devices as they are outside the home
without them. And when the neighbor kids stay at home, the
outdoors is even less entertaining as there is no one else to play
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with. It is a vicious cycle with the natural end state that no one
plays outside. With the internet and its billions of cat videos,
plethora of video games, and any music one could want, along with
instant virtual connectivity to anyone anybody might want to
socialize with, there is mounting evidence to suggest that people are
refraining from the need to go out.
In recent years, urbanized areas in the US have seen obsolete
land uses revert back to housing. Similarly, there has been a
conversion of old industrial lofts to housing, transformation of
offices to housing. Cities are adding far more housing space as a
share of new development then in previous decades. Retail spaces
are being abandoned and repurposed.
Automation means that:
• Manufacturing and warehousing have even fewer ties to the labor
force than before, and so are even more footloose (to locations
where the cost of robots and transport of materials to the site and
transport to end users is lowest),
• Transport costs drop, and depend primarily on the value of time
of the goods being moved, wear and tear on vehicles, and the costs
of energy (which are falling),
• Agriculture and food production are more like manufacturing
than artisan craft-work. While manufacturing and food
production will require space, they do not necessarily require
space inhabited by people.
To the extent that people will be employed, they will less and less
need to work any particular place. They may need to meet with
others, but that need not be at one another’s cubicle. Second space
will disappear. This may result in an increase in Third space as
humans, at least the extroverts among you, and even introverts in
extrovert mode, still want some face-to-face interaction. But what is
to say that won’t occur in people’s large, large homes? In a world
with authenticated people identifiable from facial recognition by
your smart home and with established identities and reputations,
the threat of inviting a ’stranger’ into your home, or the public
portion of your home may no longer be so frightening, as no one is
really a stranger anymore. The greater threat will be meeting
someone in a public place where you don’t control the environment.
In the end, like in the beginning, the only built structures people
require is housing. Second space will slowly diminish. An open
question lies in whether a Third space can fill the gap. While
transport automation is changing cities as discussed above,
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automation more broadly has the potential to more profoundly
change the function and nature of cities.
13.3 Replacing and Adapting Retail
Although physical transactions are here to stay, if only for the raw
materials needed to operate 3-D printers (Chapter 10), going
shopping in the physical world has peaked (Chapter 3).
Fortunately, a lot of the retail that will disappear is, for lack of a
better word, crap. We all know the dumpy strip malls that besot the
scorned suburban landscape. First they will lower rents, attracting
bingo halls, massage parlors, karate schools, and board game shops.
Second they will be abandoned. Then they will be replaced.
As with many of these processes, there will be a rich get richer
phenomenon, a few remaining retail centers may continue to grow,
as the experience of shopping (requiring many many choices)
replaces the necessity of shopping. The commodity distributors will
be replaced by commodity deliverers if the cost of distribution can
be flipped so that delivery is cheap enough. But people still need to
leave home, if only to get out of the house. Looking at things is a
good excuse. Artisans and crafts, and things that are more attractive
in person than online will be the things that motivate us to leave the
home-work axis for alternative destinations. The purchase of stocks
like paper towels or detergent will rarely be stimulating enough to
get us out of our chairs.
As shopping transitions from the real to virtual, some, if not all,
of the land that was devoted to shopping (14.2 billion square feet
(1.32 billion m2) will need to be reallocated.9 The UK has the9 For perspective, the Mall of America
is 4.2 million square feet, of which 2.5
million is retail. So US retail is basically
3000 Malls of America.
world’s largest e-commerce share of retail, accounting for 13% of
their total retail sales10 and their Parliament has noticed this trend,
10 (eMarketer 2015). introducing legislation specifically designed to preserve High
Streets and help small businesses.11 But with what will we replace11 (All-Party Parliamentary Small Shops
Group (APPSSG) 2006). ‘High Street’ is
the British equivalent of ‘Main Street,’
though it applies to neighborhoods
within cities as well as small towns.
the losers? As opportunities for re-development arise, better
regulations and incentives will lead incrementally to more desirable
land use.
Advocacy groups like Smart Growth America predict a robust
future demand for hundreds of millions of square feet of walkable
urbanism over the next generation. They go so far as to claim that
once the real estate industry “better figures out” how to build this
style of development, it will mark the end of sprawl. Such optimism
claims a new foundation for the American economy (in the same
vein that the suburbs and driving underwrote much of the
American economy for many years). We are less convinced this the
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new real estate model will comprise a walkable Main Street, if only
because the demand for shops will decline. The demand for
services like eating out may continue to grow though, as shown in
Figure 11.2. People will not want to just stay at home. Recreation
and entertainment are among other possibilities.
These older less desirable retail areas are the tear-downs. If they
retain good transport access, they might remain commercial, or be
appropriate for medium or high density residential (Building ‘Up’).12 12 (Dunham-Jones and Williamson 2008).
While the highest and best use may not be retail stores, there are still
other activities that benefit from locations that are easily reached.
As fetching is replaced by delivery (especially by automated
delivery), the amount of shopping (and naturally, the space devoted
to shopping) will shrink. This is counter-balanced by trends toward
greater income13 (which ultimately must be spent on something)
13 There is no guarantee that GDP,
GDP/person, or personal income will
rise. In the US GDP, which is a
function of the number of people and
productivity per person, has risen, but
has not translated directly into rising
individual incomes. In the UK average
personal incomes have fallen. See (John
Polak and Scott Le Vine 2014).
and more available time (which also has to be spent on something),
for which shopping may be an attractive solution.
Sometimes, the architecture, history, culture, food of the place
itself will attract people. Outside of the US and China, the top
world tourism destinations were France (mostly Paris), Spain
(mostly Barcelona), and Italy (mostly all over) (the US and China
are arguably at the top of the list as large countries with internal in
addition to international tourism). Creating and developing
attractive places, ranging from historical and attractive Main Streets
to the recreated militarily significant outpost is one of many ways to
give people something to do with their time while separating them
from their money.
13.4 Discussion
At first blush, Up and Out appear to be contrasting scenarios; they
are not exclusive, however. More people living in the suburbs or
exurbs does not mean fewer people live in cities, because the overall
size of the pie increases (more people overall). We predict pushing
on both ends of the demand curve places more growth in central and
exurban locations, and less in existing low-density suburbs.
Similarly, as the cost of travel decreases, people will be more
willing to live in locations far from where they work. For example,
some of our Dutch transport colleagues live on opposite sides of the
country from where they work (a phenomenon relatively common
in the Netherlands), relying on the convenient bike-train network.
The Northeast Corridor of the US has people living in one city and
commuting to another (for instance from Washington to Baltimore,
Philadelphia to New York). At speeds of 100 miles per hour (160
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km/h), the commuting range expands widely.
It is entirely likely that forms of transport propelled partially by
humans and electricity (sourced by solar power), will greenwash a
new generation of dispersed development. The effect may result
in future exurbs imposing a smaller environmental footprint than
today’s cities, if not a smaller footprint than future cities.
Relaxing demands on time, owing to the decline in the commute
to work, routine shopping, the parent-taxi, and so on, invokes the
perennial issue of travel time budgets. People will need to find new
uses for that time. So time not spent at work or out shopping or
traveling must be spent on something. Certainly some of that could
just be time at home. And as people live in more preferred places,
they may want to stay at home for longer times (and thus want to
make their homes larger, facilitated by building ‘Out’. But some of
it will also be spent outside the home, which is easier in the denser
environment of ‘Up’. People go ‘stir crazy’ and have an innate need
to roam – and will find excuses to do so.1414 See (Marchetti 1994). Also see
the work of Yacov Zahavi on travel
time budgets, archived at http://www.
surveyarchive.org/zahavi.html.
Work and shopping always had a social element that will continue
in some other form, these forms will be as diverse as people are.
That roaming need not be at 7:30 am and 4:30 pm, but it is still
likely to be some amount of time at some time of the day. It need
not be to the office or supermarket or bank or day care. It need not
involve gripping the steering wheel of a two-ton vehicle powered
by petrochemicals in a violent Death Race,15 but will involve motion,15 See e.g. Death Race 2000, a 1975 Roger
Corman film. motorized or otherwise.
The interplay of AVs and pricing is especially important. While
autonomous vehicle capacity may eventually double or quadruple,
per capita demand will rise as well if traditional patterns of induced
demand hold, and people continue to work, shop, and play at
today’s rates. It is quite possible that sharing remains a niche while
most people choose to own their own cars – the Out scenario
dominates. Thus, exurbanization and AVs better leverage newly
available capacity. To fully mitigate expected congestion effects,
pricing is required (see Chapter 15).
Part III
Policy
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Reduce, Reuse, (re)Cycle
Figure 14.1: Narrowly marked
street lane in Palermo, Italy.
Photo by Kevin J. Krizek.
“I said the numbers before. 114,000 lane miles, 25,000 bridges, 4,000
miles of rail. I said this a lot in my conversation when we were talking
about fuel tax increases. It’s not affordable. Nobody’s going to pay.
We are. We’re the ones. Look in the mirror. We’re not going to pay
to rebuild that entire system.
And my personal belief is that the entire system is unneeded. And
so the reality is, the system is going to shrink.
There’s nothing I have to do. Bridges close themselves. Roads
deteriorate and go away. That’s what happens.
And reality is, for us, let’s not let the system degrade and then we’re
stuck with sorta whatever’s left. Let’s try to make a conscious choice
– it’s not going to be perfect, I would agree it’s going to be complex
and messy – but let’s figure out which ones we really want to keep.
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And quite honestly, it’s not everything that we have, which means
some changes.
– Paul Trombino, the director of the Iowa Department of
Transportation. 11 (Marohn 2015).
To minimize physical waste, the slogan “Reduce, Reuse, Recycle”
is ingrained into grade school children in the US; the mantra
emphasizes the need to:
1. Reduce waste,
2. Reuse what is available, and then
3. Recycle what remains.
A starting point for how to approach transport facilities – mainly
the space between buildings in the form of roads – modifies this
mantra to Reduce, Reuse, (re)cycle.
Figure 14.2: Crime alert: theft of
bicycle reported in this vicinity
- Singapore. Shared bikes with
embedded GPS may obviate this
problem. Photo by David M.
Levinson
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14.1 Reduce
Figure 14.3: Bike or motorcycle?
Reducing overall travel demand helps and congestion pricing is
undoubtedly the most effective strategy in the near term; we tackle
pricing and cost issues in Chapter 15. We first motivate and prescribe
tactics for more efficiently employing the existing transport supply. If we follow the “2 second rule”
(2 seconds between two successive
vehicle’s front bumpers) (or 1800
vehicles per hour), at 60 mph we have
a vehicle density of 30 vehicles per
mile, or 176 ft per vehicle. Obviously
with congestion, we are wasting time
because we don’t increase throughput
and we decrease speed, though we
increase density. Vehicles are typically
26 ft, so we are using about 7 vehicle
lengths for every vehicle we are moving
at free flow speed near maximum
stable throughput on a pipeline section
without a bottleneck.
A popular gripe is that congestion stems from scarce right-of-way
(scarce in that it is limited, and finite, and at times fully used given
the applied technologies for its use). What goes unrealized is that
collectively, this scarce and valuable resource is sorely wasted:
• Most roads are under-used most of the time. There is ample
capacity outside the peak.
• Most of the pavement is unused even at peak times; there are
large gaps between vehicles both in terms of the headway between
vehicles and the lateral spacing between vehicles.
• Most Americans drive 6 foot wide cars in 12 foot lanes, often on
highways with wide shoulders.
• Most seats in most cars are unoccupied most of the time.
• Most cars contain far more weight than required to safely move
the passenger. While bigger cars might be safer for the occupants,
they are less safe for non-occupants.2 This is an inefficient arms 2 On the discussion of whether lighter
cars are more unsafe: (Wang and
Kockelman 2005).
race.
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• Many roads are so wide we use them for storage of vehicles most
of the day.
• There is excessive delay at traffic lights, especially during off-peak
periods, wasting time and space.
Prior to costly road expansion, either in terms of wider facilities or
more rights-of-way, the transport sector is wise to realize the urgency
in adopting strategies to more efficiently use the scarce, but existing,
right-of-way.
Vehicle width/Lane width. Even without autonomous
vehicles, lanes narrower than US standards are safe and have
similar throughput.3 Driving in narrower lanes prompts increased3 (Potts et al. 2007).
anxiety and awareness and hence safer driving conditions. Few, if
any, communities in the US are willing to dip below 10 foot, marked
travel lanes, even for neighborhood streets. Even the most
progressive public works officials are unwilling to go south of that.
Meanwhile, European communities are repeatedly penning in 6 foot
(~2 meter) lanes, as illustrated in Figure 14.1.
Looking forward, driverless cars will likely have far less variability
in the use of the lane. Other vehicles are just skinnier: bikes, mopeds,
motorcycles, e-bikes, neighborhood electric vehicles, and so on. With
these vehicles, personal mobility uses less space.
Vehicle weight. The safety benefits of lighter cars, trucks, and
buses are relatively straightforward from the standpoint of physics.
The average car in the US weighs in excess of 2 tons; European
averages are roughly two-thirds of that. Most cars are carrying
around far more weight than required to safely move the passenger.
While bigger cars tend to be safer for the occupants, they are less
safe for non-occupants. The greatest risk is when a heavy truck
meets a small car at high speed, or worse, an unprotected
pedestrian.
There is enormous potential to realize heightened use of
neighborhood type vehicles for neighborhood travel (i.e., more
specialized, local, lower speed travel). Ratcheting down the vehicle
size arms race is challenging; it is unclear where Detroit’s Big Three
automakers4 stand on smaller cars given the large profits in big cars4 The Big 3 in Detroit refers to the three
major American automotive companies:
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.
(Chrysler is now owned by Fiat.)
– they make them because they have to satisfy fuel economy
standards. However, the economics of electric vehicles help in this
regard.
Vehicle occupancy. Cities should legalize real-time, ad hoc
ridehailing (with compensation for the ride provider) to better use
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excess capacity within vehicles. In many places the compensation is
illegal, a battle discussed in Chapter 8 on MaaS Transport, as it
looks and smells like a taxi, which are highly regulated. For
example, strategies to encourage drivers to share (for money) excess
seats in cars are sorely needed.
Traffic signals and stop signs. More cars need to be moving
more often, thereby reducing idling in the system (i.e., the amount
of time people spend ‘in-vehicle’ that are not actually in-motion).
Strategic use of roundabouts (both mini-roundabouts in residential
areas as well as full-size roundabouts at suburban arterials) helps
reduces delay compared with stop signs or traffic lights, and
increases safety. The Dutch are among the innovators in this respect.
For example, Bertus Fortuijn, a Dutch traffic engineer, designed
the turbo-roundabout as a high-capacity, safe, no-signal traffic
control system.5 A remarkable design solution, it prompts travelers 5 A video of the Turbo Roundabout
is shown at this link: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=iMYib3IR43I.
to choose the correct lane on approach, thereby avoiding lane
changes within the roundabout. The design limits the number of
possible conflicts, so that drivers only have to look one direction, in
a routinized way, without the need to use mirrors, etc. Traffic moves
slowly (but faster than at a stoplight), yet overall capacity remains
high.
As autonomous cars aim to increasingly navigate through normal
junctions, designs like these could be a huge ally.
The urban arterial street grid will likely remain signalized, but
more real-time intelligence in the controllers, vehicle sensors, and
eventually vehicle to infrastructure connectivity (Chapter 7) can
significantly reduce stopped delay.
If vehicles and inter-vehicle communications were better, it
would be possible to achieve real-time coordination of vehicle
movements. A new goal will be to eliminate almost all stopped
delay at uncongested intersections that are today signalized.
Pedestrian/vehicle conflicts still remain and require controls or
grade separation when speeds are high and spaces are demarcated
rather than shared. The consequence of implementing the above
changes is that space devoted to cars can be reduced, both without,
and especially with, new vehicle technologies. The logical next step
is to reallocate road space.
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14.2 Reuse: Rightsizing Roads
Figure 14.4: Installation of the
street repurposing project in
Boulder. Photo by Kevin J.
Krizek.
To the dismay of many transport planners and engineers (many
of whom got into the field to build things), the physical layer of the
urban surface transport network in the United States is largely
complete.6 Remaining projects are largely those too expensive to6 This is not to say there are no good
projects, just very few. Redundancy
for critical facilities matters, and as
old bridges and tunnels are removed,
something needs to take their place,
ideally before they are decommissioned.
build the first (or second, or third) time (much like the Second
Avenue Subway in New York or the Alaskan Way Viaduct in
Seattle). Such ’Zombie’ projects do not die. While construction is
essentially irreversible, non-construction is easily reversed. In the
end, such projects are tinkering at the edges. Given the small
amount of new construction, most travel 20, 30, or even 50 years
from now will be on roads that exist today. While populations are
growing in central cities in the US, most older cities have
infrastructure networks designed for an era when populations were
larger than today.
Demassification (Chapter 9), changing the dimensions of cars is a
first step to glean increased efficiency within existing rights-of-way.
But broader thinking reconceptualizes the inherent design of rights-
of-way – that is, the area of space that is typically reserved for public
use between buildings.
We mentioned earlier, roads are among the slowest forms of
technology. While roads aren’t going anywhere, how society uses them is.
The space in the right-of-way will continue to serve as the primary
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conduit for moving matter: people and goods, even if the amount of
matter that needs to be moved declines. But as modes of travel are
born and die off, the nature and composition of these conduits
(roads) are likely to undergo dramatic and frequent changes.
The share of space that will be devoted to any one mode – or
portions devoted to mixing modes – will need to be addressed. A
first realization stems from what we mentioned above: narrower
lanes for car users has advantages. European-traveled readers
observe how cars – and lane widths and overall transport facilities
operate safely at widths that are half of what they are in the US. For
instance, two six-foot lanes could serve narrow vehicles in place of
one traditional twelve-foot lane. Modern US lane widths are
ensconced in standards,7 and changing them requires changing 7 For more on roadway standards,
see: http://nacto.org/docs/usdg/
residential_street_standards_
benjoseph.pdf.
standards. Like lane widths, road widths are set by standards, often
driven by fire departments who are adverse to putting their trucks
in reverse.
But more broadly, critical questions for communities of all sizes
will revolve around how much of what space goes to what forms of
movement, to vehicle storage, and to other uses. This means
changing the proportions and purpose for how this space is used.8 8 (Rice 2015).
Rightsizing or repurposing roads can take many forms. It has
usually been done at a fraction of the cost of building new transport
infrastructure from scratch and might result in moving more
people. It can mean taking away a shoulder and installing a bus
rapid transit lane. It can mean a 4 lane to 3 lane (4-3) conversion (2
lanes to 1 in each direction, with a center turn lane). It can mean
replacing a vacant 12 foot median with a light rail route. But these
are examples with excess space that might be empty in the
right-of-way. What happens when all space in the right-of-way is
spoken for? What happens when people say all of that is needed for
cars? In these cases, space for other uses comes at the expense of
automobile capacity – currently a difficult sell in all communities.
However, such cases are becoming more frequent, therefore creating
greater precedent, and ultimately making such cases more palatable
to accept politically.
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14.3 Five Stages of Repurposing
Communities across the globe are at different points on the
spectrum for accepting rightsizing or repurposing arguments. We
(undoubtedly mis-)apply the Ku˘Šbler-Ross model of grief felt by the
motorist at the forthcoming loss of automobile roadspace for cycling
facilities.
Stage 1: Denial applies to most communities across the US, whose
residents refuse to acknowledge that street space will be or needs
to be changing. In fact, there might be efforts to find additional
space for auto capacity (e.g., more roads, more lanes, wider lanes,
more parking). To the degree that bike lanes are considered, they are
found on otherwise empty space within existing rights of way (e.g.,
excessively wide shoulders). Examples: Anytown, USA.
Stage 2: Anger is exemplified by the so-called “War on Bikes”
and “War on Cars”9 that are riveting cities trying to make modest9 The discussions about “War on Bikes”
and “War on Cars” are overwrought,
but have captured media attention,
see e.g. (Byron 2015; Alpert 2013).
Toronto’s highly entertaining Mayor Rob
Ford talked about the “War on Cars”
(Markson 2010).
changes, like replacing parking with bike lanes or designating
’bicycle boulevards’. Examples: New York, Washington DC, Toronto.
Even relatively progressive towns like Boulder, Colorado – which
has spent little, if any, political capital in efforts to repurpose auto
space in recent years – have recently disturbed the hornet’s nest;
much of the driving public is angry owing to recent street
repurposing experiments like the one in Figure 14.4.
Stage 3: Bargaining refers to desire to re-design select areas to
reduce auto presence. It might be traffic calming. Maybe it is a
commitment to not build more roads, expand lanes, or increase the
level of service of intersections. Given that potholes are sometimes
conceived of as an original form of traffic calming, select stretches of
roads might be left to wither, while other stretches might be better
maintained to support increased variety of use. But the reach of these
areas is increasing. Examples: St. Paul, Minnesota.
Stage 4: Depression builds on Bargaining as the perceived losers
in the War on Cars (drivers) stop fighting the extension of non-auto
infrastructure into full corridors. Efforts might be centered on longer
stretches of road where there is a willingness to reduce lane capacity.
Since the first section of bike lanes already created a bottleneck for
cars or eliminated parking, extensions matter a lot less. Examples:
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Stage 5: Acceptance means community-wide consensus to
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reduce auto space by removing on-street parking overall, installing
parking in former vehicular lanes, or any of a series of other
treatments (e.g., buffered bicycle lanes, bulb-outs). Few places have
achieved this level of nirvana but some Northern European places
are closest. Examples: Davis, California and parts of Portland, Oregon.
A similar argument would apply to bus lanes or pedestrian
spaces; we leave those as an exercise for the reader.
Residents sort themselves in urban environments, selecting the
environment that best enables them to lead the lifestyle they seek.
People who want to cycle will move to places where cycling is easier.
People who want to park will do likewise.
In one sense, the amount of space in a right-of-way is a zero-sum
game. In another, because that space is not fully utilized, better
allocation of that space makes this a positive-sum game, the gain
for ’the winners’ outweighs the loss for ‘the losers’. The challenge,
which is why local city officials and city planners are handsomely
rewarded in their occupations,10 is to share that gain somehow so 10 City officials and planners in the
US are of course not especially
handsomely rewarded while working
for government. David’s first job was at
MNCPPC-MCPD (Montgomery County,
Maryland Planning Department) a land
regulation agency. His colleague Ajay
told a friend in India that he worked for
the agency. His friend said “you must
be rich”, due to the huge opportunities
for bribes. As far as David knows, no
staffers were bribed at the agency.
as to convince ’the losers’ to not fight what is best for society as a
whole.
14.4 Reuse Tactics
More concretely, an outstanding challenge moving forward is how to
reconcile the need for hard infrastructure with the uncertainty about
what technology (and the future) provides.
One approach is seeded via the Mike Nichols film The Graduate.
Dustin Hoffman’s character (Benjamin Braddock) is advised by
Walter Brooke (Mr. McGuire) about the future:
Mr. McGuire: I want to say one word to you. Just one word.
Benjamin: Yes, sir.
Mr. McGuire: Are you listening?
Benjamin: Yes, I am.
Mr. McGuire: Plastics.
Benjamin: Exactly how do you mean?
Mr. McGuire: There’s a great future in plastics. Think about it. Will you
think about it?
“One word – plastics.” This advice was not too bad for
1968.
Plasticity. The quip can rephrased for for a transport context:
“One word – Plasticity” where plasticity is defined as the ability to
change in response to changes in the environment. This may be
184 the end of traffic and the future of access
good or bad (e.g., plastic deformation in structures would largely be
considered bad). But given that matters are changing quickly and
the accuracy of forecasts are even more suspect than they used to be
(and in prior decades, their worthiness was questioned
considerably), communities need transport and land use designs
that are adaptable. Future transport infrastructure needs to easily
change function over time. Adaptability (the ability to change) and
flexibility (the ability to do more than one thing, like serving cars,
trucks, buses, and bicycles) are paramount.
The prevailing tenor of most transport planning focuses on the
built environment, embedded infrastructure, and long-lasting
constructs. Such hallmarks are indicative of anti-plasticity. But this
is changing. An expert panel of transport specialists from the US
recently came to the following conclusion:
“The current ‘predict and provide’ paradigm in transport – in which
transport officials plan infrastructure investments based on projected
needs 20 or 30 years into the future – was seen as imperiled amid
stalled driving demand and growing interest in multimodal
alternatives.”1111 (Dutzik et al. 2015).
The tone and content of transport conversations have evolved
over recent years. There has been noticeable change away from the
primacy of congestion and level of service measures toward a
stronger need to prize access and opportunities. Charging users for
both roadway use and parking have gone from almost untouchable
to widely accepted in the policy sphere. A next threshold will prize
doing more with less. It will require creativity about what types of
infrastructure are best served and placed within limited
right-of-ways currently available. Infrastructure decisions based on
a guiding principle of ’plasticity’ is easier to laugh off than take
seriously. New plastic, adaptable, and flexible designs for transport
– land use systems are the keys to progress.
Plastics. One place to start implementing the notion of plasticity
uses actual plastic. This requires re-adjusting notions of what
comprises infrastructure. Communities test waters of road
repurposing for bicycling, for example, by turning to plant-filled,
orange five-gallon buckets from your local hardware superstore, or
strips of green astroturf.1212 (Anderson 2014).
These type of initiatives are termed ’tactical urbanism’ or ’guerrilla
traffic calming.’13 Sanctioned or unsanctioned by the community, the13 Some say a more “strategic” variant
is referred to as tactical urbanism. See
(Lydon and Garcia 2015).
result might be parklets, ’Pavement to Plaza’, or ’Build a Better Block’
initiatives. These are small-scale interventions with a community-
focus and a local scale. Their main purpose is to test the notion of
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how a place works or is perceived.
These types of initiatives allow shorter time horizons. They may
be dismantled at the end of the day. Assuming stronger materials,
they may have a shelf life of mere months. Communities like
Boulder, Colorado are launching formal programs to roll out
smaller scale, relatively radical bicycling infrastructure to test the
idea.14 14 (City of Boulder).
A key characteristic is that nothing is permanent. Furthermore,
the performance of the intervention is a key design ingredient. It
may flail or fly.
Paint. Heat plastic to the point that it becomes paint and there is
a powerful lever in transport circles. Peter Rogoff, the former US
Federal Transit Administrator is on record as candidly stating some
of them: painting buses and painting roads,15 15 (Hymon 2010).
“Supporters of public transit must be willing to share some simple
truths that folks don’t want to hear. One is this – Paint is cheap, rail
systems are extremely expensive.
Yes, transit riders often want to go by rail. But it turns out you can
entice even diehard rail riders onto a bus, if you call it a “special” bus
and just paint it a different color than the rest of the fleet.
Once you’ve got special buses, it turns out that busways are cheap.
Take that paint can and paint a designated bus lane on the street
system. Throw in signal preemption, and you can move a lot of
people at very little cost compared to rail.” – Peter Rogoff, the former
US Federal Transit Administrator
When it comes to painting roads, countries, states, regions, and
even cities have their own guidelines for using paint. Janette
Sadik-Khan who was Commissioner of New York City’s
Department of Transportation during the Bloomberg
Administration was all about paint, using it to rapidly test
alternative street configurations.16 Such efforts in New York helped, 16 (Whitaker 2007).
in part, to stimulate one such national guide in the US from the
influential American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO).17 It covers standards such as 17 (AASHTO 2012).
bike lane width. Then there is the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices (MUTCD) from the Federal Highway Administration18 18 (Hawkins 1992a;b;c; 1994).
covering signs, signals, and pavement markings, each state has its
own version. The MUTCD does authorize experiments. They grant
interim approvals for some uses. But the MUTCD is slow to make
them official and they are usually conservative in scope. Work from
the National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO),
now led by Janette Sadik-Khan is pushing the envelope with respect
to innovation, complete with a step towards standardization. While
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National Association of City Transportation Officials (NACTO), the
Federal Highway Administration, and hosts of other bodies
stipulate how paint should be used in the form of design
recommendations, we propose three areas of use:
• Conflict zones: paint should be use to highlight difficult conflict
through junctions. For example, almost 80% of bicycle crashes
occur at intersections (and merge zones).
• Something special: paint should be used to indicate an exceptional
treatment. For instance for bicycle facilities, these could include
the start (or end) of a protected lane, a left turn waiting areas or a
bike box, for instance.
• Aggressive experiments: in the forthcoming evolution of how street
space will change in cities, paint is the friend of the transport
planner. Paint could be applied more liberally when cities are
trying something avant-garde, realizing that it might be more
difficult to do on streets (like those in Europe) that are comprised
of different types of bricks or cobbles. Paint can be used more
aggressively to signal notable experiments where roads are being
repurposed. The new or experimental nature demands more
attention. Once it is no longer new (after a year or if it is deemed
not to work) then it could be erased or put out to pasture. Ideally
the design itself is self-explaining, but drivers are thick and
engineers are nervous.
The question of how to occupy the space that will reaped from
both road repurposing and possible paint delineation is a big one.
Cars can do just as a much (if not more) with less space (owing to
automation); the same arguments extend to micro-transit. Consider
the range of emerging services: E-vehicles, bus rapid transit, light
rail, various types of scooters and mopeds, microcars, cargo bikes,
carsharing, bikesharing, ridehailing services and so on. Each mode
has its own technical specifications and could benefit substantially
from dedicated infrastructures, ranging from separated lanes and
preferential parking places, to grade-separated solutions and
supporting energy services. Clearly, however, large-scale provision
of infrastructure for all these modes is impossible, if only for lack of
space and funds. This does, however, possibly open up new
avenues (figuratively and literally) for one of the oldest and
arguably the most environmental and efficient19 vehicles: the19 Walking is arguably the most
environmental and space efficient. bicycle.
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14.5 (Re)cycling back
Figure 14.5: Bicycling standing
the test of time. Photo by Kevin
J. Krizek.
Lastly, we arrive at the third of the Reduce, Reuse, (re)cycle
mantra. Cycling is a travel mode enjoying a renaissance of sorts and
one that has demonstrated remarkable resilience over time (See
Figure 14.5). Cycling’s international stock is relatively high in
current transport dialogues. It is green, efficient, flexible and
comparatively cheap to provide for. Originally a luxury good at the
onset of the 20th century, reserved for the elite, its progression
flourished hand in hand with the auto industry, before quickly
being usurped. Notwithstanding the onslaught of motorists
hijacking the ’good roads’ promoted by bicyclists, taking the best
engineers, and making cycling more hazardous, bicycling has been
resolute as a mode of transport for the committed. But is cycling
resilient enough to reach the American masses in the coming
decades? In other words, is the transport landscape changing
enough to allow it to push through the three barriers that have
historically suppressed it from flourishing: bad weather, long travel
distances, and dealing with exposure to cars?
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Weather. There’s no such thing as bad weather, just bad protection –
this is the mantra of many northern Europe.20 For mere mortals,20 Recognizing also that the weather
in the north-central US and much of
Canada is worse than most of Northern
Europe, which, while further north, is
blessed by warming Atlantic currents.
however, wind, rain, sleet, snow, hail, humidity and heat are
problematic for cycling. Warming temperatures owing to climate
change are mostly helping, not hurting winter cycling conditions in
many cities in the Northern Hemisphere (recognizing, however, that
increased precipitation hurts cycling conditions, and warmer
temperatures make summer cycling less attractive). Nevertheless,
more bicycling requires continued cultural shift of people’s
tolerances of a commute to work (or travel anywhere, for that
matter) in conditions that are less than optimum. If 70 Fahrenheit
(21C) (and sunny) is a temperature ’sweet spot’ to lure most people
into cycling, any fluctuation more than 10 degrees (5C) on either
side of it prompts either the ’sweat’ or ’freeze’ factor. Cities like San
Diego, California fare well in this respect, holding a consistent
temperature; most other places do not.
Range. The upper distance range for those who cycle regularly
usually bumps up against three miles (5 km). Technological
advances are changing that. New brands of bicycles have roll-cages
and weather proofing. But the strongest frontier for cycling lies in
amping up its power via batteries. The e-bike has caught on in
select markets.21 Within Europe alone, 1.1 million were sold in21 And there is a great deal of
potential innovation here, see e.g.
the Copenhagen Wheel. (Anneal 2013).
2014.22 Over 100 million e-bikes are reportedly on the road in
22 (CONEBI 2015). China.
23 Considering lifecycle costs (including fuel/energy
23 (Research 2015). production, infrastructure, maintenance, manufacturing and
operation), e-bikes are estimated to be 12 times more cost-effective
than buses, 7.2 times more cost-effective than urban rail systems,
and 13.2 times more cost-effective than cars.24 Improvements in24 (Dave 2010).
battery technology and renewable energy sources can only enhance
these numbers.
By reducing levels of effort from humans to better combat the
wind, hills, or simply longer distances, new markets of users are
quickly emerging (e.g., the elderly, the less physically fit, the
commuter with a greater than 3 mile (5 km) commute). The e-bike
has the potential replace everyday trips made in cities and
metropolitan regions across Europe, even when hilly or windy. Yet,
such advantages will only materialize if the latent demand for
e-cycling is addressed via infrastructure investments with respect to
safety and security.2525 Better technologies for keeping your
bike from being stolen, or making it
easier to recover.
Safety. Discussions of more cycling revolve around safety.
Whether the dangers of cycling in any particular location are real or
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perceived is less important; cyclists and fast moving cars fail to mix
well. Cyclist comfort matters. First order remedies include:
• Slowing cars (at least on some shared corridors to better share
limited space),
• Protecting cyclists via space that is both horizontally and vertically
delineated (i.e., curb, plastic bollards), by far the most relied on
strategy recently, and
• Removing cars (i.e., prizing completely separated corridors).
While road-repurposing won’t really affect prevailing bicycle
travel distances or weather, it can dramatically increase the overall
amount of space devoted to cycling facilities on many city streets.
Meshing the benefits of paint (plasticity) with cycling’s flexibility
and efficiency implies that the bicycle is the mode with the most to gain
by subscribing to prescriptions within this chapter.
14.6 Ending Modal Warfare
Similar to the competition between cars and transit, there has been
a highly vocal and occasionally violent modal war between cars and
bikes. (just search for ‘War on Cars’ or ‘War on Bikes’).
Standards and technology ‘wars’ can be brutal. The word war is
a metaphor, but not entirely unreasonable. Edison characterized
electrocution as ‘Westinghousing’, to promote his preferred (but
doomed) DC transmission system as safer than the shocking AC
alternative promoted by Westinghouse and Tesla.
The minicomputer vs. mainframe platform wars took years to
resolve, but the personal computer vs. minicomputer wars resolved
more quickly. Everyone knows the Mac vs. PC wars have filled many
screens of Usenet postings.
All of those however are today meaningless, and one wonders
why people were so religious about a technology standard with the
rise of mobile computers (smartphones), which most of you possess.
Moving from electrical engineering/computer science to civil
engineering, our really old readers will remember the wars between
turnpikes and the canals. (Well, okay, remember is probably not the
right word, will recall history tell of). Both modes were largely
deposed by the new steam train, and neither has many flag-bearers
today.
Horsescars were replaced by electric streetcars (trolleys/trams).
The streetcars were, with post-bellum nostalgic bitterness,
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‘bustituted’ by buses, but buses, like the streetcars before them,
were kicked over to the sidewalk by the automobile.
There was great rivalry between electric, steam, and the internal
combustion engine (ICE), but we know how that turned out.
Almost all cars today have an ICE with small electric systems with
very large batteries driving the starter and the other appliances
(radios, lighting, etc.). It’s just an everyday case of technological
endosymbiosis. This will be revised as EVs rise.
There has long been a war on walking, waged (and mostly won)
by motordom, as described by Peter Norton in Fighting Traffic.26 The26 (Norton 2011).
US lacks a radical pedestrian advocacy organization (Jaywalkers
United . . . Will Never be Divided) and some cities want pedestrians
to carry ‘orange flags of surrender’27 when crossing streets. This27 (Gottfried 2014).
war is not just over convenience or user interface preference. Lives
are at stake, like in a real war. The war is asymmetric, not too many
motorists are killed by pedestrians.
• Bikes and cars compete for market share (though not much of a
competition in most of the US).
• They compete for mindshare, which explains all of the religious
advocacy to partisans assuring themselves of their rightness
within their bubbles.
• They compete for public funds.
• And, this is where it matters from a transport planning
perspective, they compete for roadspace.
What does the future look like though? As transport gets smarter
and follows paths from other technologies, we remove waste from
the system.
In short, if we do reduce this waste, as described earlier in the
chapter, cars will be the right size for the job, and trips will only be
made when they are worthwhile, each trip-maker paying for the cost
that trip imposes. We will recognize that road infrastructure has been
largely overbuilt. This implies we will generally have ample capacity
for both cars (which will be narrower and automated and electric
and seat a single passenger and far less a danger than now) and
bikes (which may have electric supplements built inside the frame),
as well as, on selected corridors, buses (which will have the right
number of seats for their passengers). When capacity is scarce, the
road owner will allocate capacity based on value using prices.
All of which is to say, the war between cars and bikes probably has
a half-life of about 10-15 years as this technological transformation
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of the car and roads takes place. This is not to say that fighting the
good fight doesn’t have some value – bike lanes now are better than
a 50% chance of a bike lane 15 years from now, and will save lives
in the interim. The faster the systematic switchover takes place, the
sooner there will be safe transport everywhere.
14.7 Discussion
Most roads – at least in the US – are too wide. Many are too long
as well (e.g., it is possible to reduce the paved rural grid from a 1
mile to a 2 mile spacing in many places). Yet roads generally lack
sufficient depth (pavement thickness) to support more economically
efficient heavier vehicles without premature failure. Some of the
excess width and length should be gracefully abandoned. It may not
be worth demolishing, but entropy can have its course. When it is to
be rebuilt, it can also be appropriately rescaled. The term ‘road diet’
is sometimes used, and applies in cases.
But one point is well founded: roads are overbuilt for today with
declining per capita travel, and way overbuilt for tomorrow with
autonomous cars making more efficient use of capacity. Travel
patterns in the US do not warrant more net road pavement. That does
not mean all communities have all the needed infrastructure. There
surely are some investments that have benefits that exceed their
costs. It also doesn’t mean that all infrastructure should be
abandoned. Most infrastructure is quite useful, and developed land
is conditioned on the existence of that infrastructure. Thus,
wholesale abandonment is not practical. However for every lane mile
added, more than a lane mile should be decommissioned or reused
elsewhere.
It is conceivable that in the future, many cities – particularly
American ones – will finally recognize the systematic
over-allocation of public space in urban areas to the auto. Most of
today’s right-of-way is devoted to 6 foot vessels in 12 foot wide
corridors. Little is reserved for pedestrians, bicycles, transit, or any
variety of yet to emerge types of vehicles, reducing, reusing, and
cycling have room to grow.
Speculatively, it might be best to move to a model without pre-
defined lanes, where vehicles move as near each other as necessary
without colliding, like people walking in crowds.
The interplay of autonomous vehicles and bicycling is also worth
considering. New small vehicles: imagine automated electric bikes,
enclosed automated electric bikes, Segways with roofs, advanced
golf carts, electric Tuk Tuks,28 and the autonomous neighborhood 28 (Autoblog 2015).
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electric vehicle, will compete for market share in the niche the bike
presently occupies. And they will compete for roadspace on
designated bike lanes, with similar operating characteristics and
guaranteed safety. Though that local travel niche avoiding the
traditional automobile may increase overall, the desire to bike may
not fully become mainstream with so many new options on the
table.
Figure 14.6: Stationless bike
sharing, Shanghai. Photo by
David M. Levinson
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Figure 15.1: Gasoline pumps
have been in use since the
beginning of the current US
transport financing regime in
the 1920s. Photo by Pixabay.com
(CC0 license).
By just traveling around most communities, even a naive transport
eye can detect three characteristics endemic in most urban transport
systems:
Roads deteriorate. Minnesota, for instance, claims about 6
percent of state roads have poor ride quality and about 3 percent of
state bridges are structurally deficient. This says nothing about local
roads and bridges though. While you will not pay attention to road
quality where the roads are smooth, rough roads, like a five year
old, insist upon you noticing them. And roads will only get worse if
insufficient revenues are raised to maintain and reconstruct existing
infrastructure, as existing roads continue to age and deteriorate. In
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short aside from the one-day the newly repaired road opens, roads
are worse today than yesterday. There are both mundane reminders
– the pothole you hit every morning – and tragic ones like bridges
that collapse.
There’s more to daily travel than just getting to work.
People shop, go to services, visit friends and the sort. Non-work
travel has temporal flexibility but most of it happens during peak
periods because travel appears free (un(der)priced).
Car travel affects society as a whole. Cars increase crash
risk, they creates parking problems of crashes, pollute the air, and
exasperate equity issues – all of these are what economists call
negative externalities. But these side effects are rarely paid for by
the traveler (i.e., drivers don’t pay for their full cost).
—
In countries with advanced economies that have ubiquitous
vehicles and networks, there is a fundamental disconnect between
allocation and funding. The link between who uses what
infrastructure at what time and who pays for that use is broken. For the
large sums that US society devotes to transport,1 drivers should1 Limiting to recent US federal legislation
(i.e., MAP-21 from 2012) suggests
$40.3 billion for highway and bridge
improvements in FY 2013 and $40.9
billion in FY 2014. Both are slightly
more than the $39.9 billion invested
in FY 2012, but less than the $41.9
billion enacted by Congress for highway
improvements in both FY 2010 and FY
2011. Most federal highway investment
is used to upgrade and maintain the
nation’s core highways, including the
Interstate Highway System, and to repair
and replace deficient bridges. The most
ever invested in highway improvements
by the federal government was $68.9
billion in FY 2009. Information from
(American Road and Transportation
Builders Association (ARTBA) 2010).
This excludes state and local funding,
which is about twice as much.
expect to savor its splendor. A structural feature at the core of these
problems is the lack of an apparent price that is sensitive to time of
day, location, and costs. In describing five funding alternatives that
quickly move beyond the interest level of the naive eye, we cover the
range from the shopworn (though still viable) to the futuristic.
15.1 Gas Tax
In the US roads are partially funded with the under-loved gas tax;
general revenues pick up the slack. General revenues are the primary
source of roadway funds. This is especially true for local roads, as
most localities fail to have a user fee the way states do and instead
rely on property taxes. general revenue sources impose costs on non-
users as well as users. They also send no signal about the appropriate
amount of roads that should be built or how scarce road space should
be allocated. There is some relationship between property taxes and
roads of course, as access via roads gives property value, but this is
extremely loose compared to actual usage of the roadway. Raising
gas taxes as a road user fee is more administratively efficient in the
short run than implementing tolls owing to lower collection costs.22 (Levinson and Odlyzko 2008).
It is a technically easy way to raise revenue. Simply send the tax
collector to each fuel wholesaler once a year and query the number
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of barrels of oil that were sold.
Furthermore, the gas tax serves as an adequate (but not great)
environmental tax. Many pollutants are proportional to the amount
of gasoline burned. Their economic effect, however, depends on
when, where, and how they were burned as well. As a congestion
tax, however, it is clearly deficient. It fails to differentiate travel by
location or, more importantly, time of day.
While the gas tax is better than the alternative of general revenue,
or not paying for roads at all, it doesn’t address some important
problems. In particular, traffic congestion is a problem. It is not
getting measurably worse, but it is not getting obviously better. Even
if traffic reduces in the aggregate, it won’t disappear to zero in the
next decade.
And, it turns out that many transportation systems management
strategies are effective at the edge of congestion. For instance ramp
metering, the traffic light at the end of the freeway on-ramp that tells
you whether you can enter, is most effective by keeping traffic just
below the critical point at which congestion sets in (See Appendix for
details). If traffic is far below that critical point, there is no danger
of significantly higher congestion in letting an additional vehicle on
to the roadway. If traffic is well past that point, there is little value
in not letting an additional vehicle on, traffic will be stop-and-go in
any case. It is just near that critical point where it matters.
It is often noted that if 10 percent of cars were removed during
rush hour, there would be little or no delay. This is true in a way.
The problem would be the response of traffic. If there were no delay
or other penalty, more cars would try to travel at that time, so
getting rid of one slice of vehicles will induce another slice of
vehicles to travel. Though cars use slightly more fuel in congested
conditions than freeflow, that is insufficient to account for the delays
being imposed on others.
Still, states in the US can and should raise the gas tax prior to
using property taxes or general revenue to pay for roads because
the gas tax is directly related to usage. It is something that can (and
should) be done immediately. This should be coupled with
assurances that the money gets spent on maintaining the valuable
parts of the existing system, not building wasteful new facilities. It
will have the effect of raising the cost of automobile travel (and
lowering other taxes), and thus deterring total travel by a small
amount.
Today combined gas tax, vehicle license fees, and existing tolls
cover about half the direct costs of roads – and the other half comes
from General Revenue – states could, as a first step, double the
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federal and state gas tax rate (from approximately $0.50 today to
$1.00/gallon (~$0.25/liter)) and replace general revenue sources
with user fees.33 Like everything this share is disputed
and depends on accounting. Federal
gas tax revenue on highways typically
exceeds federal spending on highways
while gas tax revenue from local roads
is less than spending on those roads. It
should be noted that gas tax revenue is
collected from travel on all roads, not
just highways. Instead various sources of
general revenue (typically property tax)
pay for local roads,. For one perspective
see (Henchman 2014) and by the same
author the previous year (excluding
license fees) (Henchman 2013).
Furthermore, insurance is also a fixed cost that people don’t think
about on a per mile basis. Pay-as-you-drive insurance fixes that. Just
$0.60/gallon (~$0.15/liter) at 20 mpg (11.75 liter/100 km)) on top of
the price of gas would go a long way to further reduce travel. This
imposes no net additional cost on average; it just changes in the basis
of the cost drivers already pay.4
4 On average drivers would be no worse
off (and the system could be constructed
so that drivers were not worse off at all).
Covering other costs, such as paying for the damage that
pollution costs (including greenhouse gases) would require an
increase of roughly a $0.50/gallon (~$0.125/liter) in the gas tax.5
5 (Parry et al. 2007).
This is a much more complicated step in the US. It asks the gas tax
to be something more than just a highway user fee whose revenue is
fully spent on roads. What goes largely unrecognized is that this
money could offset other taxes and be revenue neutral.
15.2 Electrification
The onset of electrification (discussed in Chapter 5) or other
alternative fuels prompts discussion of the inevitable: moving away
from the gas tax altogether. Outstanding questions are when and
whether states and the federal government switch to something
better like direct road pricing, or something worse, like funding
from general revenue.
At some point, non-petroleum powered vehicles will become a
non-negligible share of free-riders on the road network. Electric
Vehicles (EVs) do not require less road pavement or cause less
congestion than similarly sized internal combustion engine (ICE)
vehicles.6 The rate of electrification is unclear, but given federal fuel6 EVs accelerate faster, so can lead to
slightly reduced headways exiting traffic
signals.
efficiency requirements, it is plausible that a large share of new
vehicles will be EVs or EV-ICE hybrids in a 10 year time frame.
The least painful way to address the looming funding shortfall
would be to implement mandatory per mile charges for new
Electric Vehicles, and hybrids. Establishing such a system on
existing cars would be difficult; but EVs are such a small share now,
a share which obviously does not pay a gas tax and whose owners
have above average incomes that such a charge is an excellent
wedge to move towards road pricing. Expanding an existing per
mile charge over time, from an initial base of EVs, and later all new
cars and trucks, would be much easier than establishing it on all
vehicles all at once.
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15.3 Congestion is Unnecessary
The technologies we discussed thus far – particularly vehicle
automation – help increase capacity and efficiency. There can be
more vehicles on the networks and ride sharing helps increase the
efficiency of vehicles on networks. Other trends, particularly the use
of information technology as a substitute for travel for shopping
and work purposes will reduce the demand for travel.
But nothing can compare to the potential of road pricing to end traffic
congestion as we know it.
Since the 1970s, engineers have tried to use information
technology to help with surface transport. That is what Intelligent
Transportation Systems are all about. But the most important
information technology is price. Price is not itself a good, but rather
a technology that provides information about the value at which
people will exchange one good or service for another.7 7 The common term is congestion
pricing. Versions have been successfully
implemented in cities including
London, Stockholm, and Singapore
among others. Almost all economists
like congestion pricing. For further
information, see: (Lindsey 2006).
It would be a shame to see public policy fail to enter the modern era,
where prices vary in time and place, to reflect the real costs of travel. Most
other goods have prices that vary with demand. When demand is
up for gasoline, the prices rise. When supply rises, prices fall. The
price matches consumer willingness to pay with supplier willingness
to accept. Getting on-board with this concept sooner rather than
later can simultaneously solve the problem of funding and allocation,
reducing if not eliminating congestion.
When travelers drive an untolled road in the US, they still have a
price to pay: their time and the monetary costs of operating an
automobile, including gas taxes. But such prices contain little
information, and do not represent the costs they impose on the
system (their marginal costs). The cost of fuel does not reflect the
cost of traveling during the peak (except to the extent that fuel
consumption is higher in stop-and-go traffic), or the cost of
traveling on costly or critical facilities. The price travelers face is
neither real-time nor real-space, but rather an abstracted expectation
of some fraction of average costs.
Money can be transferred and store value, time cannot. Thus
congestion delay is a loss. If instead of charging time by having
travelers waiting in a queue, the road agency charged drivers a
congestion toll equivalent to the delay they imposed on others, that
loss could be eliminated.
Tolls create revenue. Road owners can take some of that money
and use it to operate and maintain existing infrastructure. Tolls may
create a surplus. That surplus can be returned to the general public
(for instance, through lowering some other tax or providing an
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annual road dividend – make the rebate as progressive as you like,
it doesn’t matter from a transport perspective). Surprising as it may
seem, society as a whole would be better off.
This requires political will and public acceptance for people to
exchange money for time. To date, the public is skeptical when they
are unfamiliar with road pricing, but supportive after seeing it in
action. Returning congestion pricing revenue back to the
neighborhoods where it was generated may help.8 Phasing pricing8 (King et al. 2007).
in one Electric Vehicle at a time seems an obvious strategy.
15.4 Networks of HOT Lanes
Figure 15.2: Cumulative length
high/occupancy toll lanes
in United States. Sources
various. Special thanks to David
Ungemah and Mark Burris.
0
200
400
600
800
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
The onset of High Occupancy/Toll (HOT) or express lanes is
already happening across the US (Figure 15.2). Whereas road
pricing requires everyone to pay for use of the facility, HOT lanes
allow users to opt into paying a toll in exchange for assurance of
uncongested travel (or travel for free or a discount if they are in a
carpool). In the near term, we foresee HOT lane networks running
adjacent to most urban freeways in the US, shaving some time off
for those who chose to pay. HOT Lanes are compatible with road
pricing systems that do not entirely eliminate congestion, as they
provide higher reliability (just as FedEx offers alternative rates for
same-day, overnight, and two-day delivery).99 The end result might be parallel HOT
lane networks and conventionally priced
networks that have some crowding, but
off-peak discounts.
HOT Lanes will also be important because they are likely to be the
first roads to be entirely automated. Given their isolation from other
lanes and the premium price, they can be automated much sooner
than other roads, which will continue to serve mixed human and
automated traffic for at least another decade past the onset of select
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lanes for automated cars.
15.5 Reservation Pricing
Roads are first-come, first-serve. They have been generally designed
to allow aspiring car drivers the freedom to do so by showing up
and getting on the road. Sometimes this requires queueing at a ramp
meter to wait for the opportunity.
On some freeways High Occupancy/Toll (HOT) lanes guarantee
free-flow travel times, but have tolls which vary dynamically. In the
case of dynamic tolls they are intended to ensure the toll is high
enough to prevent congestion.10 However with the dynamic toll, 10 The MnPass system in Minnesota,
among others, is a good example of such.travelers don’t know the toll until they are already on the freeway,
about to decide between using the priced lane or not. Almost
everywhere else, the price on a road is guaranteed ($0) with
variable travel time.
The driver faces either uncertainty on price with certainty on time,
or certainty on price and uncertainty on time. Ideally, there should
be an option to have certainty about both of these.
First-come, first-serve is not the only way to allocate space. Nice
restaurants don’t allocate table space that way during prime time.
Parking structures do not. Theaters do not. Airlines do not. Private
race tracks do not. Public roads need not.
At its most primitive level, for instance, every day the commuter
pre-purchases a ticket (electronically, on a smartphone app or over
the web, or via an in-vehicle communication system) to use a
particular road segment (for instance between exit 400 and exit 401)
during a particular time slot (say between 7:45 and 8:00). The ticket
cost is known in advance before departure, like a plane ticket. The
road agency would only sell as many tickets as the road would
accommodate (without congestion) at that period. The ticket would
be validated electronically through some form of Electronic Toll
Collection.
Roads are unlike airports with spacious waiting areas. Travelers
might arrive with their vessels at 7:44 or 8:01; but the road agency
does not force the car onto the shoulders. More likely, the agency
could charge a penalty which increases with deviation from the
purchased window. So if the charge were $2, there might be a
$0.10/minute surcharge added for each minute early or late the
traveler was.
If the system were deployed universally, congestion would be a
rarer occurrence.11 Furthermore, the system would know whether
11 Non-recurring congestion would still
be an issue, owing to crashes and other
incidents, but not the daily recurring
congestion because of excess demand for
the available capacity.the traveler or the agency was the cause of the earliness or lateness.
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If there were non-recurring congestion, the agency might waive the
penalty. In contrast, if the traveler left too early or too late to
reasonably make their slot under planned for circumstances, the
surcharge would stand.
But travelers don’t want to map out their route every day. To
simplify, the agency could just sell a ticket allowing travelers to be
’on the roads’ (as opposed to being on a specific road), and let
individual travelers sort out the best path. The losses from not
micro-managing prices spatially are relatively small, compared to
the gains from spreading traffic out by time of day. Traffic
information providers like Waze, TomTom, and others will help
advise travelers, or their autonomous vehicles directly, what routes
to take.
For instance, the traveler pre-purchases a ticket to use any
metropolitan area road between 7:00 and 7:30 am. The total number
of passes is limited by system capacity. If the purchase is made far
enough in advance the price is lower then if the ticket were
purchased just-in-time. But few people want to plan their schedule
that far in advance, or log-in daily spending even 5 minutes to buy
tickets for a 20 minute trip.
Here the road agency managing the system can be a little bit more
clever. They could sell various types of season passes (just like transit
agencies). A traveler might buy an unlimited use pass for a premium,
but there would be a limited number sold to residents in each zone.
Or they could buy a more limited use pass at a lower price. And of
course, travelers would buy these as recurring subscriptions, billed
to a credit or debit card account. Like utilities, most people would
just pay their bill, but some travelers will respond to incentives at the
margins.
People without passes could take their chances with same-day
tickets which might be more expensive when traffic is on the edge of
congestion, or cheap if traffic is low that day. Once properly set up,
these passes replace existing revenue sources for the agency.
How should the road allocate these passes? Clearly it should not
just give them away. But setting a fixed price and selling them does
not allow discovery of demand patterns. Here auctions might be
appropriate. For instance, the passes would be available at a posted
price (’buy-it-now’), but the agency would also accept lower bids.
Suppose there were 100 passes, there would be a bidding period, and
at the end of the period, the top 100 bids would win and the price
would be set at the willingness to pay of the 100th bidder. There are
many variations on auctions (what we described is referred to as a
Dutch Auction).
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Each have different advantages for buyers or sellers in terms of
maximizing revenue or price discovery or fairness. Certainly there
are trade-offs between efficiency and equity, and some users will be
priced off the roads – if they weren’t, what would be the point? There
will also be some uncertainty if passes are auctioned, especially as
price discovery takes place. The degree to which this is a problem or
a feature remains to be seen. We believe it can all be made to work,
as other market goods do. Concerns about equity can be ameliorated
by giving funds or vouchers to people with low income.
15.6 Separating Roads and State
Road pricing for financing and congestion management in the US
remains under the guise of existing institutions doing the pricing.
To date, this has essentially been a non-starter. With institutional
reforms, reconfiguring state and local DOTs as public utilities rather
than departments of government, the logic the public applies to
roads will change, from one of a public service paid by the pot of
general revenue to a fee-for-service proposition paid for by direct
user charges.
Many traditional utilities share with transport systems the
characteristic of having a networked structure. Most, if not all, of
these utilities are operated on the basis of payment-for-use. Utility
pricing varies regionally. Some locales vary prices by time of day,
and users often have the option of choosing different rate plans.
Utilities can manage demand by altering infrastructure, repackaging
services, substituting technologies, and changing the price of
service.
Transport agencies have considered all of these, but implemented
them weakly. In reverse order: Prices are largely invariant,
technological (modal substitutions) are not viable for most
passenger or freight users, bundling and packaging of services is
not considered when looking at pricing, and infrastructure is
hidebound to engineering standards, and difficult to modify. One
could easily imagine more creativity on the part of road providers
in all of these aspects. The constraints on the application of
creativity are due to the engineering culture in a public agency,
where risk-taking is discouraged if not punished, and certainly
never rewarded.
Australia and New Zealand demonstrate that it is possible to
transfer the utility model of governance to road transport. This
model separates the organization delivering the service from the
client, is subject to rate regulation, and implements a more direct,
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user-pays system of financing. While planning and scope of service
decision will remain political, the utility model could depoliticize
management of the existing transport system. One expects from
experience with other utilities, toll roads, and road concessions in
other countries that it would be politically necessary to have some
public guarantee of an upper bound on the rates a road utility
could charge, as provided by a regulatory agency. The risk is that
an upper bound on revenue would be too tight, resulting in
financial losses, as occurred in the private mass transit sector
throughout in the US in the early to mid 1900s. Still, public utilities
have a “mean level of trust” of 42%12, which is much higher than12 (Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2004).
the trust in the federal government, hovering in the 20% range in
good, peaceful years.13 Interestingly, private utilities may provide13 (Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press 2010). better environmental outcomes, as they are easier to regulate than
public agencies.1414 (Koninsky and Teodoro 2014).
Taxes or charges of any variety are unpopular; but there is an
issue of framing with any poll, and a general problem of the public
not believing that user fees are dedicated to transport, even when
the law says they are. Instead people, most of whom don’t think
about transport finance much, assume that gas taxes go to general
revenue – which is true in many countries, but not in most states or
the federal government.15 While marketing and education15 “Raising the gas tax is unpopular
among voters as well. A poll from the
Eagleton Institute at Rutgers University
found that two-thirds of New Jersey
residents oppose an increased gas tax.
The poll noted, however, that opposition
fades when people learn the taxes would
pay for repairs to crumbling roads and
bridges.” (Gould 2014).
campaigns would help, there are fundamental issues of trust. This
is an institutional problem, which can be rectified by separation of
roads from the executive branch into a public utility.
15.7 Implementation
The most widely discussed pricing system in the US is a
mileage tax concept, sometimes employing GPS systems.1616 (Forkenbrock 2008).
There are a variety of potential technologies for assessing mileage
taxes, most use GPS (or an equivalent such as cellphone
triangulation) to identify location, since one of the advantages of
these types of systems is the ability to charge different rates for
different locations (city vs. country, freeway vs. local street,
congested vs. uncongested road).
GPS receivers do not normally transmit information but
GPS-equipped vehicles can log the vehicle location. Some additional
communication technology, which might report a reduced form of
information (e.g. total amount owed) would be used to complete
the transaction. For instance, a pilot study in Oregon had a chip in
the vehicle log distance traveled by geographic zone and time of
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Figure 15.3: Oregon road pricing
trials are branded OReGO.
day, without storing the precise location.17 The chip only reported 17 (Zhang et al. 2009).
the total charge owed, calculated by an onboard algorithm. So no
detailed tracking information was shared. Simpler technologies
such as a mileage based user fee would simply record the odometer
reading, but this would not allow differentiation by time of day or
location. For individuals concerned about privacy, they can pay
peak prices all the time. We suspect most people will choose to
reveal information about time and location to save money (by
getting off-peak rates). Oregon is presently testing a voluntary
mileage charge (1.5 cents per mile) for up to 5000 participants
dubbed “OReGO.”18 18 (Rose 2015).
While road user charging remains an attractive prospect, its
application may still be many years away due to a combination of
privacy concerns, implementation and transaction cost issues, and
technological development issues.19 Some of these concerns might 19 (Levinson and Odlyzko 2008).
be obviated under a different governance structure, where it was
neither the legislative nor executive branch of government making
these decisions.
We argue here that congestion exists, governments should price
roads to encourage use in the off-peak and discourage use in the
peak. The revenue obtained should first and foremost be used to
operate and maintain existing roads. Furthermore, it should largely
replace existing funding sources (fuel taxes, vehicle taxes, property
taxes). Surpluses should then be returned to taxpayers.
Prices need to be systematic, not just on specific routes, to
maximize system efficiency. Random sets of underutilized toll roads
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fail to advance this aim because ’free’ roads remain congested.
Pollution and noise and crash risk all need their own externality
charges. This will collectively reduce the vast waste in existing
system, and turn roads into a highly efficient freely flowing system,
with cars incentivized to carry multiple passengers, and travelers
motivated to travel when it is less congested.
Changing how roads (and transit) are governed could do this. A
logical first step is to implement pricing on vehicles that do not now
pay the full gas tax. Continuing to roll out HOT Lane Networks will
accelerate the adoption of automated vehicles, by providing a
network that can be transitioned rapidly into an all-automated
network where vehicles will find a more predictable environment
with capacity and throughput increased significantly.
16
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Figure 16.1: The future of
transport depends on what
happens in developing
countries, and whether they
repeat the mistakes of before,
or learn. This more optimistic
scenario is from Wuhan, China.
Photo by David M. Levinson.
The first and second editions of this work were titled The End of
Traffic and the Future of Transport. Vehicle travel in most fully
industrialized countries is falling, slowing or stagnant.1 Per-capita 1 Quarterly figures from the US
Department of Transportation reveal
how the US has seen per capita vehicle
travel well off the peak for more than
an entire decade (total vehicle travel has
plateaued too, but not as severely owing
to population gains). See: (Office of
Highway Policy Information and Travel
Monitoring 2014).
vehicle travel in the US is roughly where it was in the late 1990s.
And, vehicle miles traveled, the number of miles that cars move, is
roughly where it was in the mid 2000s. The significant change is
that these trends follow 90 years of steady, almost uniform increases
in the amount of automobile traffic. Barring a few exceptions owing
to economic downturns or energy shocks, vehicle miles traveled
increased almost every year in almost every setting for an entire
century!
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The automobile regime, in its current form, is
demonstrating considerable signs of instability.
There are complementary hypotheses as to why people are
driving less per capita in 2015 than 2000. When we ask “What
Killed America’s Traffic?,” we identified some of the important
ones, which include the price of fuel, the declining workforce,
changing driver license regulations, telework, online shopping, and
virtual connectivity with friends.
These last three reasons for traveling less by car (and overall) are
due to information and communications technologies (ICT)
substituting for travel. They are not mainstream transport
explanations. Varying demographic sectors use ICT in different
amounts. Just as your parents or grandparents once did, and may
still, receive a physical issue of the newspaper while you read
online, your children are more likely to be early adopters of future
technologies than an older you, your parents, and grandparents.
And the habits formed while young likely persist over time.
One could easily argue, therefore, that the future in cities is less
about traffic per se. It might even be less about traditional transport
as a whole – the primary rationale for why we titled the 3rd edition
of this book, The End of Traffic and the Future of Access.
The transport sector’s limited role. Within the transport
sector alone, there have been small policy shifts over the past 15
years. But these don’t really help in explaining the decline of travel.
Increased use of walking and bicycling play a role and work well
for short trips; they certainly have niches they can grow into if land
development intensifies and people reorganize their lives to enable
them. When David lived in Minneapolis, he was one of the 7% of
Minneapolitans who walked to work. The numbers, while rising, are
much lower outside core cities, and nationally (3%).2 Kevin often2 According to (US Census Bureau 2017).
rides one bike from his ever changing fleet of bicycles in Boulder.
While these types of activities are increasing, nationally, they explain
maybe 15% of all travel (work and non-work). And while transit
ridership is up, it is up ever so slightly.
There are a slew of ‘new mobility options’ which use information
technologies to allow travel without owning an automobile, but are
not yet visible in the broader transport statistics. These include peer-
to-peer taxi and ridehailing services, dynamic real-time rental cars,
and the like. While these are useful in their niches, they are not yet
cost-effective to be the main transport mode for the vast majority of
the population. Today they are supplements when the main mode
doesn’t solve ‘the job to be done.’3
3 The ‘jobs to be done’ framework is due
to Clay Christensen, a Harvard Business
School Professor. (Clayton Christensen
Institute 2017).
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Emerging technologies. Technologies allow people to do more
of the same, and they allow people to do new things. It is easier to
predict more of the same than new things. Now couple the
emerging changes in transport technologies with the trend of
decreasing car use that is evident in the US and other countries in
the developed world,4 and we argue Western societies on the verge 4 Future demands for cars an peak travel,
see: (Ministry for Transport 2014).of a transformative technological revolution in the transport sector,
akin to how information technologies have restructured many other
economic sectors.
After six decades of quiescence in the automotive sector,
vehicle automation is coming. Self-parking cars are already
here, self-driving cars are in test-mode on real streets in mixed traffic,
and the auto industry predicts mainstream use on roadways by 2020.
Big changes are close enough in our horizon that we can not only see
it, we can smell it. Admittedly one cannot smell tailpipe emissions
on electric vehicles, but we still hope they have that new car smell.
Soon enough we will taste these changes, metaphorically.
Roadway efficiency. In contrast to the magical two-second rule
that was ingrained in driver’s education classes,5 driverless cars, 5 It was taught that you should follow
the car ahead of you with at least a
two-second gap – a value that is often
disregarded at rush hour and hovers
nearer 1.8 seconds.
when unfettered by pesky humans in the mix, will follow at
startlingly small intervals.6 Slender autonomous cars will travel in
6 California’s Drivers Handbook in fact
recommends a “3 second rule,” which
is apparently not hard-wired into the
minds of California’s actual drivers.
(Department of Motor Vehicles 2017) (p.
34).
narrower lanes.7 The process of decommissioning the last
7 Platoons of connected vehicles, have
been tested with 1 meter following at
highway speeds of 60 mph (100 km/hr).
A world with all driverless vehicles will
likely double linear capacity. There is
horizontal space savings on top of that.
Two passenger smaller cars might travel
space of 8 ft rather than 12 (bringing
an additional 50% increase in capacity).
Even more slender one passenger cars
might travel in a space of a lane of 4-6
feet instead of 12 feet (100% increase in
capacity).
human-driven car will be a long evolutionary one, but probably will
not happen prior to 2040. Before that though, HOT Lane Networks
will be converted to automated-only operation. Prohibitions of
human-driven vehicles from some, many, and most roads at some,
many, and most times will occur gradually over the next several
decades, as networks are converted to the new technology, just as
horses became increasingly uncommon.
Daily Travel. Taken to an extreme, these conditions suggest a
future where travel – a daily 1 - 2 hour set of chores of getting to
things and having things come to us – might be be a thing of the
past. Driving to work five days a week and driving to the big box
store for detergent are both disappearing. The Amazon Dash button
demonstrates howwe might address some such chores. And, parents
will soon be able to order a self-driving car to take their children
to soccer practice. Relying on descendants of apps like Skype and
FaceTime, workers will meet colleagues periodically at both offices
and random third places. Yet-to-crystallize effects will be rendered
by 3-D printers.
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Stimulus Effects. While the traditional workplace will shrink in
size and importance, it will not vanish. Work, like shopping and
much of life, has a social as well as economic function.
Furthermore, like all social and information networks, bytes also
have stimulus effects. Possible substitution effects inevitably need to
be addressed on a global stage. While metropolitan travel might
drop, absent war or economic collapse – both quite real possibilities
– international travel will continue to rise for decades. The
consequences of that on the environment depend on progress in the
aviation sector, particularly the use of biofuels.
Demise of Traditional Modal Warfare. New vehicles
portend the end of modal warfare as is currently conceived.
Cambrian explosions of new and attractive combinations of modal
travel will mitigate the car versus bus and car versus bike strife –
strife that has riddled discussions (and therefore, progress), for
decades. Transit and cycling advocates continue to lambast
car-oriented planning and policy priorities. The antagonism
between the two draws from a great struggle that has been playing
out in the twentieth century between Mass Motorization and Mass
Transit.8 It is a conflict that continues to this day and has spawned a8 (Jones 2008).
morality play in the culture wars. While transit and cars mostly
serve different markets, at the margins they compete for users,
roadspace, funding, and the hearts and minds of travelers. They are
competing on old turf though.
While limited resource issues still suggest a zero-sum game, new
modes and new fusions of existing modes will change the calculus.
Cities will increasingly struggle to find ways to reconcile competing
demands of existing modes – and new ones – within limited street
space.
The good news is that transit advocates, fortunately, can now
stop trying to put the (transit) genie back in the bottle because the
bottle itself has now changed radically. Given the demise of modal
warfare, more reliable transport services will form around the
passenger rather than the facility or vehicle. On the other hand, the
battles between the new modes could be quite significant, as we see
with Uber’s largely illegal invasion of cities and the varying public
sector responses, from acquiescence to arresting drivers.
In ‘the more of the same’ category, extrapolation of
historical trends gives more travel. Generally as the cost of
travel declines, travel increases.
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Value of time. Automation changes the value of time. Today’s
cars require active driving with hands on the wheel and eyes
looking forward, periodically checking the rear-view mirrors. Like
transit today, tomorrow’s cars allow the passenger to pursue other
activities. What this means is you may be less concerned with a few
extra minutes in motion, since you are able to do something more
pleasurable than watching traffic (though as Transport Planners and
Engineers, we have a hard time seeing what that could possibly be).
If you read or watch or type or listen or talk or shave or apply
make-up or eat or drink (far too much of which happens now while
driving), you can do so without concerning yourself about exactly
what your car and its neighbors are doing. You would still prefer
not to be in motion, but not by nearly as much as today.
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS). Autonomous cars make the so-
called new mobility options most useful in cities; they may be more
useful in less dense suburbs than transit is today. Instead of owning
a car, renting on demand is more viable. The right-sized car can
in principle be summoned at any time. Instead of paying a fixed
cost of ownership once (independent of use), and a variable cost that
includes only fuel and time, imagine an alternative world where the
cost of car use pays for the fixed cost of ownership on a per trip
basis. If a driver is paying by the minute when the car is used,
instead of paying for a car loan or lease by the month, the incentive
structure the driver faces changes. This would significantly raise
the out-of-pocket costs, thereby discouraging driving. It also makes
driving better and less frustrating as there will be fewer cars on the
road. It might also lower the total cost of transport, since individuals
would no longer have so much capital tied up in vehicles, and would
drive more efficient cars, less often. This is independent of, and
multiplicative with, any reductions in vehicle use that could arise
with increased ride-sharing enabled by logging your planned trips
in advance. This counters the historical trends, and argues travel will
be less frequent and more thoughtful. The daily pattern of transit for
routine trips and MaaS for special trips becomes feasible.9
9 The lack of effective MaaS options now
pushes people to owning vehicles, and
once they own a vehicle, they are going
to use it. This new lifestyle model works
in cities, where transit can be a mainstay
transportation mode, and MaaS are
conveniently located. It works less well
in the suburbs, exurbs, and rural areas,
where the baseline transportation mode
cannot be as expensive on a per-trip
basis as the MaaS rental model requires,
but the density is not high enough
to support fixed route transit on most
corridors.
Land use effects. We identified two possible land use effects.
Increasingly, driverless cars will make it easier to drive by reducing
the cognitive burden on the driver. An initial effect, assuming
people continue to own their cars, is the ’out’ scenario. People
would travel farther, to places they are less familiar with, and move
to places farther from their place of work. They would thus be able
to get more real estate for the dollar. Today’s commuter rail
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passengers travel farther (and longer) than auto users, and
autonomous vehicles, where the passenger can do something else
while traveling are more like commuter rails than are today’s cars.
Such cars can deposit drivers in front of buildings and park
themselves, reducing the amount of time that drivers spend parking
and accessing and egressing their cars, which would naturally lead
to longer distances. Autonomous vehicles are likely to be safe at
higher speeds, since humans won’t be driving, which will also lead
to longer distances in the same travel time. They expand mobility
for those who are now restricted (the young, the disabled, and so
on). But electrification will likely affect perceptions of accessibility
and land use effects.1010 Today our internal combustion engines
give us a range of maybe 500 km. Battery
powered vehicles currently give many
potential travelers ‘range anxiety.’ While
not yet in the DSM, (The Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
a catalog assembled by the American
Psychiatric Association of the many
ways the mind goes wrong), ‘range
anxiety’ is the fear that your electric
vehicle will not be able to get you
where you want to go throughout the
day within the range of the existing
battery. As Chapter 5 describes, many of
yesterday’s and today’s battery powered
cars have had limited ranges (on the
order of 120 miles (200 km)), which is
beyond most people’s daily travel, but
not everyone’s, and not every single day.
So the issue of recharging or battery
swapping is relevant, and may add to
travel costs. Just as recharging the
phone is a daily issue for smart phone
users, and filling the tank is weekly for
most people with cars, daily or sub-
daily charging might be important. If
autonomous, this may be able to be done
when there are no passengers in the
car, so from the passengers perspective,
there is nothing to notice. But for long
trips, this may present a limit on the
practicality of electric auto-mobility.
The other scenario – ‘up’ – depends on the success of Mobility-
as-a-Service within cities, and will lead to urban intensification as
city-dwellers shed their cars and obtain mobility on demand from
MaaS providers and micro-and macro-transit systems.
Vehicle fleets. Obtaining more efficient use of existing capital out
of the surface transport fleet through MaaS will reduce the lifespan
of cars by using fewer vehicles more intensively, and wearing them
out sooner. Airlines are already onto this model, keeping planes in
motion as much as possible. Thus MaaS vehicles will on average be
newer than today’s fleet. As technology continues to advance with
greater rapidity, this becomes increasingly important. The difference
between a 2030 and 2020 model car likely will be far greater than the
difference seen between any decade since 1920 and 1910.
Perceptions of cities. Hybrid-electric and electric vehicles will
be more common, if not the only vehicles allowed on city streets,
eventually. The smell and sound of the city will change; it might
even have that new car smell. Cities with more EVs will be less
polluted and nicer, and thus more attractive than cities smelling of
diesel and petroleum, or horse poop that populated the streets
decades prior. There will be lower levels of tailpipe emissions, even
for transit vehicles and trucks. There will be less confusion about
the degree to which cities are better for the global environment.
There is already emerging evidence that they produce less overall
carbon emissions than lower density areas with greater distances
and fewer shared walls. But they might soon be as good (if not
better) for the individuals residing in them, with less overall
pollution per capita and perhaps lower pollution intake than
suburban areas. (The suburbs will fight back with solar power
though).
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Outside of cities, there will be less change. Mobility-as-a-Service
proves less practical the farther one is from other people, since
dispatching the car takes time. Longer distances means speeds will
be higher. Thus, the privately owned automobile will remain
important for rural, small town, and suburban markets that cannot
justify the fixed cost of high capacity transit services nor have a
thick enough market to enable vehicles on-demand within a
timeframe customers will accept. However, that auto or light truck
will be automated, and will eventually be electric as well.
“There is an urgent need to move beyond the techno-determinism that
surrounds discussions about innovation in transportation, that have
become bogged down in a Silicon Valley versus City Hall narrative,
the innovate upstart versus the hidebound local regulator.” – Anthony
Townsend11 11 (Townsend 2014).
In previous chapters we described what has happened, or more
speculatively, what might happen. The future of transport has
always had more unknowns than knowns. Its overall character
depends on many moving parts, and primary among them is how
quickly forms of innovation take root and the changing density of
land use activities. Key aspects of the future will happen on their
own, following a technological trajectory more-or-less independent
of policy intervention; other dimensions can or will be accelerated
by policy intervention.
By 2050 an estimated two thirds of the global population will live
in cities (10 percent of the world’s population will live in ’mega-
cities,’ larger than 10 million).12 Urban personal transport will be 12 (The Economist Data Team 2014)
predicts 8.6% of world’s population will
live in Mega-cities of 10 million or more
by 2030, growing at about 1% of the
world’s population per decade.
more multi-modal. The appropriate mode, as always will depend on
the trip. But technology will change which modes are appropriate
for which trips. We imagine different scenarios in different places.
For the shortest trips, within and between buildings, on
campuses, and in neighborhoods, walking will remain dominant.13 13 We do not foresee Segways or Pogo
Sticks supplanting feet in most places.Escalators and elevators will remain as alternatives to staircases, but
moving sidewalks are likely to be rare, limited to special
environments like airports. Standard bicycles have stood the test of
time for a century; being relatively cheap and environmentally
efficient, their overall stock may rise for trips in the 1-5 km range;
newer and modified forms of electric bikes will rival more
traditional forms of transport for longer distances.
But the bulk of urban personal transport vehicles using ’everyday
streets’ will likely be comprised of small ultra-light, smart,
battery-based vehicles that would be hired (not privately owned),
both MaaS transport for the fully customized point-to-point trip
and micro-transit for less cost, semi-customized shared rides. Cars
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that drive themselves change how people use such devices.
These combinations will most profoundly affect medium distance
trips, possibly feeding traffic to fixed route systems. Mixing vehicles
of different sizes and desired speeds will always remain a challenge;
mixing with automation raises the stakes. Though in many ways
this is transitional. Humans will eventually be fully removed from
the driving loop, when additional controls can ensure different types
of vehicles mix safely.
These smaller battery powered vehicles – along with walking and
cycling (electric bikes or other) – would seamlessly integrate with
macro-transit: large scale, fixed route, high-capacity public
transport systems. Higher volume mass transport will remain
important, particularly in existing and emerging high density
markets. Today’s largest cities support busways and rail transit, and
those will remain in markets with heavy demand. Between cities,
rail, intercity bus, and airplanes will continue to provide travel
options.
Inside dense cities and even major suburban corridors where the
geometry is favorable, the driverless bus will compete with the
driverless car on price, assuming pricing is fairly representative of
service cost. MaaS transport finds a middle ground here. Flexibility
is aided by designing networks and land use patterns that can be
served by transit as well as MaaS transport, rather than one that is
served exclusively by autonomous vehicles.
Modal options will function, if not seamlessly, with fewer seams
than today. Payment and access would be nearly instantaneous via
smart phones, watches, or biometrics. The overall system will more
closely integrate the digital with physical transport. Software will
intelligently work out solutions in real-time. It will be safer as
evidenced by fewer and less severe crashes. Yet, as the system is
tuned more toward efficiency and away from hyper-safety, it is
likely to be perceived as more frightening (for motorists and
non-motorist users alike).
In contrast, the suburban, exurban, small town, and rural
transportation landscape will look more familiar, with private, but
now autonomous cars, shuttling people about. Traffic lights will be
slowly dimmed. There may be less shuttling as going to work and
going shopping diminish in frequency, but these are slow, almost
imperceptible changes, until one-day we wake up, and realize the
world is different from how it once was.
Cumulatively, auto-mobility will be redeemed from the many
externalities it causes today (death, pollution, noise). Cars will
continue to take more space and require more energy than efficient
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transit, but will increasingly beat poorly conceived transit services.
These are gradual processes. The rapid change in information
technology can inform the direction of changes in transport, but the
pace cannot be replicated. The lifespan of a private car (15-20 years)
far exceeds that of a smart phone (about 3 years). The technology
that people possess lags far behind the technology that is possible.
Information and transport technologies differ in fundamental ways.
Building roads or rails have socio-spatial implications that laying
fiber optic cables or constructing cell phone towers do not.
With the emergence of peak travel and autonomous vehicles just
over the horizon, society needs to think not about adding road
capacity but maintaining what we have and what we need. As with
railroads from the 1920s through the present, rationalization of the
network – strategic reductions or right-sizing – should take priority.
Such a conversation is not occurring.
The mountain analogy implies society cannot climb to the peak
of the next technology in the same market niche (for instance,
serving daily transport needs) until it climbs at least partway down
the first. One can imagine a technological helicopter or zip line, or
leaping off the peak (deprecating or abandoning existing functional
technology, rather than just depreciating it over time) to accelerate
transformation, but such sudden changes are rarely wise and even
less politically acceptable, with entrenched interests having
accumulated power desirous of maintaining (or expanding) the
status quo.
If the future of transport does not involve more information
technology and more automation, we will be both surprised and
disappointed. Its exact shape and character is hard to pin down but
will be rapidly evolving.
In the 1980s, there was a vision of a future of telecommunications
and information that was something like what the Internet came to
be, all the world’s information at your fingertips. But few foresaw
that it would be supported by online advertising. The idea that a
collaboratively-built online encyclopedia would displace Britannica,
and be among the world’s biggest websites, or that an online
bookstore (a bookstore!) would become the world’s largest online
retailer were all unpredicted and unpredictable. So it is with
transport in the early 21st Century.

A
Now Extinct: The Traditional
Transport Engineer
The traditional transport engineer, who designs roads,
highways, and intersections, and times traffic lights,
should view his field as on a long slow decline, much like
the railway engineer (not the train driver) of a century ago, or the
irrigation engineer once people discovered water runs downhill. A
century ago, railway engineers understood how to design and run a
railway far better than people today, because that is what they
focused on, and that is the sector that, almost two centuries ago,
attracted the best and brightest minds of their generation. This
doesn’t mean there won’t be any traditional transport engineers,
just many fewer in the developed countries. Agencies can of course
use the released staff time to design in more detail, to higher
quality, and so on. Or agencies can redirect the efforts of new
engineers to address the resulting problems, to sectors that are
continuing to grow, to new opportunities, to different transport
problems. Future transport engineers can think about how to better
use scarce road space in cities to serve people rather than vehicles.
The profession can move beyond the mindless application of
arbitrary level of service standards that have besot our communities.
In contrast, new professions will emerge. For instance, traffic
programmers will write algorithms control cars interactions with
each other.
Today we talk about traffic engineering, designing infrastructure,
timing traffic signals, identifying where signs and markings go, and
so on to improve the efficiency of moving cars (and ideally people)
through the system (where the network itself is a given). This is
distinct from transport planning, which identifies where
infrastructure should go and what policies should be in place. This
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also differs from highway engineering, which looks at the geometric
design of facilities, ensuring the horizontal and vertical curvature
are safe (for human drivers at a given speed). There are other
related professions as well: urban designer, bridge engineer,
pavement engineer, and so on.
Traffic programming will not be simply (or not simply) modeling
human traffic, or re-arranging infrastructure, but instead will be
designing algorithms to control vehicles in real-time. This field
grows out of computer science, electrical engineering, industrial
and systems engineering, and mechanical engineering, but will
need to fully consider the environment around the vehicle and how
to react to it. The early stages of this already exists, there are
engineers and programmers designing autonomous vehicles. But
they are doing so in a way that is autonomous -- recognizing the
existence of neighboring objects, people, and vehicles, but only
optimizing for itself.
The traffic programmer of the future will design vehicles to do
that but also communicate with neighboring vehicles, and
coordinate with the system at a routing level as well. Effective
connected vehicles will come after effective autonomous vehicles.
With appropriate price signals, we can do things now like
aligning the system optimal interests of the network as a whole
with the user optimal desires of the individual (autonomous or not)
vehicle. Whether pricing can work to provide the right incentives on
the give-and-take of traffic merging and lane changing is less clear.
Drivers today negotiate that through eye contact and the actions
behind the wheels. Finding protocols to do this automatically, and
to negotiate directly between cars in real-time will be the task of the
traffic programmer.
B
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If we are foretelling the end of traffic, we should define what we
mean. Figure D.1 is an illustration of what traffic engineers call the
Fundamental Diagram.
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Flow (q) is the number of people or vehicles past a point per unit
time (usually expressed as vehicles per hour or persons per hour).
Capacity is the maximum flow that can pass a point per unit time.
The capacity depends on the road, the vehicle, and the driver. If
we were all race car drivers, at the same spacing between vehicles,
we could get a lot more vehicles past a point. Alternatively, if we
drove a lot closer together at the same speed, we could also increase
throughput. However there are reasons we don’t do this. We have to
consider human reaction times.
When taking driver’s education, you may have learned the two-
second rule, in good weather follow the driver ahead of you with at
least a two-second headway. If everyone did this, we could get 1800
vehicles per hour per lane past a point.
Recall there are 3600 seconds in an hour, dividing by a 2 seconds
per vehicle gives 1800 vehicles per hour. In fact, limited access
freeways in good weather during peak periods have a much higher
throughput, sometimes observed as high as 2600 vehicles per hour
per lane, though more typically between 2000 and 2200, indicating
people are ignoring the two-second rule, and are following more
closely.
The reason for the 2 second rule is that if the driver ahead of you
slams on the brakes, you have some amount of mental processing,
referred to by engineers as ‘Perception-Reaction Time’, to see the
brake-lights, have your brain tell your foot to move from the
accelerator to the brakes, and push hard yourself.
Density of traffic (k) is the measure of the vehicles per length of
roadway.1 When you are the only car on the road, the density of1 The letter k is used because it comes
from the German word ‘koncentration.’ traffic is low. When there are lots of cars on the road, the density is
high. The density of traffic indicates the Level of Service, which is a
grade that traffic engineers apply to roads, and ranges from A to F.
Just like your report card, from the driver’s point-of-view A is better
than F.
The maximum density, called ‘jam density,’ occurs when vehicles
will line up end to end, and none can move until the car in front
moves. If cars were on average 5 meters long, and literally
‘bumper-to-bumper,’ there could be 200 cars per kilometer per lane.
In practice cars are longer, and they are only figuratively
bumper-to-bumper, so jam density is nearer 125 cars per km per
lane (200 cars per mile per lane). But as the saying goes, ‘Your
Mileage May Vary,’ and this result depends on many factors. At jam
density, traffic does not flow.
The relationship between traffic flow, density, and speed (v) (how
fast those vehicles are going, i.e. distance per hour) measured at a
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point, typically a bottleneck location can be expressed as an equation:
q = kv (B.1)
where: q = flow, k= density , and v=speed.
So why does the ‘Fundamental Diagram’ have the shape it does
(Figure D.1)?
When density on the highway is zero, the flow is also zero because
there are no vehicles on the highway. As density increases, flow must
increase if speed is constant. It turns out, that we can drive the speed
we want to, unaffected by other drivers, at lower traffic densities. So
if there were only 1 car per kilometer, you travel at what is called
‘freeflow speed,’ and if there are 2 cars per kilometer, or 5 cars per
kilometer, you are still largely unaffected by the other cars. However
as density rises, you are eventually slowed by other vehicles.
There is a maximum throughput (capacity), determined by the
minimum following headway. In good conditions, drivers can travel
at freeflow speed up to that point, but then congestion sets in, and
as more cars are added, everyone slows down due to queueing. At
jam density, flow is also zero.
Queueing is a technical term (that is, it is a British term) for
standing in line. Imagine a road has a capacity of 1800 vehicles per
hour (1 vehicle every 2 seconds). Imagine further that 2000 vehicles
arrive in a given hour (and then, no more vehicles arrive). How
many vehicles are left after 1 hour? (Answer: 200).
The line is 200 vehicle long. In this case, it will take another 400
seconds (200 vehicles times 2 seconds per vehicle), or 6 minutes and
40 seconds to discharge the queue. The last vehicle in the queue
arrived at the end of 1 hour, and waited 6 minutes and 40 seconds.
The first vehicle arrived at the beginning of the hour and did not
wait. The average wait for vehicles during that hour was 3 minutes
and 20 seconds. (This is also the wait for the vehicle that arrived at
the half-hour point).
The bottleneck still serves a maximum of 1800 vehicles an hour.
All 2000 vehicles eventually get served. There is however delay, and
the delay is manifested on the road as traffic in a slowly moving
queue of 200 vehicles at its peak.
Ideally the queue is slowly moving. In practice there are many
stops and starts because humans are driving, and humans are
imperfectly attentive (if not perfectly inattentive), and will either not
drive at a constant velocity, or will brake too sharply when the car
in front brakes, or not brake at all and cause a crash, or so on.
Further
Any transport facility will have the properties of speed, flow, and
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density. However the maximum speed, the maximum flow, or the
maximum density may change with the technology being used.
So when we say there will be an ‘end of traffic,’ we mean it not in
a literal way that there will be no cars, which collectively comprise
traffic (just as datum is the singular of data, car is the singular of
traffic). Rather we mean it more colloquially, that the presence of
other cars will either diminish (there will be less traffic) and that the
effect of other cars will diminish (because capacity will be higher).
Our perception of traffic will decline. It will cease to be a problem.
C
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(Used with permission).
Combined traffic projections from state and regional transport
agencies (the colored lines) have been wildly off the mark (the black
line shows real traffic levels) for more than a decade.
When David was a naive young modeler, developing the Travel/2
regional travel demand model for the Montgomery County Planning
Department, such models took up to 24 hours to run in full form.
Talking with modelers today, it seems models still take on the order
of 24 hours to run. Why?
We posit "Induced Complexity." When we build a road, we
induce demand, travelers who were previously priced off the road
due to congestion or extra travel time now switch times of day,
routes, modes, and destinations to take advantage of the capacity,
and new development is pursued. Similarly, when we get a bigger
computer, we can either use it to run the same models faster, or to
run more complicated models. It seems the profession leans to the
latter. The complexity is in terms of the number of Transport
222 the end of traffic and the future of access
Analysis Zones, or in the number of times slices in a day, or in the
number of model components that are considered, or the degree of
precision required in equilibrium.
This induced complexity is real, and like induced demand is not
necessarily a bad thing (if the complexity improves accuracy, it is a
good thing), but it is a thing we should all be cognizant of.
Yet, forecasting of this nature is notoriously bad.1 Figure C.11 (Parthasarathi and Levinson 2010).
shows the error in the aggregate.
There are many reasons for this, but one is structural, failure to
understand the life-cycle dynamics. The reason for overshoot and
undershoot can be understood by visiting the S-curve. Assumed
forecasts are made by extrapolating previous results, which is how
many businesses and investors and government agencies operate, as
shown in Figure C.2. In early years (Birthing and Early Growth) the
rate of growth each year is greater than the previous year. Someone
extrapolating from history will undershoot actual growth. But in
late growth and maturity, growth is slower than the previous year.
Someone extrapolating from history will overshoot actual growth.
Extrapolation models are common in transport. These are used
for statewide modeling in many places. Such forecasting methods
(assume growth continues at a fixed percent) is embedded in some
textbooks, especially for instance, in pavement design.
Urban transport planning models are better in some ways, in that
they include multiple factors. Unfortunately, these models are based
on rates at a single point in time. Thus they assume the
mathematical function that describes traveler’s behavior is fixed,
only exogenous (input) factors such as demographics, land use,
networks, and policies are allowed to vary. Even when multiple
years of data are available, such models are typically only estimated
on the most recent survey, rather than on trends or changes. The
underlying behavior is not permitted to change, only what it
responds to. Yet we now have evidence that some underlying
preferences do change over time. It is not simply a matter of getting
the demographics or incomes correct. For instance from the 1960s to
the 1990s female labor force participation increased. Thus the
number of work trips and non-work trips (substituting out-of-home
for in-home production) both increased in that period. But that
increase has played itself out. Thus the increases it was associated
with have peaked. This reflected changing preferences. While
hindsight is 20/20, we don’t know if underlying preferences can be
modeled accurately prospectively (we are doubtful), but we do
know failure to account for them will lead to model inaccuracies.
What changes are going on now that are not considered in travel
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demand forecasting? A brief (and very incomplete) list below:
• Vehicle technology shifts (driverless vehicles)
• Preference shifts (and economic scarcity) among young travelers
• Changing driver licensing requirements
• Vehicle ownership vs on-demand vehicle rental (car "sharing")
• Telecommunication increasing substitution for work, shop, and
social travel
• Telecommunication complementarity for work, shop, and social
travel
None of this is easy to model, certainly not within the existing
framework of urban transport planning models, even more modern
activity-based models. In many ways it is easier to do macroscopic
than microscopic forecasting. The question is, if some kinds of
forecasting are impossible (we can forecast traffic pretty accurately
two weeks from today, but not the first Tuesday of 2044), why do we
do it? Is there a human-need to fill the void of future uncertainty
with authoritative assertions?
Speculating about the future is useful, it opens up pathways.
Developing scenarios is useful, it challenges assumptions. Thinking
about the lifecycle process and markets helps frame the possible,
the plausible, and the likely. Studying history (and past forecasting
methods and errors) provides humility and insight. Visions (and
alternative competing visions) help establish what we want.
Developing a communal hallucination can organize individual
activities to become the ideal (or nightmarish) self-fulfilling or
self-negating forecast. Planning needs more methods for thinking
about the future than single point forecasting.
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Figure C.2: System deployment
vs. extrapolative forecasts.
S-Curve and the Danger
of Extrapolation Source:
Figure 29.2 from (Garrison
and Levinson 2014).
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Access, What Is It?
Figure D.1: Figure D.1 An
Accessibility Heat Map of
Tampa Bay region. Red indicates
higher accessibility. Source:
Accessibility Observatory.
Access – the north star of transport analyses – typically has
measured the ease of reaching things (e.g., number of jobs which
can be reached within 30 minutes travel time by car at 7:00 am on a
typical weekday). One can change the travel time, the mode, the
time-of-day, or the destination and develop another measure. The
travel time could be converted to a monetary cost (or monetary
costs could be added to the time) to account for tolls, or paid
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parking, or transit fares and the like. These variants work
reasonably well for today’s world.1 For tomorrow’s world, not so1 David led an organization called
the Accessibility Observatory, which
measures these things across the US, and
Kevin has worked on similar projects).
much.
For instance, typical accessibility measures look at the shortest
travel time path. The shortest travel time path by car assumes you
store a vehicle where you live (on your property) and park it at your
destination (on its property). With autonomous vehicles picking you
(and only you) up, the start and end points might be the same for
you. If you share a ride, there will be deviations adding to your travel
time (but presumably reducing your out-of-pocket cost). But because
these are dynamic, there will be variation from day-to-day that is
greater than today’s variation due to traffic or transit schedules. If
you walk to a car rental (as today’s car2go operates) (rather than
being picked up taxi-like) that adds an additional access cost. Paying
per trip also adds an out-of-pocket cost that today is mostly ignored.
Or it might be a combination of time and money. Instead of how
many places can you reach in 30 minutes, how many places you can
reach in $10 out-of-pocket costs by mode might be the relevant factor.
E
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Many professionals in the transport community consider surface
transport to be underfunded – there are unmet ‘needs.’ National
reports from industry groups urge more resources. Local reports are
similar. ‘Needs’ is one of those words with which economists have
difficulty; in transport circles it has come to mean things for which
the benefits outweigh the costs (subject to the usual debates about
what are the benefits and costs of any given project).
The claim that the US is spending too little on transport has several
arguments in its favor.
• On the side of ‘too little’ are some economists, following on the
heels of David Aschauer’s1 work about the infrastructure 1 (Aschauer 1989).
investment shortfall. They claim, based on selected
macro-economic analysis, that infrastructure investments drive
economic growth.
• There are arguments about economies of agglomeration,2 2 (Melo et al. 2017).
which infrastructure may enhance, operating through
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accessibility. To the extent accessibility increases, agglomeration
increases too. This is likely to be non-linear, but may be
increasing or decreasing in a particular range.
• There is also the stimulus argument, from macro-economists
looking for useful jobs projects, to employ the unemployed.
• Having some redundancy in the network is also valuable, as it
makes the network more robust to failures (such as terrorist acts,
bridge collapses, or superstorms).
• Stronger roads and bridges would enable buses and trucks to
make more efficient use of labor by carrying more weight.
Certainly the quality of services could always be improved,
pavement repaired, bridges strengthened, bus stops made more
useful, buses modernized, etc. Money enables any of these things
and therefore, the solution often comes back to finding more money.
Yet the sector has been steadily getting less rather than more money
(in real terms and as share of GDP) at the federal level and in most
states. So if costs are low, and there are clearly needs, why can’t it
close the gap?
The Saturation Hypothesis. The industry is saturated. One
concern is that maybe the amount of resources to do the work is
limited, so we can’t physically get more infrastructure built. If there
were a limited number of contractors, and they were all fully
employed, more money would simply mean higher prices and a
reshuffling of priorities not new building.
There are steep barriers to entry. It is difficult to start a road
construction company and get contracts from the regional provider.
Assuming firms are fully employed now, all they would do is
demand higher rates, defer something else, to do the new thing.
Contractors claim they are not fully deployed, and certainly
could add some employees and acquire additional materials. How
high is capacity utilization in the road construction? How close to
fully employed is the sector? Figure E.1 shows that from a 2006
peak, the sector was once 20 percent larger in employment. Clearly
a lot of this is due to the effects of the recession on local government
spending, but recovery is very, very weak. Evidence is the
road-building sector is far from fully utilized, there is a lot of slack
to handle more road building. More expenditures in road building
should not significantly drive up prices at this time.
It is hard to conclude that even 2006 was “full utilization,” there
is always elasticity (if wages are high enough, some people will put
off retirement, others will be attracted to work in the sector). Some
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equipment can be transferred from building other types of projects
to road construction. New equipment can be ordered, equipment
and labor can be moved from other states. The real world is not
black and white, but as capacity utilization increases, prices increase
faster than output. However in the absence of full utilization, prices
should be relatively cheap. If firms don’t need to go to extra effort
to hire workers and machinery, (i.e. they would otherwise be idle or
working at marginal tasks), prices will be stable.
The analogy here is a bottleneck. At well below capacity, travelers
can proceed at free flow speed. Only as capacity approaches does
delay (higher prices) result.
The Cynicism Hypothesis. While there are needs, money won’t
go to needs. Political rent-seeking will divert funds from what
matters. Cynical as this may be, there is some evidence for this. The
construction industry itself is indifferent to what is built, so will
happily support any spending. It is the users and taxpayers who
suffer from the misallocation of resources, not only in the
opportunity cost of what isn’t done, but the future maintenance
burden of supporting what was done. Spending money may solve
today’s macro-economic unemployment problem (though the
stimulative effects of road building in the modern capital intensive
era are weak), but spending it poorly creates future problems. We
have no evidence that giving more money will result in it being
spent on the things the public cares about.
Infrastructure is Good Enough Hypothesis. People don’t
perceive the same needs as industry does. Most roads and bridges
are in good enough shape. Most people drive on those
good-enough roads. The perception is limited to what people
actually travel on. As Charles Lane says: “So how come my family
and I traveled thousands of miles on both the east and west coasts
last summer without actually seeing any crumbling roads or
airports?” Even Lane acknowledges “The United States probably
needs more infrastructure spending. It also needs a serious debate
about how much cash to invest and how to invest it. Alarmism
promotes the former, not the latter.”
Infrastructure is Great Hypothesis. The industry is wrong.
There is in fact no need. Not only do we not need new roads, the
existing roads are fine too. There is already enough money flowing
through the system to keep it in a state of good-enough repair. So
what if a bridge collapses every few years, that is nothing compared
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to other social problems, like the 35,000 people killed each year in
car crashes. Conditions are getting better.
While existing roads are in fine condition, they are congested, so
we need more new and wider roads. The purported need for
maintenance is just a distraction put forth by the greens to avoid
new construction.
People are Selfish Hypothesis. People see the problem but
don’t care about the social outcomes. They would rather have the
large screen TV than pay for the better road. Surveys about the
acceptability of gas taxes repeatedly find their unpopularity.
The Road-Hater Hypothesis. There is a need, but some people
(how many?) don’t like roads. They believe there are too many roads
as it is. Deterioration is a form of traffic calming, so encourage it.
The Futurist Hypothesis. There may have once been a need,
but as we adopt autonomous vehicles, our efficiency (utilization of
pavement) will increase, so we will soon need fewer lanes. Since
infrastructure lasts a long time, we can get a head-start on the future
reduction by not building any more now. While by this point in the
book, if you are still with us, you might believe this to be true, it is
highly unlikely this is the reason roads are not actually being funded.
If society spent more money on roads, what would it be spent on?
The claim that more money won’t actually go to needs has merit.
There is also a perception bias problem. There is only a problem if
you see it every day. Lots of roads are in good enough condition,
and bridges don’t fall down with alarming frequency. However it is
clear anyone who thinks we should be proud of the condition of our
infrastructure did not travel on the streets in a northern town.
Whether our communities have too much or too little
infrastructure depends on how the infrastructure is distributed and
organized. There is not simply a “lump of roads,” but rather roads
of particular designs, connecting particular origins and destinations,
with a length, width, and depth. While the previous section
presented the arguments the industry has put forth on why there
are not enough roads, this section instead makes the argument we
have too many.
We cannot (choose not to) afford to maintain the infrastructure
we have. Also worth noting is the lack of economic development
impacts3 of most new investments. Learning from history, if3 (Iacono and Levinson 2013).
demand has peaked, supply is probably also at the peak of what we
can economically support. This was true of rail in the 1920s, at
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which point the mileage of rail networks (both intercity and urban)
declined. This may now be true of roads, with peak travel
occurring, as we see rural areas continuing to depopulate, some
places considering gravelization,4 some urban freeways being taken 4 (Albert Lea Tribune Editorial Board
2011; Batheja 2013; Louwagie 2011).down and not replaced.5
5 (Reconnecting America 2013).It is clear we under-price what we have, so naturally that leads to
more consumption than if we properly priced things. It is also clear
the roads sector (and some other transport sectors) are in the mature
phase of development, and roads have at best diminishing returns
on investment, if not zero or negative returns. It is also clear that
most roads are mostly empty most of the time, and that we build
many roads far wider than are needed, so wide they can be used to
store cars 24 hours a day.
We would conclude, that in general, we do have too much road
infrastructure.
In the absence of a policy change, the edifice complex,
infrastructure infatuation edition, will continue to suck away
considerable funds that could be better spent on other things.
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